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ABSTRACT 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
THREE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
IN MALAYSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL-PALESTINE 
 
MAY 2019 
 
HEMA PREYA SELVANATHAN, B.A.,  
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN EAU CLAIRE 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Brian Lickel 
 
Collective action often aims to elicit a response from the broader public. This dissertation 
presents three distinct but interrelated investigations on the societal outcomes of collective 
action among both high- and low- status groups in society, grounded in a range of social 
and political contexts. Chapter 1 provides an integrative literature review that identifies the 
motivation for the present research. Chapter 2 examined whether and how collective action 
organized by a social movement can shape the public’s subsequent attitudes toward the 
movement and its goals, in the context of the electoral reform Bersih movement in 
Malaysia. Chapter 3 investigated when and how public reactions to movements for social 
change can promote the rise of reactionary counter-movements to defend the status quo in 
the context of race relations in Malaysia and the United States. Chapter 4 examines whether 
distinct modes of ingroup identification and preferences for justice can shape public 
support for normative and non-normative collective action in the context of the ongoing 
Israel-Palestinian conflict. Chapter 5 concludes by discussing the overarching theoretical 
contributions and applied implications of studying the societal impact of social movements, 
as well as considering the limitations of the present research and future directions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In many regions around the world, the status quo is characterized by social 
injustices and inequalities. Status and power differences between various social groups – 
whether along gender, racial, ethnic or socio-economic divides – have been 
institutionalized within systems that govern society, including its laws, practices, and 
norms. As a result, there is often a hierarchy among social groups, with some groups 
holding greater status and power compared to others. Various theories on intergroup 
relations have sought to explain how group-based hierarchies are created, maintained, and 
defended (just world theory; Lerner & Miller, 1987; system justification theory; Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; social dominance theory; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994). This work helps explain why oppressive group-based structures continue to persist 
in many societies.  
However, intergroup hierarchies are far from static. Throughout history, people 
have collectively organized to challenge oppression by fighting for equal rights, seeking 
justice over past mistreatment, and advancing the interests of their group. Dramatic 
changes to the status quo have been attributed to sustained collective actions organized by 
social movements. Collective action refers to behaviors that are undertaken by individuals 
to improve the conditions of a group. For example, the independence movement in India 
led to the liberation from British colonial rule, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa 
eventually put an end to policies of racial segregation, and the women’s suffrage movement 
in the United States pushed for a constitutional amendment to guarantee women’s right to 
vote. More recently, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights movement 
 
 
 2 
have successfully campaigned for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage in over 25 
countries. As these examples illustrate, people across different regions of the world have 
undertaken collective action to push for social change. 
So how do social movements create social change when broader society tends to 
support the status quo? One critical pathway towards long-term social change is by 
organizing collective action as a tool of social influence. Social movement scholars have 
long documented how collective action is organized to elicit a response from a targeted 
audience, including the general public (Benford & Hunt, 1992; Giugni, 1998; Hornsey et 
al., 2006). As such, collective action has been referred to as “contentious performances” 
because they make claims that disrupt everyday life and the status quo (Tilly, 2008). To do 
so, movements use a wide repertoire of tactics, such as strikes, boycotts, parades, sit-ins, 
and walk-outs (Ennis, 1987; Sharp, 1973; Tarrow, 2011). By extension, collective action 
has the potential to promote new ways of thinking, garner support for reformative policies, 
and even provoke criticism or retaliation among the broader public (Amenta, Caren, 
Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). If we view 
collective action as a means to challenge unjust and unequal hierarchies in a society, then 
it becomes important to understand why, when, and how the general public might respond 
to collective action that occurs in their social environment.  
The goal of this dissertation is to present three investigations into public attitudes 
toward collective action in different social and political contexts. Across three manuscripts, 
I will examine distinct but interrelated phenomenon that are part of the process of social 
change. First, building on the idea that collective action is a “performance” aimed to 
produce a public reaction, the first manuscript will investigate how immediate public 
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responses to collective action may lead to polarized public attitudes in the context of the 
Bersih electoral reform movement in Malaysia. While movements may raise public support 
for its cause by organizing collective action, such actions may also provoke backlash in the 
form of counter-mobilization against social change. To study this dynamic, the second 
manuscript will examine how and when a sense of collective psychological ownership over 
one’s country may promote threat in response to collective action for social change (which 
can subsequently foster support for reactionary counter-movements) in the context of race-
relations in Malaysia and the United States. Given that both low-status and high-status 
groups may support collective action to benefit their own group, in the long run, opposing 
actions can intensify intergroup conflict and lead to collective action that ranges from 
normative actions that are largely peaceful and legal, to nonnormative actions that are 
largely violent and illegal. To examine why people come to support collective action that 
is normative versus non-normative, the third manuscript will focus on the ways in which 
people identify with and seek justice for their ingroup, from the perspective of both Arab 
and Jewish Israelis in the context of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taken 
together, all three investigations aim to highlight the role of public attitudes toward 
collective action as a way of understanding the societal impact of social movements. In 
what follows, I first review extant research on collective action. Building on this past work, 
I identify key gaps in the literature that motivates the present research. I then provide an 
overview of the three investigations included in this dissertation.  
The Social Psychology of Collective Action 
Research on collective action and social change has proliferated across many fields 
in the social sciences, including sociology, political science, communications, economics, 
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history, and psychology. The multidisciplinary nature of this area of research means that 
there are different theoretical frameworks and perspectives that guide collective action 
research in each field. Within psychology, the level of analysis focuses on the attitudes and 
behaviors of individuals. In particular, this research has traditionally focused on why 
people are motivated to engage in collective action. Extensive work has documented the 
experiences and attitudes that lead people to undertake collective action, such as 
perceptions of injustice, a shared social identity, feelings of anger, and perceptions of 
efficacy to achieve group goals (for reviews, see Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Wright, 2003; 
van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). While this work has been important in 
demonstrating the underlying motivators of collective action, it says little about the impact 
of collective action in a society (for a review, see Louis, 2009). Below, I review three key 
emergent areas of research that focus on the outcomes of collective action.  
The Impact of Collective Action on People’s Attitudes 
Collective action can be conceptualized as a cyclical and dynamic process, in that 
undertaking collective action can have psychological outcomes that serve to motivate 
future actions (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Based on this view, the 
psychological predictors and outcomes of collective action are reciprocal: engaging in 
collective action can lead to the reappraisal of injustice and serve to enhance group 
identification, emotions, and beliefs that maintain subsequent collective action. This work 
has shown that participation in collective action promotes greater anger and contempt 
(Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011) as well as greater positive emotions and efficacy beliefs 
(Drury & Reicher, 2005) which are important for the maintenance of protest behavior. Even 
when collective action does not have its desired outcome, protesters can reappraise failure 
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in ways that fuel perceptions of injustice, anger, and empowerment to motivate continued 
action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Tausch & Becker, 2013). Collective action also allows 
people to act on behalf of their group, which can build politicized group identities that are 
defined in opposition to dominant groups or systems of injustice (Becker, Tausch, Spears, 
& Christ, 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Further, participants of collective action can 
derive well-being and health benefits from their activism (for a review, see Vestergren, 
Drury, & Chiriac, 2016). Taken together, this line of work has revealed how collective 
action can powerfully shape psychological outcomes for those who participate in collective 
action.  
However, if the ultimate goal of collective action is to create social change, it is 
important to examine the attitudes of the broader public who may not directly be involved 
in collective action but are instead the targeted audiences of collective action. Many models 
of social change have argued that the success of social movements critically relies on its 
ability to raise broader public support for its goals (e.g., Mugny & Perez, 1991; Subašić, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). By extension, research on 
public attitudes toward collective action thus far has used vignette-based experiments to 
identify the characteristics of collective action that elicit the most public support. This 
research has shown that people are more supportive of peaceful compared to violent actions 
because they find it more effective and legitimate (Thomas & Louis, 2014), as well as more 
moral (Orazani & Leidner, 2018). Relatedly, collective action that utilizes extreme tactics 
such as unlawful activities or inflammatory speech, reduce public support for the 
movement (Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017). In fact, people tend to report having 
negative stereotypes of activists (viewing them as deviant, eccentric, and radical) which 
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reduces their willingness to adopt the social change behaviors that activists advocate 
(Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). Thus, social movements face the 
crucial challenge of organizing collective action in ways that can gain public support.  
While past work has shown that collective action and its actors can vary in how 
effective they are in gaining public support, we know little about how members of the 
public react to ongoing collective action that occurs in their immediate social environment. 
Capturing societal response to collective action as it occurs in the real-world is important 
to test whether and how collective action can directly shape people’s social change 
attitudes. Thus, extending the primary focus of prior research on how collective action 
influences collective actors, activists, and protesters themselves, and building on the 
research that has identified the conditions under which collective action will be effective, 
I instead focus on whether the occurrence of collective action can elicit a reaction from the 
broader public and subsequently influence their social change attitudes. Chapter 2 will 
present a manuscript examining the public’s psychological reactions to a real-world 
collective action, and how their reactions can shape support for the movement and its goals.  
The Rise of Counter-Mobilization Against Social Change 
While staging collective action has the potential to raise public support for a 
movement, the same collective action may also provoke backlash in the form of counter-
movements aiming to maintain the status quo. Social movement scholars have argued that 
when a movement shows signs of success – whether by raising support for their demands 
or influencing public policy, counter-movements that resist social change are likely to 
emerge (Inclán, 2012; Mottl, 1980; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Counter-movements 
tend to use rhetoric and tactics that are in opposition to movements for social change and 
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their activities are typically fueled by social and political advances (Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996). For example, in response to desegregation efforts in the 1960s – which signaled the 
success of the African American civil rights movement – segregationist private academies 
grew dramatically throughout Southern United States, which reflected the White 
community’s resistance to school desegregation (Andrews, 2002). To take another 
example, in response to climate change and environmental movements, conservative think 
tanks have made various counter-claims that attempt to delegitimize scientific evidence 
that harmful global environmental change is occurring (McCright & Dunlap, 2000).  
Scholars have applied several different theories to explain public support for 
different forms of social movements (Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 2016; Milesi & 
Alberici, 2016; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2018). First, based on intergroup 
threat theory, which posits that competition over scarce resources (realistic threat) and 
incompatibility of values or beliefs (symbolic threat) can promote negative intergroup 
attitudes, Cakal and colleagues (2016) showed that in the context of the asymmetrical 
conflict between Turks and Kurds, perceiving threat from the outgroup promoted greater 
collective action intentions to defend ingroup interests – which for Turks (the high-status 
group) meant upholding the status quo and for Kurds (the low-status group) meant 
challenging the status quo. Second, drawing on moral foundations theory, which argues 
that people have basic moral intuitions that shape their moral judgement, Milesi and 
Alberici (2016) found that care and fairness foundations that aim to protect individuals’ 
well-being were linked to support for liberal movements (e.g., intergroup equality), 
whereas foundations of loyalty that aim to build cohesive groups were linked to support 
for conservative movements focused on conformity (e.g., protection of traditional values). 
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Third, extrapolating from system justification theory, which states that people are 
motivated to defend and uphold even illegitimate systems, Osborne and colleagues (2018) 
found that system justification beliefs were related to lower support for movements that 
challenge the status quo but more support for movements that defend the status quo. Taken 
together, this past work has shown that support for movements that challenge versus defend 
the status quo may stem from different underlying motivations.  
Although there seems to be a link between the occurrence of movements for social 
change and the rise of counter-movements, we know relatively little about the 
psychological underpinnings of the dynamic between progressive and reactionary social 
movements, for example, how the occurrence of one movement may promote support for 
an opposing movement. Notably, this aforementioned research has identified separate 
predictors for movements for social change and reactionary counter-movements. Building 
on this past work, I propose that the occurrence of collective action for social change may 
elicit a public response that in turn can promote support for collective action against social 
change. As a first step towards investigating this proposed link, I draw on research about 
collective psychological ownership over one’s country, which suggests that advantaged 
group members may defend their group’s right to determine the course of the country 
because they were the first to establish or inhabit the land (Brylka, Mähönen, Jasinskaja-
Lahti, 2015; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015; 
for a review, see Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). I propose that such ownership beliefs 
may promote the experience of threat in response to protests for social change, which can 
trigger support for reactionary counter-protests. Testing this process, Chapter 3 will present 
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a manuscript examining when and why public reactions to movements for social change 
may promote support for reactionary counter-movements.  
Public Support for Different Forms of Collective Action  
to Advance Ingroup Interests 
Intergroup conflict between low-status and high-status groups can intensify when 
opposing social movements continue to occur. In fact, in the context of hostile, protracted 
conflicts, both groups may come to support various forms of actions to advance the 
interests of their ingroup. A critical feature of intractable conflicts is that both sides view 
the conflict as irreconcilable and engage in efforts that perpetuate its continuation, thereby 
developing into a vicious cycle of violence (Bar-Tal, 2007). While research on intergroup 
conflict has typically examined public support for conflict resolution and reconciliation 
policies and efforts, it has generally overlooked public support for collective action. 
Research on collective action on the other hand, has traditionally focused on actions that 
occur in democratic and low-risk contexts. This work has therefore often neglected the 
collective actions organized in non-democratic or authoritarian contexts in which these 
actions carry considerably greater risks (for a similar argument, see Ayanian & Tausch, 
2016). The generalizability and applicability of collective action research is further limited 
by its extensive focus on examining predictors of normative forms of collective action, 
such as peaceful protests, sit-ins, and marches, which are legally protected and even 
expected in healthy democracies (Thomas & Louis, 2013). 
We know relatively less about the predictors of non-normative forms of collective 
action, such as illegal or violent protests, destruction of public property, and terrorist 
attacks targeting civilians, which may be more commonplace in regions that face ongoing 
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intergroup conflict, violence and war. Aiming to fill this gap, there have been recent 
investigations into the precursors of non-normative collective action. This work has found 
that non-normative collective action is motivated by distinct group-based emotions and 
efficacy perceptions compared to normative collective action (for a review, see Becker & 
Tausch, 2015). In particular, feeling emotions of contempt (rather than anger), as well as 
perceiving a low sense of group-based efficacy, are strong motivators of non-normative 
collective action (Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016; Tausch et al., 
2011; Zaal, Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). Further, greater beliefs in the efficacy 
of violent means (rather than peaceful means) to achieve group goals can motivate non-
normative collective action, thereby leading to a “nothing to lose” mentality (Saab, Spears, 
Tausch, & Sasse, 2016). 
While prior work has shown that there are distinct group-based emotions and 
efficacy pathways to normative and non-normative collective action (Becker & Tausch, 
2015), group identification and justice concerns have largely been examined as 
unidimensional constructs. However, research from the social identity perspective have 
shown that the content and meaning of group identities can motivate divergent group-based 
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Leach et al., 2008; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Roccas, 
Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). Further, work on intragroup and intergroup 
conflict has shown that in response to injustice, there are different types of justice demands 
that can shape the outcomes of conflict (e.g., Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013; Wenzel, 
Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). Thus, integrating both these literatures, I propose that 
modes of ingroup identification and notions of justice may provide distinct pathways to 
public support for normative and non-normative collective action. Chapter 4 will present a 
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manuscript examining this question in the context of an ongoing protracted intergroup 
conflict.  
Overview of Dissertation Content 
This dissertation presents three investigations on collective action that aim to 
address the following questions: 
1. How does the occurrence of collective action organized by social movements for 
social change elicit reactions from the public audience and influence their 
subsequent attitudes toward the movement and its goals? 
2. When and how does support for reactionary counter-movements aiming to defend 
the status quo arise in response to movements pushing for social change? 
3. What promotes support for normative and non-normative forms of collective action 
among high- and low- status groups involved in a protracted intergroup conflict? 
While each investigation addresses a unique research question, they all share the common 
goal of extending our understanding of public attitudes toward collective action by using 
theoretically-driven and ecologically-valid approaches across different socio-political 
contexts. Between each chapter, a bridge is provided to synthesize the findings of the 
preceding manuscript, as well as consider theoretical and practical implications as a 
transition into the next manuscript. 
In Chapter 2, I present a manuscript on how psychological responses to a real-world 
collective action organized by a social movement can promote changes in public attitudes 
toward the movement and support for social change. In the context of the Bersih electoral 
reform movement in Malaysia, a two-wave longitudinal survey conducted before and 
immediately after a mass protest organized by the movement found that greater 
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empowerment in response to the protests promoted more subsequent public support for the 
movement and its goal for social change, whereas greater threat in response to the protests 
promoted less subsequent support for the movement and its goals. This work suggests that 
empowerment and threat responses to collective action can influence public opinion in 
divergent ways. This manuscript was published in the European Journal of Social 
Psychology in 2018 and will be reproduced in this dissertation. In addition to the published 
manuscript, I present an addendum with additional analyses examining whether race (i.e., 
belonging to a racial majority or minority group) moderates public responses to collective 
action. A bridge from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 will consider the downstream implications of 
public reactions to collective action for social change, particularly focusing on advantaged 
group members who may be motivated to defend the status quo. I also discuss recent 
research that has emerged after the publication of this manuscript which has examined 
public responses to collective action (e.g., Saguy & Szekeres, 2018) 
In Chapter 3, I present a manuscript on how reactions to movements for social 
change can promote the rise of reactionary counter-movements to defend the status quo. In 
particular, I focus on the role of collective psychological ownership in promoting threat in 
response to collective action for social change, and subsequently support for reactionary 
counter-movements. This research was conducted in two different socio-political contexts 
in which advantaged group members derive collective psychological ownership over their 
country in unique ways, and therefore extends prior theorizing on the ways in which 
ownership beliefs develop and have consequences for intergroup relations (Verkuyten & 
Martinovic, 2017). In particular, in Malaysia, the Malay majority group can claim native 
ownership because they were the first to inhabit the land, whereas in the United States, the 
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White majority group can claim founder ownership because they were the first to establish 
the country along with a governing body. Across one longitudinal study in Malaysia, and 
one pilot as well as two correlational studies in the United States, this research revealed 
that advantaged group members’ greater psychological ownership over their country 
predicted more threat in response to protests for social change (e.g., electoral reform, racial 
justice), which in turn promoted support for counter-movements (e.g., pro-government, 
nationalistic). This manuscript is in invited revision at the British Journal of Social 
Psychology. In addition to reproducing the manuscript in the dissertation, I present an 
addendum with additional analyses considering the role of another closely related 
legitimizing myth – meritocracy beliefs – in shaping reactions to movements for social 
change. Next, a bridge from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 discusses how the collective actions 
examined so far are largely normative in nature, and subsequently argues for the 
importance of studying different forms of collective actions that may arise in hostile 
intergroup conflicts.  
In Chapter 4, I present a manuscript that examines how modes of ingroup 
identification (glorification and attachment) and preferences for justice (retributive and 
restorative justice) can shape public support for normative and non-normative collective 
action among Arab and Jewish Israelis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
This conflict is one of the longest-running conflicts of our time, which began with the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine when Israel was established in 1948 (Bar-Tal, 2007). Today, 
Arabs and Jewish Israelis continue to undertake various forms of collective action – with 
Palestinian Arabs aiming to reclaim their homeland, and Jewish Israelis aiming to defend 
their right to a Jewish state. Against this background, two correlational studies and one 
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experimental study revealed that glorifying one’s ingroup promotes support for retributive 
justice, which in turn predicts support for non-normative collective action, whereas being 
strongly attached to one’s group promotes support for restorative justice, which in turn 
predicts support for normative collective action. These findings extend prior theorizing on 
collective action by viewing ingroup identification and justice as multidimensional rather 
than unidimensional constructs. Moving beyond the focus of prior research on collective 
action that occurs in largely democratic contexts and studying collective action from the 
perspective of one side engaged in a power struggle, this research examines collective 
action from both sides of an ongoing hostile intergroup conflict. This manuscript is 
currently under review at the Journal of Conflict Resolution and is reproduced in this 
dissertation. In addition, an addendum with additional analyses considers the role of 
political orientation in shaping conflict attitudes, and how ingroup glorification and 
attachment may be related to one’s political orientation.  
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes and integrates findings from each manuscript and 
discuss the overarching theoretical and practical implications of this work. Specifically, I 
consider how the manuscripts contribute to our understanding of the societal impact of 
social movements, in terms of its immediate and direct impact on public attitudes, as well 
as its broader and long-term connection to reactionary counter-movements. I also discuss 
how studying a range of social and political contexts allow us to identify the role of 
intergroup hierarchies and power relations in shaping collective action attitudes in different 
societies. In concluding, I consider the limitations of the current research and provide 
directions for future research on societal impact of collective action, in terms of its 
methodology, theorizing, and real-world applications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO MASS PROTESTS 
From India’s independence from British colonizers to the end of apartheid in South 
Africa, history has taught us that sustained social movements can create social change. It 
is widely argued that creating such social change is closely tied to garnering continued 
support from the broader public (Moscovici, 1980; Passini & Morselli, 2013; Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner; 2008). Yet, while extensive social 
psychological research has focused on people’s motivations to engage in collective efforts 
for social change (i.e., joining movements as active members; see Haslam & Reicher, 2012; 
Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), little 
psychological research has examined the external consequences of social movements, 
specifically how people outside the movement might respond to collective action (see 
Louis, 2009 for a discussion). Extant psychological research on the outcomes of collective 
action has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of those who participate in 
collective action (e.g., Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2005), 
therefore leaving the psychological impact of collective action on broader society largely 
unknown. 
 Understanding how collective action can influence public attitudes is important for 
several reasons. For one, it is hardly disputed that garnering mass support is one of the 
goals of social movements to ensure its continuity and success (e.g., Oegema & 
Klandermans, 1994; Subašić et al., 2008). Scholars have further noted that the ability for 
protests to change public policy may critically rely upon whether protests shape public 
opinion (e.g., Burstein & Linton, 2002; Soule & Olzak, 2004). The strategies that social 
 
 
 16 
movements use to impact social attitudes has also been widely documented (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Tarrow, 2011; Vinthagen, 2015), and a key 
method to engage the public is by organizing collective action, such as mass street protests, 
whereby the action itself is a tool for public influence (Berkowitz, 1970; Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, & Benford, 1986). Thus, collective action often occurs in public avenues and are 
designed to be experienced by an audience (Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam, 1983; 
McCarthy & McPhail, 2006), to the extent that social movement scholars have likened 
protests to performances (Benford & Hunt, 1992). Various civil rights organizations also 
state that any legal boundaries around the right to protest must not interfere with protesters’ 
ability to be “within the sight and sound” of its intended audience (American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2010; Kiai, 2014). 
 Anecdotal evidence does seem to show that collective action can trigger a range of 
reactions from the public. News media reports have described how protests can elicit 
excitement, as when drivers on the street honk to show their support (Montero, 2017), but 
also how protests that erupt in violence can be intimidating (Flaccus & Baumann, 2017). 
Additionally, the growing use of social media for activism allows the general public to 
indirectly experience protests by receiving updates about protest actions and by sharing 
their own personal commentary in reaction to these actions (e.g., Penney & Dadas, 2014; 
Smith, Men, & Al-Sinan, 2015). Such media narratives suggest that societal members are 
psychologically engaged with collective action, even if they are not active participants in 
the protests. Yet, there remains limited empirical research examining the psychological 
impact of collective action on the public audience (Giugni, 1998; Louis, 2009). 
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 The present research aims to investigate whether collective action can directly 
shape the movement and social change attitudes of broader society through the 
psychological reactions that the collective action creates. To address this question, it was 
important to investigate the attitudes of people who were directly targeted by large-scale 
collective action in real-time. Given that we aimed to capture people’s reactions as they 
unfold naturally in the real-world, it was also important to situate our research around large-
scale protests that would be gripping to the broader public, whereby we can expect that 
essentially all members of society could have a psychological response to the protests. 
Thus, the current research was designed around mass street protests that were organized by 
Bersih, a major social movement in Malaysia that is demanding clean and fair elections in 
response to political corruption (Y. H. Khoo, 2014). Malaysia is a multi-racial country in 
South East Asia, home to more than 30 million people, mainly comprised of three racial 
groups, Malay, Chinese, and Indian1, as well as several indigenous groups. Like many 
movements for social change, Bersih uses mass mobilization as a means of influencing 
public opinion. Over the past decade, Bersih has organized several large-scale street 
protests that have captured national attention. Furthermore, historically, protests in 
Malaysia has not been as commonplace as they may be in other democratic societies (Jha, 
2008; G. C. Khoo, 2014), and thus Bersih’s periodic large-scale protests may be 
particularly strong in triggering responses from the Malaysian public. Given this context, 
we believed that the fifth round of protests organized by the movement, called Bersih 5, 
                                                        
1 It should be noted that the Malaysian government classifies “Chinese” and “Indian” as racial 
groups and people with this designation are almost always people whose ancestors immigrated to 
Malaysia in prior centuries rather than themselves being immigrants. Thus, “Chinese” Malaysians 
are descendants of immigrants from China and “Indian” Malaysians are descendants of 
immigrants from India and Sri Lanka. 
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would be a very suitable naturally-occurring stimulus event around which to ground a pre-
post within-subjects design to assess whether public reactions to protests will predict shifts 
in attitudes toward the movement and social change more broadly. We propose that the 
occurrence of protests can psychologically impact the public by promoting differing 
degrees of empowerment versus threat in response to protests, which can subsequently 
mobilize or demobilize public support for the movement and social change. 
Public Attitudes Around Protests 
To examine the relationship between ongoing protests and public attitudes, prior 
research largely from political science and sociology has examined how public opinion 
indicators are temporally and geographically linked to protest events (e.g., Andrews, 
Beyerlein, & Farnum, 2016; Branton, Martinez-Ebers, Carey Jr., & Matsubayashi, 2015; 
Carey Jr., Branton, & Martinez-Ebers, 2014; Jones-Correa, Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 
2016; Silber Mohamed, 2013; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, & Jones-Correa, 2014). This line 
of research has provided evidence that public opinion on various issues that are tied to 
social movements, such as relevant policy support (Branton et al., 2015) and intergroup 
attitudes (Jones-Correa et al., 2016), can shift before and after protests occur. However, it 
is important to note that this work only indirectly links protest to changes in public opinion. 
People’s reactions to the protest itself and their attitudes toward the social movement were 
not measured, in part because many of these studies utilized survey data that was 
coincidentally collected during ongoing protests. The occurrence of protests was 
retroactively determined largely based on news reports (Bada, Fox, Zazueta, & Garcia, 
2006), which can also be biased in their coverage of protests (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & 
Soule, 2004). Despite these caveats, this scholarship is critical for indicating that protests 
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can shape public opinion. 
 Some research has begun to examine the more proximal links between protests and 
public attitudes. One strand of work shows that specific characteristics of protests can 
influence public support for it. Specifically, using experimental paradigms in which people 
evaluated protest scenarios, Thomas and Louis (2014) found that nonviolent protests 
garnered more support than violent ones because they tend to convey the illegitimacy of 
the situation and highlight the efficacy of the group. In another line of research, Feinberg, 
Willer and Kovacheff (2017) showed that media depictions of extreme protest tactics 
reduced public support for protests. This work therefore provides clear causal evidence 
about how different features of protest actions can influence people’s reactions to 
descriptions of protests. However, there remains a question of how people respond to the 
actual occurrence of protests in their society and importantly, the impact of these protests 
on the public audience that is specifically targeted by these mass actions. In one study on 
the effects of ongoing protests on public attitudes, Schwartz (2016) found that when people 
had direct physical encounters with protests, they reported lower political engagement. Yet, 
the sentiment around ongoing protests, as reported by public opinions polls (Roper Center, 
2017), would suggest that even people who do not directly encounter protests may still 
have a psychological response to it. Can the occurrence of protests shift public attitudes? 
One way to effectively study this question is by timing data collection around mass protests 
as they occur. 
 Data collected around real-world political events are critical as they allow us to 
study psychological processes as they temporally unfold, thereby having ecological 
validity and applied relevance (Dunning, 2012). Yet, the scarcity of data around real 
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protests may reflect practical constraints: protests may be unplanned or if planning does 
occur, it may not be visible to researchers or the public. Researchers also have no control 
over the characteristics of protest events (e.g., size, demonstration tactics, police response) 
and the way in which people come to learn about them. Even when mass protests are 
publicly announced in advance, researchers often have a very short window of time to 
design and implement their research. These challenges may explain the lack of empirical 
data on public responses to ongoing protests. 
 In an attempt to address this gap, the current research was designed around mass 
street protests that took place in Malaysia, called Bersih 5, which advocated for electoral 
reform and an end to political corruption. Given that the organizers publicly announced 
ahead of time that the Bersih 5 protests would be held on November 19th 2016, we used 
this unique opportunity to design and administer a survey two weeks before the event 
unfolded, and then immediately after the event occurred. This pre-post within-subjects 
design allowed us to assess how people’s reactions to the protests predicted their support 
for the movement and for social change, over and above their initial attitudes toward the 
movement and social change, thus testing whether specific reactions to the protests itself 
can uniquely predict people’s attitudes immediately after the protests occurred, beyond 
people’s pre-existing attitudes. To our knowledge, ours is the first study with this design 
and therefore represents a novel approach for studying the immediate impact of mass 
protests on public attitudes. 
Reactions to Protests 
It is a core assumption in the social movements literature that effective mobilization 
will shift public opinion toward the goals of the movement (Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 1983). 
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Past psychological research on movement participants have suggested that there are 
cyclical effects of collective action, such that participation in collective action itself can 
promote the emotions and beliefs that fuel future actions (Becker et al., 2011; Drury & 
Richer, 2005; Tausch & Becker, 2013; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). To date, 
these cyclical effects have been primarily theorized as affecting those who directly 
participated in collective action, and scholars have yet to extensively consider the emotions 
and beliefs of those who are uninvolved in the actual action (i.e., did not physically 
participate in the protests), but who may still have reactions toward the collective action 
that either mobilizes or demobilizes their support for the movement and its goals for social 
change. Thus, extending past research, we focus on the reflexive emotions and beliefs that 
members of the public may have toward protests, which we hypothesize will shape their 
subsequent movement identity and support for social change. 
How might the general public react to protests? Mass protests by their nature are 
designed to be disruptive (both literally and symbolically) of the social order and daily 
routine of life. Members of the broader society may respond to this disruption in multiple 
ways. As we review next, prior research has suggested several key emotions and beliefs 
that are important in predicting support for social change, which may also be important in 
understanding responses to collective action. Specifically, we propose that people may 
respond to protests by having both empowerment and threat reactions. Consistent with 
prior work, in the current context we define empowerment as deriving a sense of 
confidence from and in the protest (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2005), and threat as 
experiencing the protest as posing a potential harm to one’s physical or psychological well-
being (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). As we conceptualize 
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empowerment and threat as broad psychological constructs, we now review prior research 
on the specific emotions and beliefs that we propose are a part of an empowerment or threat 
response to protests. 
Empowerment 
It is well established that direct participation in collective action promotes positive 
emotional experience (Becker et al., 2011; Boehnke & Wong, 2011; Klar & Kasser, 2009; 
Páez, Basabe, Ubillos, & Gonzalez-Castro, 2007). Drury and Reicher (2005) demonstrated 
that empowerment emerges during protest participation, and is experienced as feelings of 
excitement and strength. Beyond the experiences of those who directly participate in 
collective action, Tausch and Becker (2013) showed that feeling pride in response to a 
successful outcome of a protest movement promoted future collective action intentions. 
Another empowering emotion that has been found to motivate collective action and social 
change is hope (Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki, & Branscombe, 2016). Prior 
work has also found that hope predicts peaceful conflict resolution strategies in intractable 
intergroup conflict settings (see Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2017 for a review). 
However, past research has not investigated the positive emotions that the broader public 
may experience in response to efforts for social change, such as a mass protest. 
 In addition to positive emotions, anger about injustice is a strong motivator of 
collective action (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Montada 
& Schneider, 1989), and is also an outcome of movement participation (Becker et al., 2011; 
Drury & Reicher, 2005). Given that anger is an action-oriented emotion often tied to 
appraisals of blame towards a target (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Frijda, Kuipers, & 
ter Shure, 1989), anger towards injustice can be construed as an empowering emotion. 
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Thus, because past research suggests that both positive emotions (e.g., excitement, pride, 
hope) and anger about injustice can empower those who participate in collective action 
(Becker et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2012), we extend this work by proposing that the 
public, who are uninvolved in the collective action itself, can also feel positive emotions 
and anger about injustice in reaction to collective action. 
Besides emotional reactions, there are also certain beliefs closely tied to the 
experience of empowerment, in particular, perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy of 
collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Believing that group actions can be successful 
is emotionally empowering (Bandura, 2000), and such actions can fuel the perceived 
legitimacy of collective action to challenge injustice (Drury & Reicher, 2005), thereby 
promoting collective action participation (Blackwood, Terry, & Duck, 2015). Yet, protests 
may only achieve long-term social change to the extent that they influence broader society 
to also believe in the efficacy of collective action and the legitimacy of their claims (Passini 
& Morselli, 2013; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Thomas & Louis, 
2014). We suggest that in response to ongoing protests, empowerment – experienced as 
positive emotional experience and anger about injustice, as well as believing in the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the protest – can promote supportive movement identity 
and support for social change amongst the public. 
Threat 
 Besides empowerment reactions to protests, it is also important to examine the 
potentially demobilizing or counter-movement reactions that people may have in reaction 
to protests. Due to its confrontational and often controversial nature, collective action can 
clearly be threatening to the broader public. Literature from communication studies suggest 
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that feeling threat in response to protests is highly likely given that the news media often 
portrays protesters as dangerous and deviant (Ana, López, & Munguía, 2010; McLeod & 
Hertog, 1992; Shoemaker, 1984), which can then shape public opinion on protests 
(McLeod, 1995; McLeod & Detenber 1999). Consistent with this view, earlier sociological 
work found that perceptions of the 1960s African American civil rights protests as unsafe 
predicted reduced movement support amongst the American public (Jeffries, Turner, & 
Morris, 1971; Turner, 1969). Opposition to Black Americans’ protests have also been 
linked to perceptions that the movement threatened White’s status within society (Bobo, 
1988). Thus, social movements may lose public support if their protests are perceived as 
dangerous. 
 Past research has suggested that several emotions can arise during the experience 
of threat, namely, anxiety and anger toward the target of threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), which have been found to predict a host of negative intergroup 
outcomes (for reviews, see Fritsche et al., 2011; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). For 
example, in response to outgroups, anxiety provokes anti-immigrant attitudes (Brader, 
Valentino & Suhay, 2008; Stephan & Stephan, 1996), and fear and anger can promote 
aggressive conflict approaches (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). We 
therefore suggest that the extent to which the protests arouse threat – experienced as 
emotions of anxiety and anger toward the protests, as well as believing that the protests are 
dangerous – will predict oppositional movement identity and lower support for social 
change amongst the public. 
The present research 
 Our goal was to examine whether the broader public’s experiences of 
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empowerment and threat in response to mass protest can influence their subsequent 
movement identity and attitudes toward social change. To this end, we surveyed a sample 
of the Malaysian public on their movement identity and support for social change before 
and after a day of mass street protests (i.e., Bersih 5), and we also measured their 
empowerment and threat reactions (specifically to the Bersih 5 action itself) immediately 
following the protests. We hypothesized that people’s empowerment and threat reactions 
to the Bersih protests would shape their subsequent movement identity and support for 
social change. 
 Although ahead of time we did not specifically know how the protests would 
unfold, we expected that the event would receive wide-scale public attention and media 
coverage similar to prior Bersih protests. Indeed, the Bersih 5 protests drew an estimated 
40 thousand people to the streets, including prominent politicians, celebrities, and civil 
society leaders (Chandran, 2016). The protests took place peacefully as planned in major 
cities in Malaysia including its capital, Kuala Lumpur. High-level government officials 
condemned the protests and several key movement activists were arrested. The Bersih 5 
protests also faced threats from a counter-protest defending the government. Both local and 
international news media outlets widely reported on the protests.2 
Method 
Design 
 The study employed a two-wave within-subjects design. At Time 1, participants 
were recruited to complete an online survey two weeks before the day of mass protests. 
                                                        
2 For news coverage of the Bersih 5 protests, see Chan and Westcott (2016), Kamal (2016), 
“Malaysiakini Live: Bersih 5 Rally” (2016), and Teoh and Leong (2016). 
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Participants were re-contacted the day after the protests occurred, and were invited to 
participate in the second wave of data collection for up to 2 weeks. The survey questions, 
data, and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/dbphm/. 
Participants and Procedure 
 A convenience sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete 
surveys on their social and political attitudes by TurkPrime, a crowdsourcing research 
platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). At Time 1, 646 participants were 
recruited. After excluding 18 participants who failed to complete the study, 12 participants 
who did not identify as either Malay, Chinese, or Indian Malaysian, and 4 participants who 
took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours), 612 participants were 
retained (296 Malay, 244 Chinese, and 72 Indian Malaysians). All 612 participants were 
invited to complete the survey at Time 2. Of those who were invited, 459 participants 
returned at Time 2 (response rate = 75%). After excluding 13 participants who failed to 
complete the study, 2 participants who completed the survey twice, 4 participants who took 
a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours), and 18 participants whose 
demographics reported at Time 1 did not match Time 2, a final sample of 422 participants 
who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 measures were retained for analyses (218 Malays, 
177 Chinese, and 27 Indian Malaysians). Table 1 contains descriptive information on 
participants’ demographic characteristics. Participants’ age ranged from 18-68 (M = 33.46; 
SD = 9.45), with almost equal numbers of males (N = 213) and females (N =197; 12 
participants did not report their age and gender). As seen in Table 1, although we did not 
have a nationally representative sample, we obtained participants from a range of religious, 
economic, and educational backgrounds, that were living in various regions across the 
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country. Participants completed a set of measures at both Time 1 and 2 that were important 
for assessing attitude change. Additionally, participants completed measures at Time 2 
specifically about their reactions to the protests. We describe these two set of measures 
below.3 
Table 1 
 
Participants’ demographic characteristics 
 
Characteristic n % 
Age   
18-20 19 4.50 
21-30 158 37.44 
31-40 148 35.07 
41-50 58 13.74 
51-60 23 5.45 
≥ 61 4 0.95 
Did not report 12 2.84 
Gender   
Male 213 50.47 
Female 197 46.68 
Did not report 12 2.84 
Race   
Malay 218 51.66 
Chinese 177 41.94 
Indian 27 6.40 
Religion   
Islam 217 51.42 
Buddhism 98 23.22 
Christianity 56 13.27 
Hinduism 14 3.32 
Taoism 14 3.32 
Sikh 2 0.47 
No religion 21 4.98 
                                                        
3 The data presented in this manuscript is one component of a larger project on Malaysians’ 
socio-political attitudes that aimed to test multiple research questions. The exclusion criteria were 
selected to ensure data quality before any analyses were conducted to test our hypotheses. 
Although we could not conduct analyses including the participants excluded at Time 1 since we 
do not have Time 2 data for them, we also analyzed the data using all participants at Time 2 (i.e., 
without excluding any data), and we found virtually the same results as reported in this paper. 
This suggests that our results were largely robust, stable, and not dependent on the exclusion 
criteria we chose (see Supporting Information online). 
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Monthly household income   
Less than RM 2,000 26 6.16 
RM 2,000-RM 4,000 82 19.43 
RM 4,000-RM 6,000 108 25.59 
RM 6,000-RM 8,000 68 16.11 
RM 8,000-RM 10,000 60 14.22 
More than RM 10,000 75 17.77 
Did not report 3 0.71 
Education level   
Some primary/secondary school  11 2.61 
Graduated from secondary school 40 9.48 
Some college 61 14.45 
Graduated from college 245 58.06 
Some Masters/PhD 50 11.85 
Completed Masters/PhD 14 3.32 
Did not report 1 0.24 
Location   
Selangor 142 33.65 
Kuala Lumpur 90 21.33 
Johor 38 9.00 
Penang 27 6.40 
Sarawak 24 5.69 
Perak 18 4.27 
Kelantan 16 3.79 
Sabah 15 3.55 
Negeri Sembilan 14 3.32 
Melaka 13 3.08 
Pahang 12 2.84 
Kedah 8 1.90 
Terengganu 3 0.71 
Perlis 1 0.24 
Did not report 1 0.24 
Note.  Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Measures collected at both Time 1 and Time 2 
 Movement identity. Participants were asked to select one of the 7 following 
options to describe their identity in relation to the Bersih movement: “A very active 
opponent of the Bersih movement”, “Unsupportive of the Bersih movement, and 
sometimes an active opponent”, “Unsupportive of the Bersih movement”, “Neutral”, 
“Supportive of the Bersih movement, but not active”, “Supportive of the Bersih movement, 
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and sometimes an active participant”, “A very active participant of the Bersih movement”. 
The items were adapted from Dunlap and McCright’s (2008) measure of movement 
identity that was deemed appropriate for assessing both support and opposition to a 
movement, particularly amongst the heterogeneous public. Higher scores indicate a more 
supportive movement identity. 
 Support for social change. Participants were asked to report the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with four statements assessing support for social change on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were developed based on the 
actual political platform of the Bersih movement (“The political system in Malaysia needs 
to be reformed”, “The democratic system in Malaysia needs to be improved”, “Those who 
are involved in corruption need to be held accountable for their actions”, “The elections in 
Malaysia need to be made fair”; αT1= .80; αT2 = .86). 
Measures of reaction to protests collected at Time 2 
 Empowerment reactions. 
 Positivity. Participants reported the extent to which they felt each of the following 
emotions when thinking about the Bersih 5 demonstrations, on a scale from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (extremely): “excited”, “proud”, “strong”, “inspired”, “empowered”, “joyful”, and 
“hopeful” (Drury & Reicher, 2005; αT2 = .98). 
 Anger toward government. Participants reported the extent to which they felt 
“angry with the government”, and “annoyed with the government”, when thinking about 
the Bersih 5 demonstrations, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely; Iyer et al., 2007; 
rT2 = .87).  
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 Perceived effectiveness of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which 
they believed that the Bersih 5 demonstrations were “effective”, “influential”, “successful”, 
and “well-organized” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; αT2 = .94). 
 Perceived legitimacy of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the following statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree): “Bersih 5 was justified”, “The demands of Bersih 5 are legitimate”, 
“Given the current situation in the country, there were good reasons to hold Bersih 5” (αT2 
= .92). 
 Threat reactions4. 
 Anxiety. Participants reported the extent to which they felt “uneasy”, “worried”, 
and “fearful” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) when thinking about the Bersih 
5 demonstrations (αT2 = .91). 
 Anger toward protests. Participants reported the extent to which they felt “angry 
with Bersih 5” and “annoyed with Bersih 5”, when thinking about the Bersih 5 
demonstrations, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely; Iyer et al., 2007; rT2 = .92).  
 Perceived danger of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which they 
agreed that the Bersih 5 demonstrations were “violent”, “chaotic”, “unsafe”, and 
“disruptive” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; αT2 = .95). 
                                                        
4We also measured the extent to which participants felt “hopeless” and “weak” when thinking 
about the Bersih 5 demonstrations (rT2 = .85) as part of our threat composite. However, in 
hindsight, the hopelessness items were not specifically worded in relation to threat, thus 
participants could have interpreted the items as a disempowerment response. It is therefore 
ambiguous whether the hopelessness measure is a threat response or merely the conceptual 
reverse of empowerment. Due to reviewers’ noting this conceptual issue, we dropped the 
hopelessness and weak measures from the threat composite in our analyses reported in the main 
text. The findings remain consistent when we do include these measures in the threat composite 
(see Supporting Information online). 
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Results 
Panel attrition 
 To test for systematic dropouts from Time 1 to Time 2, we compared the 
participants who responded at both Time 1 and Time 2 (N = 422) to those who responded 
only at Time 1 and did not return for Time 2 (N = 190) on key demographics (i.e., age, 
gender, race) and the two variables measured at Time 1 (i.e., movement identity and 
support for social change). We used chi-square tests for categorical variables, and 
independent t-tests for continuous variables. It was found that 73.65% of Malay and 
72.54% of Chinese participants returned at Time 2, however only 37.50% of Indian 
participants returned at Time 2, χ²(2) = 37.79, p < .001. There were no significant 
differences between the samples on any other variable (all ps > .22). Importantly, 
participants did not differ on movement identity and support for social change (ps > .30). 
Protest Reaction Variables: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
 We conducted a CFA for a two-factor solution for the reaction measures, whereby 
the composite measures of 1) positive emotions, anger toward government, perceived 
effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of protests loaded onto the first latent factor 
(empowerment reactions), and 2) anxiety, anger toward Bersih, and perceived danger of 
protests loaded onto a second latent factor (threat reactions). The model fit was acceptable: 
χ2 (11) = 54.15, p < .001, SRMR = .03, NFI = .98, CFI = .98. All the unstandardized 
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parameter estimates were significant at p < .001, and b ranged from .73 to 2.045. Thus, 
composite measures of empowerment (αT2 = .88) and threat reactions (αT2 = .89) were 
created. The two reaction variables were negatively correlated, r = -.67, p < .001. The 
correlations between the individual measures included in the empowerment and threat 
composites are displayed in Table 2. 
 
                                                        
5 We also tested a four-factor solution CFA, whereby 1) positivity and anger toward the 
government loaded onto a factor of empowerment emotions, 2) perceived effectiveness and 
legitimacy of protests loaded onto a factor of empowerment beliefs, 3) anxiety and anger toward 
Bersih loaded onto a factor of threat emotions, and 4) perceived danger of protests loaded onto a 
factor of threat beliefs. The four-factor solution CFA also provided acceptable model fit: χ2 (4) = 
39.91, p <.001, SRMR = .02, NFI = .98, CFI = .99. However, the high correlations among the 
composite measures within the empowerment emotions and beliefs (rs = .41-.89), as well as 
within the threat emotions and beliefs (rs = .68-.80), indicate that most of the variance between 
the emotions and beliefs within empowerment and threat respectively, are shared. In our 
conceptualization of empowerment and threat, we also did not a priori hypothesize a theoretical 
distinction between the emotions and beliefs that underlie these psychological constructs. Thus, 
we find it parsimonious to use a two-factor solution to test how empowerment and threat 
reactions predict movement identity and support for change. 
 
Table 2 
 
Correlations among measures in the empowerment (1-4) and threat (5-7) composites. 
 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Positivity 4.43 (1.75) -       
2. Anger toward 
government 
5.24 
(1.57) .41*** -      
3. Perceived 
effectiveness  
4.69 
(1.48) .89*** .43*** -     
4. Perceived 
legitimacy 
5.01 
(1.58) .83*** .50*** .86*** -    
5. Anxiety 3.63 (1.59) -.49*** -.30*** -.48*** -.51*** -   
6. Anger toward 
protests 
2.68 
(1.78) -.65*** -.38*** -.66*** -.69*** .68*** -  
7. Perceived 
danger of 
protests 
2.93 
(1.69) -.56*** -.32*** -.57*** -.61*** .69*** .80*** - 
 
Note. *** p < .001 
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Changes Before and After the Protest 
 Paired samples t-test found that on average, movement identity was higher after the 
protests (MTime 2 = 4.61, SDTime 2 = 1.06) compared to before (MTime 1 = 4.45, SDTime 1 = .94); 
t(419) = 3.89, p < .001, d = .19. However, on average, support for social change was lower 
after the protests (MTime 2 = 6.27, SDTime 2 = .99) compared to before (MTime 1 = 6.36, SDTime 
1 = .83); t(421) = -2.37, p = .018, d = -.11. To assess whether the strength of the relationship 
between movement identity and support for social change shifted across time, we used 
Raghunathan, Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1996) recommendation for comparing two 
correlations among the same sample. We found that the correlation between movement 
identity and support for social change was significantly stronger after the protests (rTime 2 = 
0.43, p < .001), compared to before (rTime 1 = 0.17, p < .001; z = 4.17, p < .001). 
Using Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Movement Identity and Support for 
Change 
 The means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and 
Time 2 are displayed in Table 3. As expected, Time 1 and Time 2 scores on movement 
identity, as well as Time 1 and Time 2 scores on support for change, were highly correlated. 
Most people’s attitudes are not making huge shifts from before to after the protests.6 
Nonetheless, if our hypothesis that reactions to the protests themselves are important in 
shaping movement identity and support for change is supported, then after controlling for 
the ability of Time 1 scores to predict Time 2 scores, reactions to the intervening protests 
should uniquely predict Time 2 scores. This analytical method has been used in past 
                                                        
6 We also conducted descriptive analyses of the changes in movement identity from Time 1 to 
Time 2. These analyses suggest that although few participants made large quantitative shifts in 
their attitudes, among those who did change, shifts in attitudes occurred across the different levels 
of Time 1 movement identity (see Supplementary Information online). 
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collective action research that utilized data from two time points, with predictor variables 
measured at one time point and outcome variables measured at both time points (Becker, 
Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2001, Study 1; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Tausch & Becker, 2013; 
see Finkel, 1995 for a statistical discussion). Specifically, we hypothesized that 
empowerment reactions will positively predict Time 2 movement identity, and threat 
reactions will negatively predict Time 2 movement identity, over and above the ability of 
Time 1 movement identity to predict Time 2 movement identity. Similarly, we 
hypothesized that empowerment reactions to Bersih 5 will positively predict Time 2 
support for social change, and threat reactions to Bersih 5 will negatively predict Time 2 
support for social change, over and above the ability of Time 1 support for social change 
to predict Time 2 support for social change. The alternative, and certainly plausible, 
possibility is that the reactions to the protests are a mere reflection of preexisting movement 
identity and support for social change. If this is the case, then empowerment and threat 
reactions to the protests will not significantly predict any additional variance in Time 2 
movement identity and Time 2 support for social change beyond what is predicted by Time 
1 movement identity and Time 1 support for social change7. 
 
                                                        
7 Another common approach in two-wave designs is the use of differences scores to assess 
change (Allison, 1990; Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer, 2014). Thus, we also computed difference 
scores across time for movement identity and support for social change, and we found support for 
our hypotheses, in that empowerment reactions were positively related to increases in movement 
identity (r = .24, p < .001) and support for social change (r = .35, p < .001), whereas threat 
reactions predicted decreases in movement identity (r = -.18, p < .001) and support for social 
change (r = -.22, p < .001). Although the covariate approach (i.e., using Time 1 as a covariate) 
and the difference score approach are different types of analyses and can sometimes yield 
different conclusions (e.g., Lord, 1967), we find converging evidence with both methods. To be 
consistent with prior research in this area (e.g., Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2001; Stürmer 
& Simon, 2004; Tausch & Becker, 2013), we present the covariance approach within the main 
text. For details of the difference score analyses, please see Supplementary Information online. 
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Table 3 
 
Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and Time 2. 
Variables M  (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Movement identity 
(Time 1) 
4.45 
(.94) -      
2. Support for social 
change (Time 1) 
6.36 
(.83) .17*** -     
3. Movement identity 
(Time 2) 
4.61 
(1.06) .64*** .20*** -    
4. Support for social 
change (Time 2) 
6.27 
(.99) .32*** .62*** .43*** -   
5. Empowerment 
reactions (Time 2) 
4.84 
(1.37) .61*** .30*** .73*** .54*** -  
6. Threat reactions 
(Time 2) 
3.08 
(1.52) -.48*** -.36*** -.57*** -.48*** -.67*** - 
Note. *** p < .001        
 
Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Movement Identity. At Step 1 of a 
hierarchical regression analysis, movement identity at Time 1 predicted greater movement 
identity at Time 2, b = .72, SE = .04, t(418) = 17.06, p < .001, R2 = .41. As hypothesized, 
at Step 2, empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant increase 
in R2, indicating that reactions to the protest uniquely predicted movement identity at Time 
2, beyond what could be predicted by movement identity at Time 1, R2change = .19, Fchange 
(2, 416) = 99.71, p < .0018. Specifically, stronger empowerment reactions to the protests 
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2, b = .37, SE = .04, t(416) = 10.37, p < .001, 
                                                        
8 When empowerment and threat were entered at separate steps of the regression analyses, rather 
than together at the same step, there was still a significant R2 change at each level of when 
empowerment or threat were first entered into the regression model to predict movement identity 
(see Supplementary Information online). 
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and stronger threat reactions to the protests predicted weaker movement identity at Time 
2, b = -.07, SE = .03, t(416) = -2.42, p = .016.  
Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Support for Social Change. At Step 1 of a 
hierarchical regression analysis, support for social change at Time 1 predicted greater 
support for social change at Time 2, b = .74, SE = .05, t(420) = 16.27, p < .001, R2 = .39. 
As hypothesized, at Step 2, empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a 
significant increase in R2, indicating that reactions to protest uniquely predicted support for 
social change at Time 2, beyond what could be predicted by support for social change at 
Time 1, R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 418) = 61.78, p < .0019. Specifically, stronger 
empowerment reactions to the protest predicted more support for social change at Time 2, 
b = .25, SE = .03, t(418) = 7.48, p < .001, whereas stronger threat reactions did not 
significantly predict support for social change at Time 2, however it was in the expected 
negative direction, b = -.05, SE = .03, t(418) = -1.64, p = .102.10 
Reactions to Protest as Simultaneous Predictors of Movement Identity and Support 
for Social Change 
 To test both outcomes (movement identity and support for social change) 
simultaneously, we conducted a path analysis with 1) Time 1 movement identity, Time 1 
support for social change, empowerment, and threat reactions entered as exogenous 
                                                        
9 When empowerment and threat were entered at separate steps of the regression analyses, rather 
than together at the same step, there was still a significant R2 change when empowerment or 
threat were first entered into the regression model to predict support for social change. However, 
the effect of threat became non-significant when empowerment was added as a predictor (see 
Supplementary Information online). 
10 We also asked participants whether they attended prior Bersih protests and the Bersih 5 protests 
specifically. We conducted exploratory analyses to test the role of protest participation in shaping 
people’s reactions to the protests. We report the details of these analyses in the Supplementary 
Information online. 
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variables, and 2) Time 2 movement identity and Time 2 support for social change entered 
as endogenous variables. Mirroring the regression analyses above, we modeled 1) Time 1 
movement identity, empowerment, and threat as predictors of Time 2 movement identity, 
and 2) Time 1 support for social change, empowerment, and threat as predictors of Time 2 
support for social change. The model fit the data well, χ2 (3) = 4.40, p = .222, SRMR = 
0.01, NFI = 1.00, CFI = 1.00. The direction and significance of all paths were as 
hypothesized, except for the negative link between threat and support for social change at 
Time 2 which was not statistically significant, although it was in the hypothesized direction 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Path model depicting empowerment and threat reactions to protests as 
simultaneous predictors of movement identity and support for social change at Time 2, 
while controlling for movement identity and support for social change at Time 1. 
 
Discussion 
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 Collective action aims to elicit a reaction from targeted audiences with the goal of 
instigating support for social change. However, we know little about the effects that 
protests have on mobilizing or demobilizing support for its cause amongst broader society. 
To begin to address this question, we situated the present research around a mass protest 
event that occurred in Malaysia to study how public attitudes may shift from before to after 
the protests. We find that protests can trigger empowerment and threat reactions, which 
can subsequently shape the public’s support for the movement and for social change. 
Specifically, we found that experiencing empowerment in response to the protests 
promoted a supportive movement identity and more favorable attitudes toward social 
change after the protests. By contrast, threat reactions to the protests promoted an 
oppositional movement identity and less favorable attitudes toward social change after the 
protests occurred. In this particular context, our findings also showed that empowerment 
reactions were a stronger predictor of changes in movement identity and social change than 
threat reactions. Taken together, this research demonstrates the immediate psychological 
impact of a real-world protest on society. 
 While prior psychological research has largely focused on those who directly 
participate in collective action by explaining their motivations (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 
2012; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and personal outcomes 
derived from participation (see Vestergren, Drury, & Chiriac, 2017 for a review), more 
recent research has begun focusing on the consequences of protests on those who are not 
involved in the original action (Feinberg et al., 2017; Schwartz, 2016; Thomas & Louis, 
2014). Additionally, research from political science and sociology has indirectly linked 
various protest occurrences to public attitudes (e.g., Andrews et al., 2016; Wallace et al., 
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2014). Our study contributes to this growing area of research by demonstrating that 
individual-level shifts in attitudes before and after a protest can be linked to reactions to 
the protest itself. Further, given that most extant research in psychology, including 
collective action research, has been concentrated in Western regions (see Henrich, Heine, 
& Norenzayan, 2010 for a discussion), the present research tested relevant psychological 
concepts in a previously underexplored social and political context. 
 Our findings are also consistent with existing social psychological models on 
collective action. The Social Identity Model of Collective Action posits that thinking of 
oneself in terms of a group member promotes collective action through group-based anger 
and efficacy (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008). This model has been extended to describe 
how participation in collective action can fuel anger and efficacy beliefs, and consequently 
contribute to stronger group identification, therefore creating a reciprocal and dynamic 
model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012). If we view collective action itself as 
a starting point of mobilizing others, as we do in the present research, we find that the 
extent to which protests arouse feelings of anger over injustice and beliefs in the 
effectiveness of the protest – which we include in our conceptualization of empowerment 
– promotes shifts in movement identity even amongst those who are observers (not 
participants) of collective action. In addition, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM; 
Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005) describes how crowd dynamics can empower its participants 
during collective action. We show that members of the broader public can likewise feel 
empowered in response to collective action, which can in turn promote support for the 
movement. Similarly, given that Tausch and Becker (2013) demonstrated how emotional 
responses to the policy successes and failures following a movement can motivate future 
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collective action, we build on this work to reveal that the emotional and cognitive 
experiences in response to collective action itself can mobilize or demobilize broader 
public support for social change. Collective action, therefore, does not only cause change 
within those who directly participate in the action, but can also incite change within other 
members of society.  
Beyond our primary hypothesized effects, it is important to note several other 
findings. Most interestingly, we found that the association between movement identity and 
support for social change was stronger after the protests. Although the measure of support 
for social change was developed based on the explicit goals of the Bersih movement, the 
relatively modest correlation between movement identity and support for social change 
before the protests may mirror past work on the principle-implementation gap (Dixon, 
Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007), suggesting that even when people support certain goals in 
principle (e.g., social change), they may fail to support the efforts needed to achieve those 
goals (e.g., a social movement). A somewhat stronger correlation between movement 
identity and support for social change after the protests may indicate that the protests 
reduced the principle-implementation gap in people’s attitudes. Thus, examining the 
strength of relationship between these outcome variables, and the specific predictors of 
these outcomes (i.e., empowerment vs. threat in response to protests), may be more 
informative of the change processes occurring, rather than the average differences in 
attitudes. Indeed, after the protests occurred, the average support for social change was 
slightly lower than at baseline, whereas the average level of movement identity was slightly 
higher. These results point to the importance of disentangling and keeping clear the 
distinction between the average effect of the protests on attitudes versus the within-
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participant change due to reactions to the protest. 
Limitations 
 One of the major strengths of the current research was its panel design, by which 
we could assess individual-level change in attitudes in a way that was tightly linked to a 
real-world event, thus affording us sound internal validity. However, at the same time, our 
findings may not be generalizable to other types of protests, and there is clearly a need for 
further research in different contexts. The present research focused on peaceful mass 
protests that occurred in a democratic country, which has also largely been the focus of 
prior work on collective action (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016 for a discussion). It is possible 
that violent protests, or protests that occur in extremely repressive or non-democratic 
countries may elicit more polarized psychological reactions among the public. It is also 
possible that in societies where the frequency of protests is much higher and the culture of 
dissent is prevalent, the ability of a protest to elicit public responses may be muted. 
 Additionally, we used a broad definition of “the uninvolved” to include societal 
members who largely did not participate in collective action (i.e., Bersih 5). Nevertheless, 
even those who did not directly participate in the protests on the streets may have engaged 
in behaviors related to the protests, such as social media activism or informal discussions 
online with friends and family about the protests, which could have influenced their 
responses to the protests and their subsequent attitudes. Indeed, prior research has found 
that social media plays a prominent role in the consumption of political news and the 
expression of people’s political attitudes (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; 
Valenzuela, 2013), through which people may encounter information that challenges or 
reinforces their attitudes (e.g., Messing & Westwood, 2012; Stroud, 2010). Taken together, 
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while our findings provide initial understanding of the immediate processes through which 
protests may influence broader social attitudes, future research is needed to test the 
moderators of these effects. 
Future Directions 
 The present research motivates several questions for future research. For one, what 
are the factors that shape empowerment and threat responses to protests? Given the 
importance of group identification in motivating collective action (van Zomeren et al., 
2008), it is possible that the extent to which people identify with a low-status group 
advocating for its rights or a high-status authority legitimizing the status quo (e.g., a 
governing regime), can determine whether the public audience will be mobilized in favor 
of, or against, a movement for social change (Subašić et al., 2008). In addition, media 
framing of events may influence public responses to protests (e.g., McLeod & Detenber, 
1999; Shoemaker, 1984). For instance, media depictions of protests as violent or chaotic 
can be threatening, whereas coverage that highlights the enthusiasm and unity amongst 
protesters may be empowering. While the current research focused on the immediate 
impact of a collective action, it is possible that in response to social movements, other 
forms of mobilization may develop over time, such as solidarity protests by those who are 
not directly affected by an injustice (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; Stewart et al, 
2016), or reactionary counter-movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Thus, future 
research could consider the long-term effect of collective action on various audiences, 
including uninvolved third-parties who may be potential sympathizers, and adversarial 
groups that may mobilize against protests for social change. 
Concluding Remarks 
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 In conclusion, while existing models of social change puts forth the idea that the 
ability for social movements to achieve societal change critically relies on raising support 
for the movement amongst broader society (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; Passini & Morselli, 
2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008), and social movement scholars 
have extensively discussed how protests are intentionally designed to elicit a reaction from 
its targeted audience (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam, 
1983), to our knowledge, no psychological research to date has explicitly tested how 
members of the public respond to ongoing protests. The present research contributes to our 
theoretical understanding of the immediate impact of protest occurrence on public attitudes 
and has practical applied value by showing that the promise of mass protests in shaping the 
public’s subsequent attitudes critically relies on the relative ability of protests to elicit 
empowerment and threat reactions. 
Addendum: The Role of Race 
The results from Chapter 2 provide initial evidence of how reactions to the focal 
Bersih 5 protest event shaped subsequent public attitudes toward the Bersih movement and 
support for social change. However, the public is far from homogenous; not all members 
of the public may be similarly affected by a protest for social change. In particular, research 
on intergroup dynamics have shown that advantaged group members are often motivated 
to defend the status quo, whereas disadvantaged group members are instead motivated to 
challenge it (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). This dynamic may be at play in Malaysia, 
which is a multiracial country made up primarily of the Malay majority group and Chinese 
and Indian minority groups. The Malays, who are viewed as the original inhabitants of the 
country, hold greater political power than the Chinese and Indian minorities, who are 
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descents from immigrants during the colonial era. Given that the Bersih movement aims to 
reform the electoral system, it challenges the government which is primarily represented 
by Malays. Although the goals of the movement are not explicitly targeting any one race, 
the movements’ demands have been racialized. Critics of the Bersih movement have 
argued that it destabilizes the government, creates racial divisions, and threatens the special 
privileges of Malays (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). It is therefore plausible that public reactions 
to Bersih may differ across race.  
This addendum focuses on formally testing whether race moderates the results 
presented in the manuscript in Chapter 2. First, I examine whether the changes in Bersih 
movement identity and support for social change from before to after the Bersih 5 protest 
was different among Malays and non-Malays (i.e., Chinese and Indians). Second, I test 
whether empowerment and threat reactions to the Bersih 5 protest differed by race. Third, 
I also test whether race influenced the extent to which empowerment and threat reactions 
to the Bersih 5 protest shaped subsequent Bersih movement identity and support for social 
change. Given that there was only a small percentage of Indian Malaysian participants due 
to logistical constraints during data collection, the Chinese and Indian participants were 
combined to form the non-Malay group as the racial minorities in Malaysia.  
Does Race Moderate Changes in Attitudes from Before to After the Protest? 
Movement Identity 
At Time 1 before the protest occurred, Malays on average had lower levels of 
supportive movement identity (MTime 1 = 4.09) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 1 = 
4.84). At Time 2 after the protest occurred, Malays once again had lower levels of 
supportive movement identity (MTime 2 = 4.31) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 2 = 
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4.94). However, there was no significant interaction between race and time in predicting 
changes in Bersih movement identity from before to after the protest occurred, F(1, 418) = 
2.17, p = .141. Among both racial majority (i.e., Malays) and minority (i.e., Chinese and 
Indians) groups, there was an increase in supportive movement identity, from before (Time 
1: MMalays = 4.09; MChinese and Indians = 4.84) to after the protest occurred (Time 2: MMalays = 
4.31; MChinese and Indians = 4.94), F(1, 418) = 14.77, p < .001.  
Support for Social Change  
At Time 1, before the protest occurred, Malays on average did not significantly 
differ on support for social change (MTime 1 = 6.38) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 
1 = 6.35). At Time 2 after the protest occurred, Malays once again did not significantly 
differ on support for social change (MTime 1 = 6.26) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 
1 = 6.29). There was also no significant interaction between race and time in predicting 
support for social change from before to after the protest occurred, F(1, 420) = .57, p = 
.452. Among both racial majority (i.e., Malays) and minority (i.e., Chinese and Indians) 
groups, there was a main effect of time such that there was a small decrease in support for 
social change from before (Time 1: MMalays = 6.38; MChinese and Indians = 6.35) to after the 
protest occurred (Time 2: MMalays = 6.26; MChinese and Indians = 6.29), F(1, 420) = 5.51, p = 
.019. 
Does Race Moderate Empowerment and Threat Reactions to the Protest? 
There was a significant effect of race on empowerment reactions in response to the 
Bersih 5 protest, F(1, 420) = 21.09, p < .001. Malays on average reported lower levels of 
empowerment (M = 4.55) compared to Chinese and Indians (M = 5.15). There was also a 
significant effect of race on threat reactions in response to the Bersih 5 protest, F(1, 420) 
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= 29.53, p < .001. Malays on average reported higher levels of threat (M = 3.46) compared 
to Chinese and Indians (M = 2.68). 
Does Race Moderate the Extent to Which Reactions to the Protest Shape 
Subsequent Attitudes? 
Movement Identity 
There was no significant interaction between race and empowerment reactions to 
the protest in predicting subsequent movement identity, F(1, 413) = .04, p = .834. 
Regardless of race, empowerment reactions promoted a more supportive movement 
identity after the protest, b = .51, SE = .05, t = 10.14, p < .001. There was also no significant 
interaction between race and threat reactions to the protest in predicting subsequent 
movement identity, F(1, 413) = 2.36, p = .126. Regardless of race, threat reactions 
promoted a less supportive movement identity after the protest, b = -.09, SE = .04, t = -
2.00, p = .047. 
Support for Social Change 
There was a significant interaction between race and empowerment reactions to the 
protest in predicting subsequent support for social change, F(1, 415) = 5.24, p = .023. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that the positive link between empowerment and support 
for social change after the protest was somewhat weaker among Malays (b = .27, SE = .06, 
t = 4.62, p < .001), compared to Chinese and Indians (b = .48, SE = .07, t = 6.84, p < .001). 
However, there was no significant interaction between race and threat reactions to the 
protest in predicting subsequent support for social change, F(1, 413) = 2.36, p = .126. 
Regardless of race, threat reactions promoted less support for social change after the 
protest, b = -.10, SE =.05, t = -2.22, p = .027. 
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Taken together, the polarizing effects of the protest generally did not appear to 
differ across racial groups, except for the effect of empowerment on subsequent support 
for social change being stronger among Chinese and Indians (vs. Malays). Nevertheless, 
we do observe that Malays (vs. Chinese and Indians) reported relatively lower levels of 
empowerment and higher levels of threat from the Bersih 5 protest. We also observe that 
Malays consistently reported a less supportive Bersih movement identity before and after 
the Bersih 5 protest occurred. These race-based differences in attitudes toward Bersih raises 
several questions: What underlying beliefs motivate the Malay majority group to show 
more negative reactions to the Bersih protest and movement? What is the consequence of 
this potential backlash toward Bersih? Chapter 3 seeks to examine these questions. 
Bridge to Chapter 3 
Since the publication of the manuscript from Chapter 2, recent research has 
examined when and how collective action for social change may promote negative 
reactions or backlash among the public, specifically among advantaged group members. In 
particular, Saguy and Szekeres (2018) examined changes in gender system justification, 
which refers to people’s legitimization of gender inequalities. Across a two-wave 
longitudinal study conducted before and after the 2017 Women’s March in the United 
States, Saguy and Szekeres (2018) focused on the effects of being exposed to the Women’s 
March either in person, through the television, news, or social media. They found that 
protest exposure predicted divergent attitudes among men and women. Men who were 
weakly identified with their gender showed lower levels of gender system justification 
when they were more exposed to the protests. By contrast, men who were highly identified 
with their gender showed higher levels of gender system justification when they were more 
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exposed to the protests. Among women, gender identification did not change the link 
between exposure to the protests and levels of gender system justification. This work 
suggests that while some men may be more likely to go against gender-based hierarchies 
after the Women’s March, other men may instead exhibit elevated levels of support for 
gender inequality.  
While Saguy and Szekeres’s (2018) research demonstrated that advantaged group 
members may exhibit backlash toward collective action that challenges the status quo, there 
remains an open question about the underlying mechanisms and its implications for social 
movement dynamics. Thus, Chapter 3 presents a manuscript aimed to understand why 
advantaged group members may exhibit elevated levels of threat in response to movements 
for social change, as well how support for reactionary counter-movements may arise as a 
result of this threat. In particular, the focus will be on a hierarchy-legitimizing myth tied to 
a group’s status and power in society: the sense of psychological ownership over one’s 
country. This myth refers to the belief that a group should be more entitled to determine 
the rules and norms in a given society because it was the first to inhabit or establish the 
country. Chapter 3 therefore complements Chapter 2 by examining one potential reason 
for polarized public attitudes in response to movements social change. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  
 “This is our soil, our land, the land where our blood has spilled.”  
– Alwi Che Mat.  
“This country does belong to White people, culturally, politically, socially, everything. We 
defined what America is.”  
– Richard Spencer.  
The quotes above are from leaders who have mobilized people to participate in 
rallies aiming to retain their group’s special positions within their respective countries. The 
first quote is from a speech of a Malay leader during the Himpunan Maruah Melayu (Malay 
Dignity Rally) on September 16th 2015 in Malaysia. Clad in red and branded as the Red 
Shirts, the rally was organized by Malay supremacist groups aiming to defend the 
government against the pro-democracy electoral reform movement, named Bersih which 
means “clean” in Malay. The Bersih movement has been criticized for challenging the 
government and accused of threatening the rights of Malays (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). The 
second quote is from a leader of the Alt-Right movement in the United States during a 
speech, at a time in which the country has witnessed an upsurge of White nationalism. 
While many cities and towns have begun removing Confederate monuments because of 
ties to African American slavery, a range of far-right groups came together in 
Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11th and 12th 2017 to oppose the removal of a 
Confederate leader’s statue, arguing that the monument stands as a symbol of American 
heritage.  
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These two quotes come from two very different social and political contexts, yet 
both are strikingly similar; they reflect the ideology of psychological ownership over a 
country. Psychological ownership involves perceiving a sense of entitlement, privilege, 
and the right to determine the rules and codes of conduct in a particular society (Verkuyten 
& Martinovic, 2017). This sense of ownership can be derived from being the first to inhabit 
or establish the country (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), and is often present in the 
rhetoric of various reactionary movements organized by majority group members to uphold 
the status quo (e.g., Due & Riggs, 2008; Khan, Svensson Jogdand, & Liu, 2017; Moreton-
Robinson & Nicoll, 2006). The present research aimed to examine the link between 
psychological ownership and attitudes toward social movements that are either for or 
against social change. We propose that majority group members’ who have greater 
psychological ownership will perceive more threat from progressive collective action 
demanding for social change, which will subsequently predict greater support for 
reactionary collective action against social change. Thus, ownership beliefs could promote 
efforts to re-assert the rights of the group believed to “own” a country, and may partially 
explain the rise of reactionary counter-movements that we observe in various societies. 
To examine the interplay between progressive and reactionary movements, we 
situated the present research in two different contexts in which there are real-world tensions 
between opposing social movements: 1) the Bersih electoral reform movement and the pro-
government Red Shirt movement in Malaysia, and 2) the Black Lives Matter racial justice 
movement and the White nationalist Alt-Right movement in the United Stated. These 
contexts also allowed us to examine psychological ownership beliefs in a country in which 
the majority group is acknowledged to be the native people (i.e., Malays in Malaysia), 
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versus a country in which the majority group is not native to the land but is credited as 
“founding” the country (i.e., Whites in America). Thus, we propose that psychological 
ownership, whether derived from native or founder ownership beliefs, will promote greater 
threat in response to movements for social change, which will in turn foster greater support 
for movements against social change. 
Psychological Ownership 
People often feel that they, personally or collectively, “own” various material and 
non-material objects, such as resources, institutions, and physical spaces. A key aspect of 
psychological ownership is a sense of control over the object that is owned, which can 
justify various efforts aimed at maintaining power and influence over the object (Brown, 
Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005; Lyman & Scott, 1967). In the present research, we focused 
on territorial claims of ownership, which involves believing that a group is entitled to 
“own” a country because of their primacy in inhabiting and/or establishing it. This ideology 
has been referred to as autochthony, which means “sprung from the land” in ancient Greek 
(Cueppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009; Martinovic & Verkuyen, 2013). Not all 
groups may derive ownership over their country in the same way. In particular, majority 
group members differ in whether they can claim to be native to, or founders of a particular 
nation depending on their unique history and socio-political contexts. 
To be native is to claim ownership based on the first-possession principle, in other 
words, being the first to acquire and inhabit the land (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; 
Giguère, Lalonde, & Jonsson, 2012; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, in 
Malaysia, Malay are widely acknowledged to be the original inhabitants of the country, 
and are legally known as bumiputeras, which literally translates to “sons of the soil” (Neo, 
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2006). They hold special privileges at the expense of non-Malays (e.g., Chinese and Indian 
Malaysians) who are descendants of immigrants groups (Noor & Leong, 2013). By 
contrast, to be founders of a nation is to claim ownership based on the formative principle, 
which refers to being the first group to establish the nation along with its guiding principles, 
laws, and constitution (Gans, 2001; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, White 
Americans cannot legitimately claim to be indigenous to the land which was first inhabited 
by Native Americans, but White American can and do claim to be founders of the country. 
The founding figures were descendants of European settlers, which has helped define 
White American identity (Lipsitz, 2006). Native and founder ownership beliefs are 
therefore culturally-bound and dependent upon the history of colonialism in a particular 
country.  
Prior research has theoretically distinguished between native and founder 
ownership (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), but to our knowledge, this distinction has not 
been demonstrated empirically. Most work on collective psychological ownership to date 
has focused on claims of native ownership. For example, prior research in Western Europe 
has found that claims of primo-occupancy beliefs among indigenous groups promoted 
prejudice (Brylka, Mahonen, Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013) and 
opposition to the rights of immigrants (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015). 
However, both native and founder ownership claims may form the basis of intergroup 
conflict (Geschiere, 2009; Toft, 2014). For instance, in Australia, Whites, who are not 
native to Australian land but are acknowledged to be founding figures of Australia, have 
claimed ownership over the country to exclude recent immigrants (Due & Riggs, 2008) 
and even Aboriginal Australians (Garbutt, 2006). In the present research, we seek to more 
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clearly distinguish between native and founder ownership, and subsequently demonstrate 
that when majority group members cannot legitimately claim native ownership, they can 
and do derive founder ownership over their country.  
Further, we aim to examine the downstream consequences of both native and 
founder psychological ownership on attitudes toward social movements that are either for 
or against social change. Specifically, we propose that majority group members’ claims of 
ownership over their country will promote perceived threat in response to movements for 
social change, which will in turn promote support for reactionary counter-movements 
against social change. Our approach therefore takes into account culture-specific ideologies 
in a nation (see also Osborne, Yogeeswaran, & Sibley, 2017), which is responsive to recent 
calls for integrating cultural contexts in collective action research (van Zomeren & Louis, 
2017).   
Threat in Response to Social Change and the Rise of Reactionary Movements 
A large body of research has shown that perceived threat promotes negative 
intergroup attitudes (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Threat includes 
concerns about a group’s well-being, and perceiving challenges to a group’s status or 
values (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Prior work has shown that when majority group 
members perceive threats to their group’s well-being and status within society, it can 
trigger reactionary efforts to preserve existing social hierarchies from which they benefit 
(Blumer 1958; Bobo, 1999). Recent work has found that when White Americans are 
reminded that they would become a numerical minority by 2050, they reported more 
negative attitudes toward racial minorities (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt, 
Miller, & Garcia, 2012). 
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Given that psychological ownership beliefs are a powerful source of defining the 
ingroup’s special position within society, and movements for social change by their nature 
challenge the status quo and thus the majority group’s higher status in the system, we 
propose that majority group members’ endorsement of psychological ownership over their 
country will predict greater threat in response to protests for social change. Indeed, during 
the U.S. Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, African Americans’ efforts to push for equal 
rights were seen as threatening White Americans’ position of power (Bobo, 1988). More 
recent work has shown that the gains in political rights for African Americans can be 
perceived as a loss for White Americans, which in turn promoted a belief in anti-White 
bias (Norton & Sommers, 2011; Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014). Thus, it is plausible that 
perceived threat from minority’s demands for social change could propel majority group 
members to support reactionary efforts that defend existing structural relations.  
In line with the idea that advantaged group members may act collectively against 
social change efforts, prior work has shown that when White South Africans and non-
Aboriginal Australians felt that they were deprived in their respective countries, they were 
more supportive of political actions to benefit their ingroup (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & 
Heath, 2011; Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2007). Further, recent research has also examined 
the psychological predictors of collective action challenging the system versus collective 
action defending the system. This work has found that the extent to which people justified 
an illegitimate system (Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2018), had different 
moral foundations (Milesi & Alberici, 2018), and perceived threat from the outgroup 
(Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 2016) can differentially predict support for progressive 
versus reactionary collective action. However, this work has not directly examined the 
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relationship or potential tensions that can arise between these collective actions, such as 
how the existence of one social movement may promote the rise of the other. 
Social movement scholars have long theorized that movements often grow 
contingent upon one another, since the mobilization for a cause can draw counter-
mobilization against it (Meyer, & Staggenborg, 1996; Mottl, 1980). For example, the 
achievements made by the U.S. civil rights movement were met with pro-White resistance 
efforts (Andrews, 2002), and the protests for land reforms in Mexico had reciprocal effects 
on counter-protests as both groups aimed to influence the government (Inclan, 2012). Thus, 
in the present research, we draw on prior research on psychological ownership to 
understand how negative reactions toward collective action for social change can promote 
support for collective action against social change. We propose that majority group 
members’ endorsement of psychological ownership over their country will predict greater 
threat in response to collective for social change, which will in turn promote support for 
reactionary collective action to uphold the status quo. 
Overview of Studies 
Three studies were conducted to examine how psychological ownership (both 
native and founder ownership) operates within two different socio-political contexts, and 
help explain the rise of reactionary movements that aim to counter efforts for social change. 
Situated in the Malaysian context, Study 1 tested whether native ownership beliefs among 
the Malay majority (but not racial minorities) will predict greater threat from pro-
democracy protests, which will subsequently promote greater support for a pro-
government counter-movement. Next, a pilot study was conducted to differentiate between 
founder ownership beliefs and native ownership beliefs. Situated in the U.S. context, 
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studies 2 and 3 tested whether founder ownership beliefs among the White majority (but 
not racial minorities) will predict greater threat from a racial justice movement, which will 
subsequently promote greater support for White nationalistic counter-protests. The data, 
analysis code, and complete study materials are available at https://osf.io/nph6r/ 
Study 1 
Study 1 was conducted around mass street protests for electoral reform in Malaysia, 
a multiracial country in which the Malay majority holds greater political power than 
Chinese and Indian minorities (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). In response to corruption within 
the government, the Bersih movement, meaning “clean” in Malay, was formed over a 
decade ago to push for clean and fair elections (Y. H., Khoo, 2014). It’s fifth round of 
protests, Bersih 5, took place on November 19th 2016 and attracted thousands of 
Malaysians to the streets (Chandran, 2016). To counter the Bersih 5 protests, a pro-
government movement, named the Red Shirts, mobilized its supporters to organize a 
counter-protest to protect the dignity and rights of Malays. The Red Shirt protests drew a 
much smaller crowd than Bersih 5, and dispersed after meeting the police blockades that 
separated them from the Bersih 5 protesters. These two protests that occurred concurrently 
provided a unique real-world opportunity to assess how racial majority and minority groups 
in Malaysia responded to both protests. Thus, we surveyed Malaysian participants two 
weeks before, and immediately after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests. We aimed to test 
whether the extent to which the Malay majority group endorsed greater native ownership 
beliefs than the Chinese and Indian minority groups will predict more perceived threat from 
the Bersih 5 protests (but not from the Red Shirt protests), and subsequently predict greater 
support for the Red Shirt movement.  
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Participants and Procedure 
A sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete online surveys on 
their social and political attitudes via TurkPrime, a survey research platform. At Time 1, 
612 participants completed the first survey (296 Malays, 244 Chinese, and 72 Indians; age: 
M = 32.46, SD = 9.61, range = 18-71; gender: 317 males and 274 females; 21 participants 
did not report age and gender). At Time 2, 422 participants returned to complete a second 
survey (218 Malays, 177 Chinese, and 27 Indians).11 Participants completed a set of 
measures at both Time 1 and 2. For cross-sectional analyses, we used all data from 
participants who responded at Time 1 (n = 612). For longitudinal analyses, we only used 
data from participants who responded at both time points (n = 422). A sensitivity analysis 
indicated that with 612 participants, we would be able to detect (with α = .05) an effect of 
r = 0.13 in a bivariate correlation with 95% power, whereas with 422 participants, we 
would be able to detect an effect of r = 0.16 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The 
measures relevant to the present study were included as part of a larger survey on 
Malaysians’ socio-political attitudes aiming to test multiple research questions.12 
Specifically, at Time 1, we measured native ownership and Red Shirt movement identity. 
At Time 2, we measured threat reactions toward the Bersih 5 protests and threat reactions 
toward the Red Shirt protests, as well as the Red Shirt movement identity again.13 The 
                                                        
11 See Supporting Information for details on participant recruitment and exclusion criteria. 
12 Analyses from this dataset that aimed to test different research questions were previously 
reported in another paper (author(s) name removed for anonymity). In that paper, threat was a 
predictor rather than an outcome variable, and threat was measured using a different scale (i.e., 
emotional reactions toward and beliefs about the Bersih 5 protests). In the present research, threat 
perceptions were measured in response to both the Bersih and Red Shirt protests using a measure 
of threat that was equally applicable to both protests. 
13 See Supporting Information for full items. 
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items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) unless 
noted otherwise. 
Measured only at Time 1 
Native ownership (αT1 =.90). We used four items from the Martinovic and 
Verkuyten (2013) autochthony scale (e.g., “The original inhabitants of a country are more 
entitled than newcomers”). 
Measured at Time 1 and Time 2 
Red Shirt movement identity. Participants were asked to select one of the seven 
following options to describe their movement identity, adapted from Dunlap and McCright 
(2008): “A very active opponent of the Red Shirt movement”, “Unsupportive of the Red 
Shirt movement, and sometimes an active opponent”, “Unsupportive of the Red Shirt 
movement”, “Neutral”, “Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, but not active”, 
“Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active participant”, “A very 
active participant of the Bersih movement”. Higher scores reflect a more supportive 
movement identity. 
Measured only at Time 2 
Threat from Bersih protests (αT2 = .94). We adapted six items from the threat 
measure used in Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers (2013) to be about Bersih 5 (e.g., 
“The demonstration is not compatible with the culture and values of Malaysia”). 
Threat from Red Shirt protests (αT2 = .92). We used same six items used to 
measure threat from Bersih protests, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Red 
Shirts. 
Results 
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Table 4 shows means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of key 
variables at Time 1 and Time 2. We also tested for race-based differences on these 
variables. As shown in Table 5, Malays reported greater endorsement of native ownership, 
a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity, and higher threat from Bersih protests, 
compared to Chinese and Indian minorities. 
 
Table 4 
 
Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and Time 2  
in Study 1. 
 
Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Native ownership 
(Time 1) 
4.86 
(1.68) -     
2. Threat from Bersih 
protests (Time 2) 
3.21 
(1.68) .36*** -    
3. Threat from Red Shirt 
protests (Time 2) 
5.20 
(1.53) .05 -.06 -   
4. Red Shirt movement 
identity (Time 1) 
3.22 
(1.08) .26*** .33*** -.24*** -  
5. Red Shirt movement 
identity (Time 2) 
3.00 
(1.11) .12* .34*** -.32*** .53*** - 
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001 
 
Table 5 
 
Race-based differences on key variables in Study 1. 
Outcome Malay majority  
Chinese and 
Indian minorities df F p 
M SD  M SD 
Time 1         
Native ownership 5.67 1.21  4.02 1.61 1, 610 205.13 < .001 
Red Shirt movement 
identity 3.52 .90  2.96 1.12 1, 609 45.22 < .001 
         
Time 2         
Threat from Bersih 
protests 3.70 1.68  2.69 1.52 1, 420 41.31 < .001 
Threat from Red 
Shirt protests 5.14 1.50  5.27 1.56 1, 420 .71 .401 
Red Shirt movement 
identity 3.14 1.07  2.84 1.13 1, 420 7.77 .006 
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Cross-Sectional Analysis. To test the hypothesis that native ownership will 
explain the link between being a Malay majority (vs. a racial minority) and endorsing a 
more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 1, we used conditional process 
modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; model 4). Race was 
introduced as the IV (1 = Malay majority, 0 = Chinese and Indian minorities), native 
ownership as the mediator, and Red Shirt movement identity at Time 1 as the DV. The 
analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of being Malay on more supportive Red Shirt 
movement identity, through greater native ownership beliefs, b = .16, SE = .05, 95% CI 
[.069, .267]. After accounting for this indirect effect, the direct effect of being Malay on 
more supportive Red Shirt movement identity remained significant, b = .39, SE = .09, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.206, .578] (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. The indirect effect of race on Red-Shirt counter movement identity via native 
ownership beliefs at Time 1, before the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred.  
 
 Longitudinal Analysis. To test the hypothesis that Malays’ higher level of native 
ownership at Time 1 will predict greater threat from Bersih protests at Time 2, which in 
turn will predict a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2, we conducted 
Malays
(vs. Chinese or 
Indian Malaysians)
1.66*** .10***
.39*** (.56***)
Red Shirt 
counter-movement
identityT1
Native ownershipT1
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conditional process modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; 
model 6). Race was introduced as the IV (1 = Malay majority, 0 = Chinese and Indian 
minorities), native ownership as the step 1 mediator, threat from Bersih protests as the step 
2 mediator, and Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2 as the DV. The analysis revealed 
a significant indirect effect from race to Red Shirt movement identity, first through native 
ownership and then through threat from Bersih protests Bersih, b = .11, SE = .03, 95% CI 
[.062, .181]. After accounting for this indirect effect, the direct effect from race to Red 
Shirt movement identity became non-significant, b = .11, SE = .12, p = .381, 95% CI [-
.133, .347] (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. The indirect effect of race on Red-Shirt counter movement identity via native 
ownership beliefs at Time 2, after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred. 
 
Discussion 
Based on two-wave panel data collected in Malaysia before and immediately after 
a mass protest calling for electoral reform (Bersih 5) as well as a counter-protest defending 
the government (Red Shirts), Study 1 tested the relationship between native ownership and 
counter-movement attitudes among racial majority (Malays) and minority (Chinese and 
1.80*** .22***
.28***
.11 (.30**)
Malays
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Red Shirt 
counter-movement
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Native ownershipT1
Threat from 
Bersih 5 protestsT2
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Indians) group members. At Time 1, before the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred, 
we found that Malays endorsed greater native ownership beliefs compared to Chinese or 
Indian Malaysians, which in turn predicted a more supportive Red Shirt counter-movement 
identity. At Time 2, after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred, we found that 
Malays’ higher endorsement of native ownership beliefs reported at Time 1 predicted more 
threat in response to the Bersih 5 protests (but not the Red Shirt protests) at Time 2 and 
subsequently, a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2. These findings 
demonstrate that native ownership beliefs play a key role in predicting counter-movement 
attitudes for majority group members. 
 While Study 1 focused on native ownership beliefs related to the first-possession 
principle, these beliefs may not be the only form of ownership that can promote counter-
movement attitudes among majority group members. As outlined earlier in the 
introduction, another powerful sense of ownership comes from being a member of a group 
that first established a particular nation, namely, founder ownership beliefs. In some 
countries, like Malaysia, the group widely acknowledged as the original inhabitants is the 
same group acknowledged as the nation’s founding figures. However, in other countries, 
the group that founded the country are not the original inhabitants.  
   In many regions around the world that have been colonized, a history of oppression 
and violence by European settlers have led to the systematic displacement of indigenous 
groups that have long inhabited those regions. In countries such as the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, the sense of ownership that White majority group members feel 
over their country today could be tied to the national founding figures of the country, who 
were descents of Anglo-European colonizers. To test this idea, we conducted a pilot study 
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in the U.S. context by adapting the native ownership items from Study 1 to be about founder 
ownership. We investigated whether White Americans’ beliefs in founder ownership, 
rather than native ownership, would be associated with a greater sense of personal 
psychological ownership over the country, and a stronger perception that original 
Americans are White, U.S.-born, Christian and English-speakers – which is the prototype 
of a “true” American (Devos & Banaji, 2005). 
Pilot Study 
Participants and Procedure 
We recruited 147 non-Hispanic White Americans via MTurk to complete a brief 
online survey (age: M = 39.57, SD = 13.42, range: 19–71; gender: 59 males, 88 females). 
Participants were randomly assigned to answer the native ownership items (n = 78) or the 
founder ownership items (n = 69). Participants also reported on their personal 
psychological ownership over the country, and perceived characteristics of original 
Americans. A sensitivity analysis indicated that we would be able to detect (with α = .05) 
an absolute difference of .30 between the slopes of the two groups, with 95% power (Faul 
et al., 2009). 
Measures  
Items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
Native ownership. We used the same four items from Study 1 (α = .95). 
Founder ownership (α = .90). We adapted the autochthony measure from 
Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) by replacing the words “original inhabitants” with the 
word “founders” (e.g., “The founders of a country are more entitled than newcomers”). 
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Personal psychological ownership (α = .88). We adapted the psychological 
ownership measure from van Dyne and Pierce (2004) (developed originally for 
organizational contexts) to be about ownership over one’s country (e.g., “I feel a very high 
degree of ownership for this country”). 
Characteristics of original Americans (α = .86). Participants indicated the extent 
to which they agreed that original Americans “are Christian”, “are born in the U.S.”, 
“identify as White”, and “speak English”. 
Results and Discussion 
Endorsement of founder ownership was related to stronger personal psychological 
ownership (r = .53, p < .001). By contrast, endorsement of native ownership beliefs were 
not significantly related to personal psychological ownership (r = .02, p = .851). The 
difference between these correlations were significant, Z = 3.38, p < .001 (Raghunathan, 
Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996). In addition, founder ownership was more strongly related to 
endorsement of original Americans as Christian, U.S.-born, White and English-speaking 
(r = .65, p < .001) compared to native ownership beliefs (r = .43, p = .001). The difference 
between these correlations was marginally significant, Z = 1.87, p = .062 (Raghunathan et 
al., 1996). These pilot findings suggest that White Americans may derive a sense of 
ownership from being a part of the group that founded the country.  
Study 2 
The pilot study showed that founder ownership is central to White American’s 
sense of ownership over their country. Study 2 aimed to test whether founder ownership 
beliefs would predict greater threat in response to a movement for social change, and 
subsequently, more support for a reactionary counter-movement. The study was situated 
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around the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement which aims to achieve justice and 
equality for Black people. A counter-movement that has recently emerged is the Alt-Right 
(or the Alternative Right), which refers to a collection of White supremacist groups whose 
core belief is that White civilization is under attack, and therefore advocates for the 
protection of White people. A recent issue that has stirred controversy between BLM 
supporters and Alt-Right supporters is the removal of Confederate monuments in the 
United States. BLM supporters have pushed for the removal of these monuments because 
they honor defenders of slavery. In response, counter-protests by Alt-Right supporters have 
emerged, arguing that Confederate monument should be preserved because they 
memorialize American history. We hypothesized that among White Americans, founder 
ownership will predict more threat from the BLM movement (but not the Alt-Right 
movement), which will subsequently predict more support for counter-protests to preserve 
Confederate monuments. 
Participants and Procedure 
We recruited 202 participants to complete online surveys via MTurk. Of those, 151 
were non-Hispanic Whites. Given that we aimed to examine the attitudes of non-Hispanic 
Whites in this study, we excluded 41 participants who did not self-identify as White and 
who were Hispanic (age: M  = 39.71, SD  = 12.41, range: 19 – 76; gender: 63 males, 88 
females). A sensitivity analysis indicated that with this sample size, we would be able to 
detect (with α = .05) an effect of r = 0.26 in a bivariate correlation with 95% power (Faul 
et al., 2009). 
Measures 
All items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
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Founder ownership (α = .95). We used the same 4 items from the pilot study. 
Threat from BLM protests (α = .96). We adapted the 5 items used in Study 1 to 
be about BLM (e.g., “The protests are not compatible with American values”). 
Threat from Alt-Right protests (α = .91). We used the same items that measured 
threat from BLM, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Alt-Right. 
Criticism of BLM protesters (α = .97). We adapted 5 items from McLeod and 
Detenber (1999) to be about BLM (e.g., “The protesters tend to be troublemakers”).  
Criticism of Alt-Right protesters (α = .92). We used the same items that measured 
criticism of BLM protesters, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Alt-Right. 
Support for anti BLM actions (α = .89). We developed 3 items (e.g., “The police 
should closely the monitor the activities of the movement”). 
Support for anti Alt-Right actions (α = .84). We used the same items that 
measured support for anti BLM actions, but the instructions were adapted to be about the 
Alt-Right. 
We found that the measures of threat from BLM protests, criticism of BLM 
protesters, and support for anti BLM actions were strongly correlated with one another (rs 
≥ .82, p < .001). Thus, we combined the three measures into a composite of anti BLM 
attitudes (α = .95). Similarly, the measures of threat from Alt-Right protests, criticism of 
Alt-Right protesters, and support for anti Alt-Right actions were strongly correlated (rs ≥ 
.59, p < .001), and were combined into a composite of anti Alt-Right attitudes (α = .87). 
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (α = .94). Participants 
were asked the extent to which they agreed with 6 statements about protesters who want to 
preserve Confederate monuments (e.g., “I can sympathize with their cause”). 
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Results 
Bivariate correlations showed that founder ownership was related to greater anti 
BLM attitudes (r = .54, p < .001), and greater support for protests to preserve civil war 
monuments (r = .27, p < .001). By contrast, founder ownership was not significantly related 
to anti Alt-Right attitudes (r = -.11, p = .196). To test the hypothesis that the link between 
founder ownership and support for protests to preserve civil war monuments is explained 
in part by anti BLM attitudes, we conducted conditional process modeling using 10,000 
bootstrapped samples (Hayes, 2013; model 4). Founder ownership was entered as the IV, 
anti BLM attitudes as the mediator, and support for protests to preserve civil war 
monuments as the DV. There was a significant indirect effect from founder ownership to 
support for protests to preserve civil war monuments via anti BLM attitudes, b = .25, SE = 
.05, 95% CI = [.1592, .3630]. After controlling for this indirect effect, the direct effect was 
no longer significant, b = -.01, SE = .07, t = -.12, p = .906, 95% CI = [-.1556, .1381] (see 
Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The indirect effect of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil 
war monuments via anti Black Lives Matter attitudes.  
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Study 2 demonstrated that White Americans’ belief in founder ownership predicted 
greater anti-BLM attitudes, which subsequently predicted more support for counter-
protests to preserve civil war monuments. Study 2 focused exclusively on the downstream 
consequences of founder ownership beliefs among White Americans. However, various 
theories of intergroup relations have argued that minority group members may sometimes 
defend the status quo (system justification, Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; belief in a just 
world, Hafer & Bègue, 2005; social dominance orientation, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994). This literature would suggest that people of color may also endorse founder 
ownership beliefs. We agree with this possibility, however, we further propose that founder 
ownership will be particularly predictive of counter-movement attitudes among White 
Americans, given that the national founders are uniquely linked to the history and 
formation of White American identity. Thus, Study 3 aimed to test whether founder 
ownership beliefs will be differentially linked to reactionary counter-movement attitudes 
among majority and minority group members. We expected that founder ownership beliefs 
will predict greater threat from BLM and greater support for counter-protests to preserve 
civil war monuments among White Americans, and not among people of color.  
Study 3 
Participants and Procedure 
There were 484 participants recruited via MTurk to complete online surveys. Of 
those, 364 were non-Hispanic Whites, and 120 were from a minority race or ethnicity (19 
Hispanic Whites, 9 American Indian/Alaskan Native, 41 Asian, 37 Black or African 
American, 12 mixed race, 1 Middle Eastern, and 1 other). There were also 3 participants 
that did not respond to the demographic questions, and 1 participant that did not identify 
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with any race; therefore, these participants were excluded from analyses (age: M = 38.49, 
SD = 13.13, range: 18 – 82; gender: 197 males, 285 females, 2 other).14 A sensitivity 
analysis indicated that we would be able to detect (with α = .05) an absolute difference of 
.19 between the slopes of the two groups, with 95% power (Faul et al., 2009). 
Measures 
Founder ownership (α = .93), anti BLM attitudes (α = .93), and support for protests 
to preserve civil war monuments (α = .94) was measured using the same items from Study 
2.  
Results 
Bivariate correlations showed that founder ownership was related to greater anti 
BLM attitudes (r = .50, p < .001), and greater support for protests to preserve civil war 
monuments (r = .35, p < .001). Anti BLM attitudes were also related to greater support for 
protests to preserve civil war monuments (r = .54, p < .001). As seen in Table 6, we also 
tested for race-based differences, which showed that White people and people of color did 
not differ on founder ownership beliefs. However, Whites reported greater anti BLM 
attitudes and greater support for protests to preserve civil war monuments compared to 
racial minorities. 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Before responding to the measures, half of the participants were randomly assigned to view 
images of vandalized confederate monuments. However, there were no effects of the 
manipulation, thus we collapsed participants across conditions. 
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Race as a Moderator of the Link Between Founder Ownership and Social Movement 
Attitudes 
There was a significant interaction between race and founder ownership in 
predicting anti BLM attitudes, F(1, 480) = 9.62, p = .002. Simple slopes analyses revealed 
that greater founder ownership predicted greater anti BLM attitudes among White people, 
b = .59, SE = .04, t = 13.09, p < .001, but the relationship between founder ownership and 
anti BLM attitudes was weaker among people of color, b = .28, SE = .09, t = 3.17, p = .002. 
There was also a significant interaction between race and founder ownership in 
predicting support for protests to preserve civil war monuments, F(1, 480) = 11.24, p < 
.001 Simple slopes analyses revealed that greater founder ownership predicted greater 
support for the protests among Whites, b = .43, SE = .05, t = 8.99, p < .001, but there was 
no significant relationship between founder ownership and support for the protests among 
people of color, b = .08, SE = .09, t = .81, p = .421. 
Moderated Mediation Analysis 
To test the overall hypothesis that founder ownership will predict greater anti BLM 
attitudes, which will in turn promote greater support for protests to preserve civil war 
Table 6 
 
Race-based differences on key variables in Study 3. 
 
Outcome 
White majority  Racial minorities 
df F p 
M SD  M SD 
Founder ownership 4.85 2.23  4.90 1.98 1, 482 .05 .817 
Anti BLM attitudes 5.52 2.25  4.64 2.19 1, 482 13.75 < .001 
Support for 
protests to preserve 
civil war 
monuments 
5.93 2.19 
 
5.28 2.16 1, 482 8.08 .005 
 
 
 71 
monuments, among Whites but not people of color, we conducted conditional process 
modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; model 8). The 
moderated mediation analysis tested the moderation (by race) of both the direct path from 
founder ownership to support for protests to preserve civil war monuments and the indirect 
path from founder ownership to support for protests via anti BLM attitudes. The index of 
moderated mediation was significant (b = .14, SE = .06, 95% CI [.0325, .2604]), which 
indicates that the strength of the relationship from founder ownership to support for protests 
via anti BLM attitudes was significantly different for Whites and people of color. Follow-
up examination of these conditional indirect effects revealed that for Whites, there was 
significant indirect effect of founder ownership on support for protests through anti BLM 
attitudes (b = .27, SE = .04, 95% CI [.1973, .3474]). There was also a significant indirect 
effect among people of color, although to a lesser extent (b = .13, SE = .05, 95% CI [.0322, 
.2341]). After controlling for these indirect effects, the direct effect of founder ownership 
on support for protests remained significant for Whites (b = .17, SE = .05, t = 3.22, p = 
.001, 95% CI [.0632, .2605]), but not for people of color (b = -.05, SE = .09, t = -.60, p = 
.549, 95% CI [-.2200, .1171]) (see Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Founder ownership
.59*** .45***
.16*** (.43***)
Support for protests 
to preserve 
civil war monuments 
Anti 
Black Lives Matter 
attitudes 
White people
 
 
 72 
 
 
Figure 5. The indirect effects of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil 
war monuments via anti Black Lives Matter attitudes, moderated by race.   
 
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 2 in that founder ownership beliefs 
predicted more anti BLM attitudes, and subsequently greater support for protests to 
preserve civil war monuments among White Americans. Study 3 extended Study 2 by 
showing that the link between founder ownership and protests to preserve civil war 
monuments via anti BLM attitudes was stronger among White Americans compared to 
people of color. Interestingly, Study 3 showed that White people and people of color did 
not differ on endorsement of founder ownership beliefs, whereas Study 1 found that Malays 
endorsed native ownership more than Chinese and Indian minorities. Nevertheless, in both 
studies, we consistently found that ownership beliefs predicted more support for a counter-
movement. Additionally, although White people and people of color endorsed founder 
ownership to the same extent, the degree to which founder ownership beliefs predicted 
counter movement attitudes differed between the groups. Thus, founder ownership is more 
strongly tied to White Americans’ support for counter movements in response to protests 
for racial justice. 
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General Discussion 
When we observe progressive social movements pushing for equality and justice, 
we also often observe reactionary counter-movements aiming to defend the status quo. Our 
project aims to understand this dynamic by focusing on the role of psychological ownership 
– a belief that the natives or founders of a particular country should be ordained with greater 
rights and privileges compared to newcomers (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). 
Distinguishing between ownership that stems from being native to a land, versus ownership 
that stems from being founders of a nation, our findings demonstrated that in the different 
social and political contexts of Malaysia and the United States, native or founder ownership 
among majority group members promoted greater threat from movements for social 
change, which in turn predicted support for reactionary counter-movements. 
Specifically, Study 1 found that the Malay majority endorsed greater native 
ownership beliefs compared to Chinese and Indian minorities, which promoted perceived 
threat from pro-democracy protests demanding electoral reforms, that subsequently 
predicted greater support for a pro-government counter-movement in Malaysia. Study 2 
showed that founder ownership beliefs among the White majority predicted greater 
perceived threat from a racial justice movement, which in turn predicted greater support 
for nationalistic counter-protests in the U.S. Study 3 replicated this effect, and 
demonstrated that the link between founder ownership and support for nationalistic 
counter-protests via threat from racial justice protests was stronger among White people 
compared to people of color. Taken together, these findings revealed how psychological 
ownership operates within two different socio-political contexts, which can help explain 
the rise of reactionary efforts against social change in these regions. 
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Contributions to Research on Intergroup Relations and Collective Action 
This research builds our understanding of reactionary counter-movements by 
identifying the key role of ownership beliefs. While prior work has found that native 
ownership beliefs endorsed by majority group members have detrimental effects on 
intergroup relations (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes et al., 2015), it has not 
examined people’s ownership beliefs when they are not native to the land. Drawing on 
Verkuyten and Martinovic’s (2017) theorizing of two principles that underlie 
psychological ownership – the first possession principle and the formative principle – the 
present research showed that psychological ownership can take different forms depending 
on the socio-political history of majority group members. Being the first to inhabit a 
country provides the group with native ownership beliefs. However, when a group cannot 
claim to be native to a country, they may derive founder ownership from belonging to a 
group that first established the country after displacing indigenous communities. Beyond 
distinguishing between native and founder ownership, we demonstrated that both forms of 
ownership beliefs were related to defensive efforts to counter social change. This work 
contributes to our understanding of how culture-specific ideologies are linked to collective 
action, and helps fill a gap in the literature which has largely overlooked the role of culture 
(van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). 
Further, by focusing on the factors that promote reactionary collective action 
against social change that aims to preserve the status quo, the present work extends prior 
research on the motivations to support collective action for social change that challenges 
the status quo (Milesi & Alberici, 2018; Osborne et al. 2018). The global upsurge of ring-
wing movements that aim to defend and protect the dominant group’s status at the expense 
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of intergroup equality and justice (Galston, 2018; Grevin, 2016) calls for a greater 
understanding of why majority group members come to support such efforts. The present 
research showed that experiencing threat in response to movements for social change 
predicts support for counter-movements. This finding contributes to our understanding of 
how mobilization for one cause can promote counter-mobilization – a dynamic that social 
movement scholars have long documented (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). 
 The present research also suggests that collective action may in part be a 
contestation about psychological ownership in society. This contestation is rooted in direct 
physical acts, as a common protest tactic is to occupy public spaces to increase the visibility 
of issues that marginalized groups face (e.g., McAdam, 1983; Snow, Rochford, Worden, 
& Benford, 1986). These acts are often coupled with rhetoric about ownership, such as the 
popular protest chant “Whose streets? Our streets!”. Relatedly, discursive research on place 
identity and attachment has shown that the ways in which groups construct the meaning of 
a place can provide them with a sense of belonging within society (Dixon & Durrheim, 
2000; Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013). Thus, collective action may be viewed as 
an expression and construction of psychological ownership. Mobilization for or against 
social change may depend on whether a group can successfully use the rhetoric of 
ownership to rally supporters. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 Although the present research was grounded on real-world tensions that exist 
between social movements, and tested hypotheses derived from prior theorizing and 
empirical work, the longitudinal and correlational design of our studies precludes causal 
claims. While we showed that ownership beliefs predict support for counter movements to 
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defend the status quo, it is possible that people may rationalize their support for counter 
movements by drawing on ownership beliefs. Ongoing movements pushing for equality 
and justice, as well as the rhetoric of counter movements defending the current status 
relations, might also increase majority group members’ ownership beliefs. The potentially 
cyclical relationship between claims of ownership and reactionary collective action await 
further empirical testing. 
 In the present work, we focused on majority group members in Malaysia as a case 
in which native ownership operates, and majority group members in the U.S. as a case in 
which founder ownership operates. One open question is whether our findings will hold in 
other contexts. We believe that native ownership beliefs would predict reactionary efforts 
to social change in other countries in which the dominant group members can legitimately 
claim to be indigenous to the land (e.g., Germans, French). By contrast, founder ownership 
beliefs should similarly operate in other countries in which descendants of European 
colonizers are credited as national founders (e.g., Canada, Australia). 
Further, while we limited our focus to understanding native and founder ownership 
claims to a country, it is important to recognize that the content of ownership beliefs itself 
can be severely contested. Territorial ownership plays a key role in various intergroup 
conflicts, for example, between Israel and Palestine, and between the Singhalese and 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. Indeed, prior research on intractable conflicts has shown that societies 
develop collective memories that reinforce the group’s dominant orientation toward the 
conflict, which can include beliefs about land ownership (Bilali, 2011). Future research 
may examine how psychological ownership is constructed among people on both sides of 
a conflict, and how these beliefs may mobilize or demobilize collective action.  
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Addendum: Myths that Legitimize a Group’s Higher Status in Society 
Psychological ownership beliefs may be a form of system-legitimizing belief that 
allows dominant group members to justify their power and status within a society. Such a 
belief may be conceptually and theoretically linked to other beliefs that uphold the status 
quo and are widely subscribed by members in a society. In line with this idea, when 
Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) first developed the measure of native psychological 
ownership (or autochthony), they tested its convergent and divergent validity, as well as its 
predictive validity. Among native Dutch, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) found that 
native psychological ownership was distinct from ethnic conceptions of national 
belonging, which refers to the belief that the “true” members of a country share a common 
ancestry or descent. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) further showed that both native 
psychological ownership beliefs and ethnic conceptions of national belonging promoted 
greater prejudice towards immigrants in the Netherlands.  
In Chapter 3, for studies in the U.S. context, we adapted the measure of native 
psychological ownership from Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) to instead measure 
founder psychological ownership to capture the idea that people may legitimize the higher 
status of White Americans because the White racial identity in the U.S. is historically tied 
to the founding fathers of the country. It is therefore important to assess how founder 
ownership beliefs may be similar or different from related system-legitimizing myths. One 
important belief system that is foundational to the national ethos of the U.S. is meritocracy 
beliefs. As a part of the “American Dream”, meritocracy beliefs refer to the idea that any 
individual, regardless of their background, can improve their status in society by working 
hard (Hochschild, 1996). This implies that low-status groups in society deserve their 
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condition because they simply did not put in the effort to succeed (O’Brien & Major, 2005), 
which can subsequently justify social inequality and the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). 
It therefore follows that meritocracy beliefs predict more opposition to race-based 
affirmative action policies and help justify claims of anti-White bias (Fraser & Kick, 2000; 
Wellman, Liu, & Wilkins, 2015). It is possible that meritocracy beliefs could would also 
be a key part of White Americans’ backlash toward the Black Lives Matter movement, and 
support for reactionary counter-protests to defend White people’s status in society. This 
addendum will focus on the role of meritocracy beliefs by reanalyzing portions of the data 
from the manuscript in Chapter 3. In particular, I examine the link between founder 
ownership beliefs and meritocracy beliefs, and I also test how meritocracy beliefs may 
operate as an underlying mechanism promoting support for counter-movements.  
How Do Meritocracy Beliefs Relate to Founder Ownership Beliefs? 
In Study 2 of the manuscript reported in Chapter 3, the survey focused on the 
attitudes of non-Hispanic White Americans. In this study, meritocracy beliefs were 
measured to explore its distinction and overlap with native ownership beliefs. Exploratory 
factor analysis with oblimin rotation showed that four items measuring founder ownership 
beliefs and the three items measuring meritocracy beliefs loaded onto separate factors. The 
rotated factor pattern showed high factor loadings (i.e., standardized regression 
coefficients) for the founder ownership items (.87 < B < .93) and the meritocracy items 
(.57 < B < .83). Thus, separate composite variables were created for founder ownership 
beliefs (α = .95) and meritocracy beliefs (α = .81). Bivariate correlations showed that 
founder ownership beliefs was related to more meritocracy beliefs (r = .42, p < .001). 
Meritocracy beliefs was also related to more threat from the Black Lives Matter movement 
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(r = .63, p < .001) and more support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (r = .44, 
p < .001). 
How Do Meritocracy Beliefs Relate to Backlash? 
To test the role of meritocracy beliefs as an additional explanatory variable for 
reactionary counter movements, I conducted serial mediation using PROCESS with 10, 
000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes, 2013; model 6). Founder ownership was entered as the 
IV, meritocracy beliefs and anti Black Lives Matter (BLM) attitudes were the serial 
mediators, and support for protests to preserve civil war monuments was the DV (see 
Figure 6). The results revealed that founder ownership beliefs predicted more meritocracy 
beliefs (b = .33, SE = .06, t = 5.66, p < .001, 95% CI [.2159, .4475]), which in turn promoted 
more threat from BLM (b = .64, SE = .08, t = 7.63, p < .001, 95% CI [.4766, .8097]), and 
subsequently more support for civil war protests (b = .35, SE = .08, t =  4.13, p < .001, 95% 
CI [.1818, .5147]). There was a significant indirect effect from founder ownership to 
meritocracy to anti BLM attitudes to pro-civil, b = .07, SE = .03, 95% CI [.0334, .1341]. 
In addition, the indirect effect from founder ownership to support for protests to preserve 
civil war monuments via anti BLM attitudes remained significant, b = .12, SE = .04, 95% 
CI [.0486, .2249], suggesting that the mediation patterns reported in Study 2 in Chapter 3 
remained consistent after accounting for the role of meritocracy beliefs as an additional 
mediator.  
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Figure 6. The indirect effects of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil 
war monuments via meritocracy beliefs and anti Black Lives Matter attitudes, among non-
Hispanic Whites (from Study 2).  
 
 
Bridge to Chapter 4 
 
While Chapter 3 focused on how reactionary counter-movements can arise in 
response to movements for social change, the movements investigated thus far have largely 
been peaceful, legal, and therefore normative within their societies. While it is true that 
some Bersih protests and Black Lives Matter protests have resulted in clashes with the 
police or damages to public property, the movement organizers explicitly relied on non-
violent approaches to civil resistance.  It is also true that the Red Shirt protests by Malay 
supremacists in Malaysia, and the Alt-Right protests by White supremacists in the United 
States have turned violent on certain occasions. However, collective actions that are violent 
and/or illegal remain relatively rare in these societies. This observation reflects the political 
context of Malaysia and the United States in which conflict between groups often do not 
take the form of overt hostility. In fact, normative forms of protest such as mass street 
demonstrations are viewed as a reflection of a healthy democracy. Thus, by examining 
largely democratic, peaceful contexts, I have been limited to focusing on normative forms 
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of collective action. This limitation is also reflected in the broader psychological literature 
on collective action that has largely sought to explain why people engage in normative 
forms of collective action such as mass public protests (for a review, see Becker & Tausch, 
2015).  
The focus on normative collective action alone does not allow us to extrapolate 
psychological findings to contexts in which people may be driven to nonnormative forms 
of collective action to achieve group goals. To begin addressing this gap, Chapter 4 
investigates public attitudes toward collective action in a context in which violence and 
warfare is the lived experience of many. By doing so, we can better examine why both 
sides of an ongoing conflict may come to support nonnormative versus normative forms of 
collective action. In particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides a suitable context 
to study this dynamic. The social and political climate in Israel is in part characterized by 
opposing social movements that are pro-Israel versus pro-Palestine. Chapter 4 focuses on 
identifying the psychological process that predict Arab and Jewish Israelis support for 
different forms of collective action to advance the rights of their respective groups. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INGROUP IDENTIFICATION, JUSTICE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 In protracted conflict settings, people on both sides of a conflict often engage in 
actions to fight for the rights of their respective groups. Collective action can be extremely 
non-normative, such as when Palestinians targeted Jewish Israelis through suicide 
bombings in their struggle for self-determination, or when Jewish Israelis attacked 
Palestinians by burning buildings and killing civilians to defend their rights to an 
independent Jewish state (Bishara, 2002). Collective action can also be largely normative, 
such as when Palestinians marched down the streets to resist forced eviction from their 
homes, or when Jewish Israelis held protests to assert their right to live in settler areas 
(Marteu, 2009). These examples illustrate that people may pursue various forms of actions 
to improve the conditions of their group. What might lead people to support the more non-
normative forms of collective action, such as aggression against civilians, versus the more 
normative forms of collective action, such as public street protests? 
 Ample research has demonstrated that a sense of injustice and identification with 
one’s group are central to collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). 
However, this work has mainly examined perceptions of injustice and group identification 
as unidimensional, rather than multidimensional constructs. We argue that different ideas 
about how to seek justice and different ways in which people identify with their groups will 
determine whether people are more supportive of nonnormative actions or normative 
actions. Specifically, we propose that ingroup glorification promotes support for 
nonnormative collective action through a desire for retributive justice, whereas ingroup 
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attachment promotes support for normative collective action through a desire for 
restorative justice. 
Collective Action 
 Researchers have identified two different forms of collective action: Nonnormative 
and normative collective action (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, 
Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). As defined by Wright et al. (1990), nonnormative collective 
actions are those that fall outside the scope of existing laws, customs, and codes of conduct 
in a society, for example violent street protests and terrorism; by contrast, normative 
collective actions are those that fall within the laws, customs, and codes of conduct in a 
society, for example peaceful street protests, sit-ins and strikes. This conceptualization 
overlaps with other taxonomies of collective action: illegal and legal (Finkel, Muller, & 
Opp, 1989), activism and radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), hostile and 
benevolent (Zaal, van Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011), as well as violent and non-
violent actions (Thomas & Louis, 2014). To refer to distinct forms of collective actions, 
we use normative and nonnormative collective action to be consistent with the terminology 
used by Wright et al. (1990), Tausch et al. (2011), and Becker and Tausch (2015). It is also 
important to note that the normativeness of a particular action is defined in relation to the 
broader social system, rather than from the perception of the group undertaking the action. 
Although traditionally the literature has focused on the socio-psychological 
predictors of normative collective action, scholars have also begun to examine the 
predictors of nonnormative collective action. To understand the factors that predict 
nonnormative versus normative collective action, prior work has investigated group-based 
efficacy and emotions as two prominent pathways that differentially predict nonnormative 
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and normative collective action tendencies (for a review, see Becker & Tausch, 2015). This 
research has found that strong beliefs in group-based efficacy and feelings of anger over 
injustice predict normative collective action. By contrast, lack of group-based efficacy 
beliefs and, instead, strong beliefs in the efficacy of using aggression to reach group goals 
and feelings of contempt over injustice predict nonnormative collective action (Saab, 
Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016; 
Tausch et al., 2011).  
While there is prior research on how various forms of efficacy beliefs (i.e., efficacy 
of peaceful vs. violent actions) and emotions (i.e., anger vs. contempt) shape distinct 
collective action tendencies, perceptions of injustice and ingroup identification have 
typically been studied as single, unidimensional constructs. There is extensive evidence 
that stronger perceptions of injustice and ingroup identification motivate greater collective 
action (for a review, see van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, research on reactions to 
ingroup-committed wrongdoing and group identification has suggested that people demand 
for justice and identify with their ingroups in more than one way (e.g., Roccas, Klar, & 
Liviatan, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). As we review next, this work 
has demonstrated that the ways of pursuing justice and identifying with groups can have 
differential downstream consequences for intergroup emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. 
Distinct notions of justice and modes of ingroup identification may thus also differentially 
relate to the forms of collective action people support. 
Justice Notions 
 A prominent explanation behind why people act against injustice is the feeling that 
one’s group is deprived compared to others. Relative deprivation theory posits that a 
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subjective sense that one’s group is treated unequally or unjustly can propel collective 
action (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Building on this fundamental 
idea, we propose that the specific ways in which people demand for ingroup justice may 
shape support for different types of collective actions. When faced with injustice, people 
may have divergent ideas about how to restore justice. Research on interpersonal and 
intergroup wrongdoing has found that there are two prominent notions of justice (Goode 
& Smith, 2016; Wenzel et al., 2008; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010). People who feel victimized 
may seek retributive or restorative justice. Retributive justice focuses primarily on 
unilateral punishment of the offender, while restorative justice focuses primarily on 
bilateral repair of the relationship between victim and offender by means of compensation, 
apology, and reaffirmation of shared values between the two parties (Wenzel et al., 2008). 
 Preferences for retributive or restorative justice have important implications in 
shaping intergroup relations in the aftermath of intergroup conflict. Although there is some 
evidence suggesting that retributive justice mechanisms (e.g., international criminal 
tribunals) can have positive effects in terms of promoting reconciliation (Study 3 and 4, Li, 
Leidner, Petrović, Orazani, & Rad, 2017), notions of retributive justice have been linked 
to destructive intergroup outcomes such as aggressive conflict resolution strategies 
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) and support for future violence (Study 1 and 2, Li et. 
al., 2017). By contrast, notions of restorative justice have been linked to peaceful 
intergroup outcomes such as forgiveness of perpetrators (Regalia, Pelucchi, Paleari, Manzi, 
& Brambilla, 2015) and support for peace deals to resolve conflict (Leidner et al., 2013). 
Building on this prior work, we move beyond conflict resolution attitudes and policy 
preferences to investigate collective action outcomes.  
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Although no prior work, to our knowledge, has examined how justice orientations 
may predict distinct collective action outcomes, recent work in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context showed that the motivation to punish the outgroup’s past behavior promoted 
violent collective action tendencies, whereas motivation to change the outgroup’s future 
behavior promoted nonviolent collective action tendencies (Study 2 and 3, Hasan-Aslih, 
Netzer, van Zomeren, Saguy, Tamir, & Halperin, 2018). While this work did not explicitly 
examine the role of justice concerns, it is likely that punitive goals mirror the notion of 
retributive justice, whereas change-oriented goals mirror the notion of restorative justice, 
thereby providing indirect support for our proposed link between retributive justice and 
nonnormative collective action, and between restorative justice and normative collective 
action. In addition to examining the link between justice orientations and distinct collective 
action outcomes, we further examine the role that different modes of group identification 
play in predicting both justice orientations and collective action.  
Group Identification 
 Group identification – that is, the extent to which people subjectively share an 
identity with others – plays a crucial role in motivating collective action (for a review, see 
van Zomeren et al., 2008). Various social psychological models of collective action have 
focused on the role of group identification. For instance, scholars have theorized that when 
people consciously engage in a power struggle to improve the condition of their group 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001), or when identities become linked to relevant group norms 
(Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), group identification will prompt collective action. 
While group identification is a central feature of collective action, it has mostly been 
studied as a unidimensional construct, such that stronger identification with a group 
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promotes collective action to benefit the group. However, the content and meaning of a 
group identity can shape the downstream consequences of ingroup identification on 
intergroup relations (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). Many scholars in the social identity 
literature, however, have theorized that group identification is a multidimensional construct 
(Ashmore, Deauz, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Leach et 
al., 2008; Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; Schatz, 
Staub, & Lavine, 1999), such that the different components of group identification can 
have distinct consequences for group-based emotions, attitudes, and behaviors.  
In the context of intergroup conflicts, ingroup glorification and attachment are 
critical in shaping relevant conflict attitudes (Castano, 2008; Roccas et al., 2006). As 
defined by Roccas et al. (2006), glorification is based on beliefs in the ingroup’s superiority 
over other groups, and (unconditional) deference to ingroup authorities, whereas 
attachment is based on feelings of emotional connection and commitment to one’s group, 
as well as a desire to contribute to the group. These dimensions of group identity integrate 
earlier distinctions such as pseudo-patriotism and genuine patriotism (Adorno, Frankel-
Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), nationalism and patriotism (Kosterman & 
Feshbach, 1989; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005), as well as blind and constructive 
patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Prior research has demonstrated that 
glorification (but not attachment) predicts hostile intergroup outcomes, such as the denial 
of ingroup violence against outgroups (Bilali, 2013) and dehumanization of victims 
(Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), thereby prolonging conflict. Further, 
there is also empirical support for a positive link between glorification and retributive 
justice (Li et al., 2017). By contrast, attachment promoted greater guilt over ingroup 
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wrongdoings (Roccas et al., 2006). By extension, it is plausible that stronger ingroup 
attachment would instead motivate restorative justice. Integrating the literatures on 
dimensions of ingroup identification and notions of justice to understand support for 
different forms of collective action, we propose that glorification will promote support for 
nonnormative collective action through a desire for retributive justice, whereas attachment 
will promote support for normative collective action through a desire for restorative justice 
(see conceptual Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Conceptual model of the link between modes of ingroup attachment, notions of 
justice, and different forms of collective action. 
Overview of Present Research 
We situated the present research around the ongoing intractable and asymmetrical 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Although high and 
low status groups do respond to conflict as a function of their primary role in the conflict 
(e.g., perpetrators or victims; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; for a review see Li & Leidner, in 
press), it is also the case that both sides can view themselves as victims (Leidner et al., 
2013; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Indeed, Palestinians and Jewish Israelis 
continue to undertake various forms of collective action in pursuit of justice for their 
respective ingroups (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The Israeli-Palestinian context therefore 
Attachment Normative collective action
Non-normative 
collective actionRetributive justice
Restorative justice
Glorification
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provides high ecological validity with strong real-world relevance to study collective action 
on both sides of an intergroup conflict. To do so, we surveyed Arab (Study 1) and Jewish 
Israelis (Study 2) to test whether there are distinct pathways from modes of ingroup 
identification to notions of justice, and subsequently to collective action outcomes. Further, 
during a period of real-world conflict escalation (i.e., the 70th anniversary of Israeli 
independence and Palestinian Al-Nakba) we examined the effects of emphasizing 
retributive versus restorative justice on the aforementioned pathways among Jewish 
Israelis (Study 3). All three studies received ethics approval from the institutional review 
board at our university. De-identified data will be made available at the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (www.openicpsr.org). Verbatim materials 
are available as online Supplementary Materials. 
Study 1 
Method 
 Participants and Procedure. One hundred and sixty-five Arab Israelis were 
recruited through the Midgam Project (www.midgam.com) to complete an online survey 
on attitudes toward conflict and were subsequently compensated with a small monetary 
reward.15 Seventeen participants did not complete the survey (i.e., dropped out midway), 
thus 148 participants were retained for analyses (78 males, 70 females; age range = 19 to 
57 years, M = 30.98, SD = 8.60). The measures of interest were included as brief scales (2-
                                                        
15 Given that we did not have direct access to Palestinians specifically, we broadly sampled Arab 
Israelis, many of whom would identify as Palestinian. On the surveys, participants were asked 
about their identification with Palestinians, and the measures of justice notions and collective 
action were in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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4 items each) as part of a longer survey on Arab Israelis’ socio-political attitudes16. 
Although we did not conduct an a priori power analysis to determine sample size, a 
sensitivity analysis indicated that with 148 participants, we would be able to detect (with α 
= .05) an effect of r = 0.24 in a bivariate correlation with 80% power (Faul et al., 2007). 
Measures. 
 Glorification and attachment. Participants were asked the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement about their identity using items from Roccas et al. 
(2006), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Four items 
measured glorification (α = .65; e.g., “The Palestinian people are better than other people 
in all respects”). Four items measured attachment (α = .90; e.g., “I am strongly committed 
to the Palestinian people”). Glorification and attachment was positively correlated, r = .48, 
p < .001. 
 Retributive and restorative justice. Participants were asked to which extent they 
agreed or disagreed with statements about how to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
to achieve justice, adapted from Leidner et al. (2013), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Two items measured support for retributive justice: “For 
the sake of justice, Jewish Israelis have to suffer” and “The only way to restore justice is 
to punish Jewish Israelis” (r = .63, p < .001). Two items measured support for restorative 
justice: “To restore justice, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a 
peaceful world” and “Without Jewish Israelis giving a sincere apology for having acted 
wrongly, the injustice is not completely restored” (r = .18, p = .041). Unexpectedly, we 
                                                        
16 The survey aimed to test several research questions as part of a larger project on conflict 
attitudes, and therefore included measures that did not pertain to the research questions addressed 
in this paper. 
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found that the two restorative justice items were differentially correlated with the 
retributive justice items. Whereas the restorative justice item regarding apology was 
positively correlated with retributive justice (r = .18, p = .041), the restorative justice item 
regarding shared values item was negatively correlated with retributive justice (r = -.38, p 
< .001). Given its low correlation with the other intended restorative justice item and the 
positive (rather than negative) correlation with the retributive justice measure, we dropped 
the apology item and only used the shared values item as a single-item measure of 
restorative justice. 
 Nonnormative and normative collective action. Participants were asked to what 
extent they supported or opposed various action in the struggle of Arab citizens to improve 
their situation in Israel, on an analog scale of 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support). 
Two items measured support for nonnormative collective action: “Non-violent yet 
unlawful actions of protest (such as participating in unauthorized demonstrations, blocking 
roads, etc.)” and “Violent actions of protest (physically confronting police, property 
damage, etc.)” (r = .38, p < .001). Three items measured support for normative collective 
action: “Actions of protest online (such as signing petitions, sharing information on 
Facebook, etc.)”, “Actions of protest in Israel within the law (such as participating in 
authorized demonstrations, distribution of informational materials, etc.)”, “Actions of 
protest abroad within the law (such as participating in demonstrations overseas, meeting 
foreign politicians, etc.)” (α = .85). The composite scores of nonnormative collective action 
and normative collective action were not significantly correlated, r = -.11, p = .204. 
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Results 
 The means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables are 
displayed in Table 7. Consistent with expectations, glorification was positively correlated 
with retributive (but not restorative) justice, and with nonnormative (but not normative) 
collective action. Attachment was positively correlated with restorative (and also 
retributive) justice, and with normative (and marginally, with nonnormative) collective 
action.  
To simultaneously investigate whether glorification predicted nonnormative 
collective action through retributive justice, and whether attachment predicted normative 
collective action through restorative justice, we conducted a path analysis using SAS 9.4. 
The model, depicted in Figure 8, fit the data well, χ2(6) = 5.42, p = .492, SRMR = .04, 
RMSEA < .01, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .97 (n = 124). We allowed the error terms of glorification 
Table 7 
 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables in Study 1. 
 
Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Glorification  4.53 (1.53) -      
2. Attachment 4.46 (2.13) .48*** -     
3. Retributive justice 2.74 (1.66) .30*** .29*** -    
4. Restorative justice 7.29 (1.95) .13 .20* -.38*** -   
5. Nonnormative 
collective action 
2.61 
(1.66) .26** .15
† .49*** -.47*** -  
6. Normative 
collective action 
6.16 
(2.07) .06 .21* -.17
† .44*** -.11 - 
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05,  † p < .09 
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and attachment (b = 1.71, SE = .03, t = 5.25, p < .001), retributive and restorative justice 
(b = -1.48, SE = .31, t = -4.71, p < .001), and nonnormative and normative collective action 
(b = .31, SE = .22, t = 1.39, p = .163) to correlate, reflecting their theoretical 
conceptualization as two parts of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, justice 
demands, and collective action, respectively). As seen in Figure 2, glorification predicted 
greater retributive justice (b = .31, SE = .09, t = 3.52, p < .001), which, in turn, predicted 
greater nonnormative collective action (b = .25, SE = .08, t = 2.99, p = .003). Attachment 
predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .08, t = 3.37, p < .001), which, in turn, 
predicted greater normative collective action (b = .49, SE = .08, t = 6.06, p < .001). The 
indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative collective action via retributive justice 
was significant, b = .08, SE = .03, t = 2.28, p = .023, and so was the indirect effect from 
attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice, b = .12, SE = .04, t = 2.95, 
p = .003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Path model for Study 1. Unhypothesized paths are in grey. Coefficients are 
unstandardized estimates. 
 
 In addition to the indirect pathway from glorification to nonnormative collective 
action through retributive justice, the direct path from glorification to nonnormative 
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collective action was also significant (b = .24, SE = .09, t = 2.81, p = .005). Further, in 
addition to the positive path from restorative justice to normative collective action, there 
was also a significant negative path from restorative justice to nonnormative collective 
action (b = -.32, SE = .07, t = -4.84, p < .001). Although these paths were not hypothesized, 
their presence is not inconsistent with the hypothesized paths and therefore does not take 
away from our predicted model. Specifically, these additional paths suggest that the 
relationship between glorification and nonnormative collective action remained significant 
even after accounting for the role of retributive justice in predicting nonnormative 
collective action; and that restorative justice, in addition to positively predicting normative 
collective action, also negatively predicted nonnormative collective action. We also 
conducted separate regression analyses to test the links between (a) glorification and 
attachment to retributive/restorative justice, and (b) retributive and restorative justice to 
nonnormative/normative collective action. Results of these regression analyses converged 
with the results of the path analysis reported above. 
Alternative Model Testing 
 It is plausible that people’s support for collective action shapes their notions of 
justice, rather than their notions of justice shaping support for collective action. People may 
justify or rationalize their support for nonnormative collective action by supporting 
retributive justice, and similarly rationalize their support for normative collective action by 
supporting restorative justice. Thus, we tested an alternative model where 1) glorification 
predicted nonnormative collective action, and nonnormative collective action predicted 
retributive justice, and where 2) attachment predicted normative collective action, and 
normative collective action predicted restorative justice (i.e., we reversed the order of the 
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mediating and the outcome variables). Although the model fit was acceptable, χ2(5) = 
10.10, p = .072, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .76, NFI = .94 (n = 124), The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) also indicated the empirical superiority of the hypothesized 
model (AIC = 35.42) over the alternative model (AIC = 42.10). It was not appropriate to 
conduct a chi-square difference test given that these models were not nested. 
Power Analysis 
 We conducted sensitivity analysis with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 
Buchner, 2007), which indicated that with a sample size of 128, we would have been able 
to detect a bivariate correlation of at least .24, with a two-tailed α of .05 at 80% power, 
which is slightly below the smallest correlation of interest that we found (r = .20), 
suggesting that the study was slightly underpowered. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 investigated how different modes of group identification (attachment and 
glorification) predict distinct notions of justice (retributive and restorative), and how these 
in turn predict support for different types of collective action (normative and 
nonnormative), among a sample of Arab Israelis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In line with hypotheses, the results revealed that ingroup glorification predicted 
more retributive justice, and subsequently more support for nonnormative collective action, 
whereas ingroup attachment predicted more restorative justice, and subsequently more 
support for normative collective action. Additionally, we found that restorative justice also 
predicted less support for nonnormative collective action. Although this link was not 
hypothesized, it is consistent with our theorizing and suggests that restorative justice does 
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not only promote support for normative collective action, but also reduces support for 
nonnormative collective action. 
 It is important to note that the restorative justice measure used in our model was 
focused on restoring shared values, not on providing compensation. As in prior research, 
we had initially measured restorative justice as both compensation (apology) and 
restoration of shared values (Leidner et al., 2010, 2013). However, we found that seeking 
an apology from the other side in the conflict was positively correlated with retributive 
justice and seeking restoration of shared values between one’s own and the other side of 
the conflict was negatively correlated with retributive justice. This suggests that 
participants understood the apology item more in retributive (rather than in restorative) 
terms. This pattern has also been found in past research; the apology dimension of 
restorative justice does not always load with restorative justice (Leidner et al., 2013, Study 
2), and can sometimes load with retributive justice (Leidner et al., 2010). Consistent with 
theorizing from Darley and Pittman (2003) who argued that retributive justice is a 
combination of punishment and compensation, it is possible that demanding compensation 
is part of retributive justice because it is a way to hold the perpetrator group accountable, 
and even punish it by means of public shaming. In line with this, Leonard, Mackie, and 
Smith (2011) found that when victims received an apology from the perpetrator group, 
their desire for retribution reduced, which indirectly suggests that apology may satisfy 
some desire for retributive justice.  
Study 2 
 While Study 1 found evidence in support of our model in a sample of Arab Israelis, 
Study 2 further tested our model with another group involved in the same conflict: Jewish 
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Israelis. The method for Study 2 was largely identical to Study 1. The key difference was 
that we adapted the measures to the perspective of Jewish Israelis (e.g., promote Jewish 
Israeli rights). We also added more items to measure our variables of interest, in particular 
address the acceptable but not ideal reliability of the four-item glorification measure in 
Study 1. By anchoring on the same conflict, we sought to examine whether the same 
psychological processes occurred on both sides of the conflict, thereby providing a test of 
generalizability. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. An a priori power analysis conducted using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) estimated a sample size of 319 to detect a correlation of r = 
.20 (i.e., the smallest correlation of interest in Study 1) with 95% power, with a two-tailed 
α of .05. To account for potential attrition and exclusions, we recruited 364 Jewish Israelis 
through the Midgam Project to complete an online survey on their socio-political attitudes 
in exchange for a small monetary reward. After excluding 13 participants who did not 
complete the survey (e.g., dropped out midway), 4 participants who were not Israeli 
citizens, 40 participants who were not native Hebrew speakers, and 13 participants who 
were multivariate outliers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), 294 participants were retained 
for analyses (155 males, 139 females; age 19 to 57 years, M = 38.03, SD = 12.81). With 
this sample size, we achieved 93% power.  
 Measures. The survey measures matched those used in Study 1 but were adapted 
to the Jewish Israeli context. 
 Glorification and attachment. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed 
or disagreed with similar statements used in Study 1 adapted for Jewish Israelis, and 
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including additional items from Roccas et al. (2006), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Specifically, in addition to the four glorification items from 
Study 1, we included four more items to measure glorification (α = .86; e.g., “It is disloyal 
for Israelis to criticize Israel”), thereby using the complete eight-item scale from Roccas et 
al. (2006). Similarly, in addition to the four attachment items from Study 1, we included 
four more items to measure attachment (α = .85; e.g., “It is important for me to help my 
country”), thus using the complete eight-item scale from Roccas et al. (2006). Glorification 
and attachment were positively correlated, r = .53, p < .001.   
 Retributive and restorative justice. Participants were asked to what extent they 
agreed or disagreed with similar statements used in Study 1 about how to deal with the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to achieve justice, using additional statements adapted from 
Leidner et al. (2013), measured on an analog scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
agree). Specifically, in addition to the two items from Study 1, three more items were 
included to measure support for retributive justice (α = .91; e.g., “Justice is only fully 
served when there are punitive measures against the Palestinians for their actions”), thus 
using the full scale from Leidner et al. (2013). In addition to the two items from Study 1, 
three more items were included to measure support for restorative justice (e.g., “For justice 
to be reinstated, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on which ethical values should not 
be violated”, “For justice to be fully reinstated, the Palestinians need to express remorse to 
the Israeli victims and their family members for what happened”), thus using the full scale 
from Leidner et al. (2013).  
A reliability analysis on the five restorative justice items indicated that the item-
total correlation for the two items about value reaffirmation was low (rs = .26 and .24, 
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respectively). Further, an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation revealed that the 
compensation items and value restoration items loaded onto two distinct factors. We 
therefore created separate composite variables for restorative justice through value 
compensation and restorative justice through value restoration. Mirroring Study 1, we 
found that the compensation and value restoration dimensions of restorative justice were 
differentially correlated with retributive justice. Specifically, restorative justice through 
compensation was positively correlated with retributive justice (r = .61, p < .001), whereas 
restorative justice through value reaffirmation was negatively correlated with retributive 
justice (r = -.14, p = .020). This suggests that participants saw restorative justice through 
compensation as more retributive rather than restorative in nature. Thus, we excluded the 
three items on restorative justice through compensation, and only used the two items on 
restorative justice through value reaffirmation as our measure of restorative justice (r = .55, 
p < .001). 
 Nonnormative and normative collective action. Participants were asked to what 
extent they supported or opposed various actions in the struggle of Jewish Israelis to 
support their cause and protect their rights in Israel (adapted from Tausch et al., 2011; 
Shuman et al., 2016), on an analog scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support). 
Six items were developed to measure support for nonnormative collective action (α = .80; 
e.g., “Organize disruptive direct actions (for example, sit ins in buildings to block 
entrances, block roads or highways) to advocate for Jewish settler rights”, “Violent protests 
(physically confronting police, property damage, etc.) to defend the rights of Jewish 
settlers”). Another six items were developed to measure support for normative collective 
action (α = .94; e.g., “Sign petitions to advocate for the rights of Jewish Israelis”, 
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“Participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler rights”). 
The composite scores of nonnormative and normative collective action were positively 
correlated, r = .41, p < .001.17 
Results 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the main variables are reported 
in Table 8. Consistent with Study 1, glorification was positively correlated with retributive 
justice, and with nonnormative collective action; attachment was positively correlated with 
restorative justice, and with normative collective action.  
 
Table 8 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables in Study 2. 
Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Glorification  6.16 (1.59) -      
2. Attachment 7.55 (1.32) .53*** -     
3. Retributive justice 4.56 (2.25) .42*** .07 -    
4. Restorative justice 7.18 (1.65) .15** .21*** -.14* -   
5. Nonnormative 
collective action 
3.22 
(1.55) .32*** .02 .61*** -.21*** -  
6. Normative 
collective action 
6.25 
(1.95) .56*** .36*** .47*** .14* .41*** - 
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
                                                        
17 The nonnormative collective action composite included items on both violent and non-violent 
actions. Given past findings that violent and non-violent nonnormative actions sometimes load 
onto the same factor (e.g., Shuman et al., 2016) but other times onto different factors (e.g., 
Tausch et al., 2011), we also tested our model using either violent or non-violent nonnormative 
collective action as the outcome composite measure of nonnormative collective action. We found 
virtually the same results as reported herein (see Supplementary Materials for details), suggesting 
that our effects generalize across violent and non-violent forms of nonnormative action. 
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To simultaneously test whether glorification predicts nonnormative collective 
action through retributive justice, and whether attachment predicts normative collective 
action through restorative justice, we conducted a path analysis using SAS 9.4. The model, 
depicted in Figure 9, fit the data well, χ2(3) = 7.43, p = .059, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .07, 
CFI = .99, NFI = .99 (n = 292). As we did in Study 1, we allowed the error terms of 
glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, SE = .14, t = 8.01, p < .001), retributive and 
restorative justice (b = -.66, SE =.19, t = -3.42, p < .001), and nonnormative and normative 
collective action (b = .39, SE = .11, t = 3.54, p < .001) to correlate, reflecting the conceptual 
idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, notions of justice, 
and collective action, respectively). As seen in Figure 3, glorification predicted greater 
retributive justice (b = .77, SE = .09, t = 8.99, p < .001), which predicted greater 
nonnormative collective action (b = .41, SE = .03, t = 12.66, p < .001). Attachment 
predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.63, p < .001), which predicted 
greater normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .06, t = 2.13, p = .033). The indirect effect 
from glorification to nonnormative collective action via retributive justice was significant, 
b = .31, SE = .04, t = 7.33, p < .001. The indirect effect from attachment to normative 
collective action via restorative justice was marginally significant, b = .03, SE = .02, t = 
1.84, p = .066. 
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Figure 9. Path model for Study 2. Unhypothesized paths are in grey. Coefficients are 
unstandardized estimates. 
 
  As in Study 1, in addition to the hypothesized effects, several other paths were also 
significant (see Figure 3). Again, although these paths were not hypothesized, their 
presence was not inconsistent with the hypothesized paths. Specifically, these additional 
paths suggest that there was a negative relationship between attachment and retributive 
justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p < .001), and restorative justice and nonnormative 
collective action (b = -.12, SE = .04, t = -2.80, p = .005). There was also a positive 
relationship between glorification and normative collective action (b = .35, SE = .07, t = 
4.84, p < .001), and retributive justice and normative collective action (b = .29, SE = .04, t 
= 6.57, p < .001). As in Study 1, we also conducted separate regression analyses to test the 
effects of (a) glorification and attachment on retributive/restorative justice, and of (b) 
retributive and restorative justice on nonnormative/normative collective action. Results of 
these regression analyses again converged with the results of the path analysis.18 
                                                        
18 We also tested our model using only the measures for which we had comparable items in Study 1 (i.e., 
without the additional items for group identification and notions of justice used only in Study 2). This model 
also fit the data well, χ2(5) = 15.38, p = .009, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .98, NFI = .97 (N = 292), 
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Alternative Model Testing 
 As in Study 1, we tested an alternative model in which 1) glorification predicted 
nonnormative collective action, and nonnormative collective action predicted retributive 
justice, as well as 2) attachment predicted normative collective action, and normative 
collective action predicted restorative justice (i.e., we reversed the order of the mediating 
and the outcome variables). The model fit was unacceptable, χ2(7) = 120.39, p < .001, 
SRMR = .13, RMSEA = .24, CFI = .77, NFI = .76 (n = 292). 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated and extended the findings from Study 1 using a sample of Jewish 
Israelis (i.e., members of the other party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). We also 
expanded on our measures of interest (group identification, notions of justice, and 
collective action) by including more items to improve construct validity and reliability. We 
replicated the core findings from Study 1: glorification predicted more retributive justice, 
and subsequently more support for nonnormative collective action, whereas attachment 
predicted more restorative justice, and subsequently more support for normative collective 
action. 
 It is important to note that we also found several additional pathways that were 
somewhat inconsistent with Study 1. Specifically, glorification and retributive justice 
predicted greater support for both forms of collective action. This may be because the social 
context of undertaking collective action for Arab and Jewish Israelis are in Israel, a Jewish 
state. The “normativeness” of a particular action is related to the social systems in which 
                                                        
suggesting that our findings were stable regardless of the number of items used to measure our variables of 
interest. 
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people are embedded (Wright et al., 1990). Further, the measures of glorification for Jewish 
Israelis were focused on glorifying Israelis, whereas for Arab Israelis, they were focused 
on glorifying Palestinians. Thus, for Jewish Israelis, collective action undertaken within 
the norms of Israel may resonate with glorifying Israel and may still reach their goals of 
retributive justice. However, for Arabs, glorifying Palestinians and their desire for 
retributive justice exclusively predicts support for actions outside the norms and laws of 
Israel.  
Additionally, as in Study 1, we found a negative relationship between restorative 
justice and nonnormative collective action, and a negative relationship between attachment 
and retributive justice. Although these paths were not hypothesized, they are not 
inconsistent with our theorizing. These pathways demonstrate that restorative justice and 
attachment are not only predictive of greater support for normative collective action, but 
also predictive of weaker support for nonnormative collective action. 
Study 3 
Study 1 and 2 provided correlational evidence for our model from the perspective 
of Arab and Jewish Israelis, respectively. Both studies provide evidence of mediation 
through mediational analyses, through which a proposed mechanism is measured (see 
measurement-of-mediation design in Spencer, Zanna, & Fond, 2005). Study 3 aimed to test 
our model experimentally to provide causal evidence for the role of justice orientations as 
the mediator of the link between group identification and collective action. The goal of this 
approach is to manipulate the mediator by emphasizing different notions of justice, thereby 
changing the strength of the mechanism between modes of ingroup identification and 
distinct collective action outcomes (see moderation-of-process design in Spencer et al., 
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2005, and manipulation-of-mediator design in Pirlott & MacKinnon, 2016). This approach 
is responsive to recent calls by researchers and journal editors in our field to employ 
experimental designs to provide evidence of mediation (e.g., Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011; 
Smith, 2012). 
Study 3 manipulated people’s perceptions of justice orientations by either 
emphasizing retributive justice, restorative justice, or neither (i.e., control), and examined 
their effect on the link between modes of ingroup identification and different forms of 
collective action. In the control condition, we expected to replicate the findings from Study 
1 and 2, such that glorification would predict increased nonnormative collective action 
whereas attachment would predict increased normative collective action. In the retributive 
justice condition, we expected that glorification would predict increased nonnormative 
action, but attachment would no longer predict increased normative collective action. By 
contrast, in the restorative justice condition, we expected that attachment would predict 
increased normative collective action, but glorification would no longer predict increased 
nonnormative collective action. 
Study 3 was conducted a week before the 70th anniversary of the Israeli Declaration 
of Independence on May 14, which is preceded by the 70th anniversary of the Palestinian 
Nakba Day on May 15. These dates hold radically different meanings for Israelis and 
Palestinians. For Palestinians, al-Nakba (“the catastrophe”) is the annual commemoration 
of the loss of Palestinian land and the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from their 
homes during the war in 1948. By contrast, Israelis celebrate the end of the war because it 
led to the establishment of an independent Jewish State, which ensured a homeland for the 
Jewish diaspora. In 2018, Palestinians organized the Great March of Return, a series of 
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protests between March 30th and May 15th, at the border between Gaza and Israel, 
demanding that Palestinian refugees displaced during the founding of Israel can return to 
their land. Clashes between protesters and Israeli armed forces left over a hundred 
Palestinians killed and thousands more injured (Sanchez & Oliphant, 2018). Thus, the 
timing of data collection provided a high-stakes, real-world context to examine Jewish 
Israelis’ support for collective action during a period of heightened intergroup conflict, as 
well as a period in which the origins of the present-day conflict were especially salient. 
This context also increased the external validity of our retributive versus restorative justice 
manipulation, given that the question of how to best respond to Palestinians’ protests was 
a critical concern among Jewish Israelis. 
Method 
Participants 
An a priori power analysis conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) estimated 
that a sample of 165 per condition (495 in total) would be sufficient (80% power) to detect 
differences between three groups, based on the smallest hypothesized effect we observed 
in Study 2 (r = .14 between restorative justice and normative collective action) with a two-
tailed α of .05. To account for potential attrition and exclusions, we oversampled 
participants. To help ensure we would obtain at least the desired sample of 495 participants, 
and anticipating a non-negligible number of participants that would need to be excluded 
from data analysis due to failed manipulation and attention checks, we recruited 607 Jewish 
Israeli participants via Midgam Project to complete an online survey on their attitudes 
about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our screening of the data resulted in the exclusion of 
37 participants because they did not understand or pay sufficient attention to the 
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manipulation material (as indicated by their incorrect answers to the attention check 
questions), 26 participants because they spent significantly more time reading the material 
compared to the rest of the sample, and 1 participant who was not an Israeli citizen. In total, 
546 participants were retained for subsequent analyses (Nretributive = 172, Nrestorative = 170, 
Ncontrol = 204; 276 females, 269 males, 1 other; age 18 to 73 years, M = 43.94, SD = 15.60). 
With this final sample size, we achieved 84% power. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to a retributive justice, restorative justice, or 
control condition. Participants in the retributive and restorative justice conditions read a 
fictitious, but allegedly real excerpt from an article written by an ostensibly Jewish Israeli 
author in which the author addresses other, presumably mainly Jewish, Israelis. In the 
retributive justice condition, the article argued that the harm that the Palestinians inflicted 
upon Israelis caused a severe loss of power and status to Israelis. The author of the article 
then reasoned that restoring justice would require Palestinians to be punished for their 
actions, proportionate to the harm that Palestinian attacks caused. Such punitive measures 
should hold Palestinians accountable for the suffering they caused Israelis, and thus help 
Israelis to regain the power they lost. In the restorative justice condition, the article argued 
that the harm Palestinians inflicted upon Israelis had disrupted the relationship between the 
two groups. The author of the article then reasoned that restoring justice would require the 
relationship between the groups to be repaired by reestablishing shared values and 
principles that had been violated. Specifically, both groups should work towards a mutual 
understanding of the harm that Palestinian attacks caused, and thus the reaffirm both 
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groups’ commitment to shared values and principles. In the control condition, participants 
did not read any article and proceeded directly to the survey questions. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks. In the retributive and restorative justice condition, 
participants were asked “According to the author of the excerpt that you just read, which 
of the following needs to happen in order to achieve justice between Palestinians and 
Israelis?” The correct answer in the retributive justice condition was “Punish Palestinians 
for their actions”, whereas in the restorative justice condition, it was “Re-establish the 
shared values of our communities”. In both conditions, the incorrect answers were “There 
needs to be a conflict mediation conducted by a third party” and “The author did not discuss 
this issue”. Participants were also asked “Which group do you think the author belongs 
to?”. The correct answer in both conditions was “Israelis”, and the incorrect answers were 
“Palestinians” and “Iranians”.  
Glorification and attachment were measured using the same items as in Study 2 
(glorification: α = .86, M = 6.21, SD = 1.61; attachment: α = .90, M = 7.66, SD = 1.44).  
Nonnormative and normative collective action were measured by adapting the 
items used in Study 2 to be about Jewish Israeli rights more generally, instead of 
exclusively about Jewish settler rights (which was the focus in Study 2). Participants were 
asked to what extent they supported or opposed various efforts of Israelis to protect itself 
from Palestinian attacks, in terms of safety, the well-being and livelihood of Israelis, and 
the right to a Jewish state, on a (continuous) analog scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 
(strongly support). Seven items were developed to measure support for nonnormative 
collective action (α = .86; M = 4.53, SD = 1.89; e.g., “participate in non-violent 
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demonstrations to support Israel’s right to defend itself against Palestinian aggression, even 
if the demonstrations are unauthorized”). Another set of seven items were developed to 
measure support for normative collective action (α = .87; M = 7.27, SD = 1.35; e.g., “join 
advocacy groups that focus on the protection of Israel through peaceful means”)  
Results 
First, we conducted general linear models to check for any effects of condition 
(retributive, restorative, control) on our measured variables. Then, we conducted a multi-
group path analysis to simultaneously test the hypothesis that glorification and attachment 
would differentially predict nonnormative and normative collective action depending on 
condition. 
Main Effects of Condition 
There was no significant effect of condition on glorification, F(2, 543) = .60, p = 
.549 (Mrestorative = 6.23, SDrestorative = 1.51; Mretributive = 6.10, SDretributive = 1.73; Mcontrol = 
6.28, SDcontrol = 1.58), or attachment, F(2, 543) = 0.36, p = .695 (Mrestorative = 7.69, 
SDrestorative = 1.33; Mretributive = 7.59, SDretributive = 1.51; Mcontrol = 7.71, SDcontrol = 1.46), 
supporting our methodological conceptualization of glorification and attachment as 
independent variables. 
There was no significant effect of condition on nonnormative collective action, F(2, 
543) = .39, p = .675 (Mrestorative = 4.44, SDrestorative = 1.83; Mretributive = 4.62, SDretributive = 
1.89; Mcontrol = 4.53, SDcontrol = 1.92). However, there was a significant effect of condition 
on normative collective action, F(2, 543) = 4.84, p = .008. Specifically, normative 
collective action in the restorative condition (M = 7.01, SD = 1.25) was lower compared to 
the retributive condition (M = 7.35, SD = 1.39), t(543) = -2.30, p = .022, and also compared 
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to the control (M = 7.43, SD = 1.37), t(540) = -2.29, p = .003. There was no significant 
difference in normative collective action between the control and the retributive condition, 
t(540) = 0.60, p = .547. Although we did not hypothesize any main effects of condition, 
the presence of main effects does not preclude our hypothesis, which is that the link 
between modes of group identification and different forms of collective action would be 
moderated by condition. 
Multi-Group Path Analysis 
We conducted a fully unconstrained and saturated multi-group path analysis using 
SAS 9.4 to assess the differences between the path estimates across the three conditions 
(i.e., paths from glorification to nonnormative and normative collective action, and paths 
from attachment to nonnormative and normative collective action; see Figure 10). Since 
fully saturated models by definition have perfect fit, our main interest was in the 
significance and magnitude of the path coefficients and their differences across conditions. 
As in Study 1 and 2, we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment, and the 
error terms of nonnormative and normative collective action to correlate, reflecting their 
theoretical conceptualization as two parts of a broader construct (i.e., group identification 
and collective action, respectively).  
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Figure 10. Multi-group path model for Study 3. Non-significant paths are in dashed lines. 
Coefficients are unstandardized estimates. 
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predicted more normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .07, t = 1.73, p = .084). The effect 
of glorification on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than the effect 
of glorification on normative collective action (b = .53, SE = .10, t = 5.09, p < .001). Also 
as hypothesized, attachment predicted more normative collective action (b = .30, SE = .07, 
t = 4.09, p < .001), but not nonnormative collective action (b = -.08, SE = .10, t = -0.82, p 
= .411). These findings replicated the correlational findings from Study 1 and 2. 
In the retributive justice condition, in line with hypotheses, glorification predicted 
more nonnormative collective action (b = .58, SE = .09, t = 6.24, p < .001) and more 
normative collective action (b = .23, SE = .07, t = 3.18, p = .002). The effect of glorification 
on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than the effect of glorification 
on normative collective action (b = .35, SE = .11, t = 3.07, p = .002). Further, attachment 
was no longer a significant predictor of normative collective action (b = .10, SE = .08, t = 
1.21, p = .228) and nonnormative collective action (b = -.17, SE = .11, t = -1.63, p = .103).  
In the restorative condition, inconsistent with our hypotheses, glorification 
predicted more nonnormative collective action (b = .61, SE = .09, t = 6.56, p < .001) and 
marginally more normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .06, t = 1.84, p = .066). Still, 
the effect of glorification on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than 
the effect of glorification on normative collective action (b = .50, SE = .10, t = 4.74, p < 
.001). By contrast, as hypothesized, attachment predicted more normative collective action 
(b = .33, SE = .07, t = 4.53, p < .001) and less nonnormative collective action (b = -.25, SE 
= .11, t = -2.35, p = .019). The effect of attachment on normative collective action was 
significantly stronger than the effect of attachment on nonnormative collective action (b = 
.58, SE = .12, t = 4.89, p < .001).  
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 To test whether the strength of the relationships between modes of ingroup 
identification and different forms of collective action differed across condition, we 
systematically tested whether the path coefficients of critical paths differed across 
condition according to hypotheses. To do so, we used the TESTFUNC statement in SAS 
9.4, which uses z-tests to determine whether specific parameters in the model are 
statistically different from each other. As predicted, we found that the link between 
attachment and normative collective action was significantly stronger in the restorative 
condition compared to the retributive condition (b = .23, SE = .11, t = 2.12, p = .034). 
However, inconsistent with our predictions, the link between glorification and 
nonnormative collective action did not significantly differ between the restorative and 
retributive conditions (b = .03, SE = .13, t = .26, p = .795).19 
Discussion 
Replicating the findings in Study 1 and 2, the control condition in Study 3 found 
that in the absence of any manipulation of justice notions, glorification predicted more 
support for nonnormative collective action whereas attachment predicted more support for 
normative collective action. Study 3 further demonstrated that emphasizing either 
retributive or restorative justice can change (or maintain) the link between modes of 
ingroup identification (glorification and attachment) with different forms of collective 
action (nonnormative or normative). Specifically, the effect of glorification on greater 
nonnormative collective action remained unchanged regardless of whether retributive or 
                                                        
19 Throughout studies 1 to 3, we consistently checked the distribution of variables for any 
violations of the normality assumption. If the distribution was severely skewed, we transformed 
the distribution according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), and then re-ran analyses with the 
transformed variable(s). The results remained virtually the same when we used the transformed 
variables instead of the raw variables. 
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restorative justice was emphasized, suggesting that the link from glorification to 
nonnormative collective action is quite stable and difficult to eliminate. Additionally, we 
found that glorification also predicted more normative collective action, suggesting that 
glorification may be linked to more ingroup-serving actions in general. Attachment, on the 
other hand, selectively predicted more normative (but not nonnormative) collective action; 
emphasizing retributive justice eliminated this link, whereas emphasizing restorative 
justice maintained it. 
General Discussion 
People engage in various forms of collective action in pursuit of justice for their 
respective groups. In the context of intractable intergroup conflict with a long history of 
real or perceived injustices, collective action is often undertaken by people from both sides 
of the conflict. To further understand this process, we situated the present research in the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to test two central questions using samples of both 
Arab and Jewish Israelis. First, we examined whether distinct dimensions of group 
identification – glorification and attachment – would differentially predict support for 
nonnormative and normative collective action, respectively. Second, we investigated 
whether distinct notions of justice – retributive and restorative justice – would explain these 
relationships.  
In line with hypotheses, in Study 1 and 2 among Arab and Jewish Israelis 
respectively, we found that glorification promoted greater retributive justice, which 
predicted more support for nonnormative collective action, whereas attachment promoted 
greater restorative justice, which predicted more support for normative collective action. 
In addition to these hypothesized findings, we also found that glorification predicted more 
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support for normative collective action, whereas attachment predicted lower support for 
nonnormative collective action. Thus, group members who strongly glorify the group tend 
to support any form of action that benefits the group – actions that are widely seen as 
normative, and actions that are widely seen as less normative or even norm-violating. 
Group members who are strongly attached to the group, on the other hand, more selectively 
support actions that are widely seen as normative, but not actions that are seen as less 
normative or norm-violating. 
In Study 3, which was conducted among Jewish Israelis during a period of 
heightened intergroup conflict (i.e., Palestinians’ March of Return at the Gaza Strip), we 
found that emphasizing retributive or restorative justice produced differential effects on the 
link between modes of group identification and different types of collective action. 
Specifically, emphasizing retributive justice eliminated the effect of attachment on greater 
normative collective action, as well as the effect of attachment on lower nonnormative 
collective action. By contrast, emphasizing restorative justice promoted the effect of 
attachment on greater normative collective action, and the effect of attachment on lower 
nonnormative collective action. Interestingly, emphasizing either retributive or restorative 
justice did not change the effect of glorification on greater nonnormative collective action.  
Taken together, our hypotheses regarding the effects of attachment were supported, 
while our hypotheses regarding the effects of glorification were only partially supported. 
Whereas Study 1 and 2 showed evidence of an indirect effect from glorification to 
nonnormative collective action via retributive justice, Study 3 did not find direct evidence 
for a causal effect of glorification on nonnormative collective action via retributive justice. 
Specifically, we could not eliminate the link between glorification and nonnormative 
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collective action even when we emphasized restorative instead of retributive justice. By 
contrast, the positive link from attachment to normative collective action via restorative 
justice was supported in all three studies. For the prospects of improving intergroup 
relations, these findings imply that while it may be difficult to diminish the negative 
consequences of glorification, it is possible to promote the positive consequences of 
attachment.  
Contributions to Research on Conflict and Collective Action 
The current work contributes to our understanding of collective action in intergroup 
conflict contexts. Most research on collective action has focused on examining collective 
action from one side of a conflict (e.g., low status group members), or collective action that 
occurs in societies where engaging in collective action does not involve extraordinary risk 
(for a similar argument, see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). By situating the present research in 
an ongoing, protracted intergroup conflict setting, our research has strong ecological 
validity and applied value. Further, we examined collective action from the perspective of 
people on both sides of an intergroup conflict, which suggests that conflict can prolong 
even when – or because – both groups strive for justice for themselves by engaging in 
collective action. We also build on emergent studies that have investigated collective action 
in ongoing conflict settings and used non-Western samples (e.g., Bilali, Vollhardt, Rarick, 
2017; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & van Zomeren, 2014; Saab et al., 2015; Tabri, & 
Conway, 2011), which is crucial for providing a more complete picture of social 
psychological processes involved in collective action. 
 The present research integrates the literatures on ingroup identification, intergroup 
conflict and collective action. By employing multidimensional conceptualizations of 
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ingroup identification and notions of justice, and applying them to the realm of collective 
action, we show that distinguishing between different modes of ingroup identification and 
notions of justice is critical in predicting divergent forms of collective action. Our findings 
are consistent with prior research on how glorification and retributive justice (but not 
attachment or restorative justice) predict hostile intergroup outcomes (e.g., Leidner et al., 
2013; Li et al., 2017; Roccas et al., 2008), but new to the work on collective action, which 
has largely treated group identification and justice demands as unidimensional concepts.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 One limitation of this research is that our conceptualization of the normativeness of 
collective action was defined in relation to the broader social context. Although this is 
consistent with the conceptualization in prior research (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et 
al., 2011), we do not know the perspective of collective actors themselves. It is quite 
possible that high glorifiers do not necessarily share the consensus view that certain actions 
are nonnormative when their group engages in these actions. Instead, they may view the 
actions as appropriate and necessary to achieve ingroup goals. Indeed, a central feature of 
glorification is that it is tied to viewing the ingroup as morally superior to other groups, 
even when presented with evidence of possibly immoral ingroup actions (Roccas et al., 
2006). Further, prior research has shown that people can come to view violence as morally 
justified (Fiske & Rai, 2014). The acceptability of violence and illegal methods of 
resistance is also contingent upon the interaction between protesters and police on the 
ground (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Thus, it is plausible that collective action, which is 
defined as nonnormative according to broader society, would be perceived as normative 
by those who participate in them. 
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Additionally, in the present research, we tested our hypotheses among both high 
and low status group members advocating for collective action to benefit their ingroup in 
the context of an ongoing, protracted intergroup conflict. Even though both Israelis and 
Palestinians may see themselves as victims of the current conflict and perceive each other 
as perpetrators, they have asymmetrical intergroup relations. Israel occupies Palestinian 
territories and has a well-armed military force, whereas Palestine does not (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). It is therefore important to examine how power can shape the forms of 
collective action that groups undertake. For high status groups, there are more opportunities 
to achieve their demands for justice. For example, Israelis could fulfill their desire for 
retributive justice by supporting aggressive policies against Palestinians (Maoz & 
McCauley, 2008), rather than turning to violent protests themselves. By contrast, for 
Palestinians, the options are far more limited; collective action undertaken by civilians may 
sometimes be the only way to enact their desire for justice (Saab et al., 2016).  
Implications 
 Our findings point to a novel way of thinking about collective action. If different 
ideas about how to achieve justice can motivate different forms of collective action, then 
this suggests that in order to be responsive and accountable to citizens in conflict societies, 
policymakers, practitioners, and third-party states should take into account people’s 
concerns for justice when responding to various collective actions. For example, effective 
intervention in nonnormative collective action cannot ignore people’s underlying desire for 
retributive justice. Indeed, when authorities attempt to suppress dissent, it can further 
alienate protesters and their supporters (Drury & Reicher, 2000). By contrast, prior work 
has shown that conflict resolution strategies such as outgroup acknowledgement of 
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victimhood (e.g., Hameiri & Nadler, 2017) and international justice mechanisms (e.g., Li 
et al., 2017) are more promising in terms of responding to victim’s desire for retribution 
and may therefore preempt future violence.  
Finally, given that prior research has shown how group identity can be strategically 
used to rally supporters for a cause (e.g., Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 
2006), it is possible that how group members frame their ingroup identity can rationalize 
or justify the type of collective action they are motivated or expected to engage in. Our 
findings suggest that supporters of the same cause may disagree about ways to achieve 
justice, which may lead to competing approaches to collectively organize for social change. 
Specifically, people who glorify their own group may look towards violent means to 
accomplish their goals and use ingroup-glorifying rhetoric to justify their strategies and 
mobilize supporters, whereas people who do not glorify their own group but are still 
strongly attached to it, may instead look towards nonviolent means to accomplish their 
goals and use rhetoric highlighting ingroup attachment to mobilize supporters. In the long 
term, these dynamics could lead to moderate and radical factions within the same 
movement or in larger society (for a discussion see Zald & Ash, 1966). Thus, our findings 
imply that it is not merely the strength of group identity, but also the content of group 
identity – specifically the extent to which people glorify or are attached to their ingroup – 
that may determine the justice orientation people adopt, and subsequently, the strategies of 
collective action people support during mobilization. 
Addendum: The Role of Political Orientation 
Chapter 4 considers the role of distinct notions of ingroup identification in the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One key contribution of this research is that by 
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viewing social identification as a multidimensional rather than a unidimensional measure, 
we can observe the distinct effects of ingroup identification on justice and collective action 
outcomes. However, given that ingroup glorification and attachment are relatively new 
constructs, it is important to examine how these variables relate to other constructs that 
prior work has established as central for understanding intergroup conflict. One construct 
that plays a key role in shaping conflict attitudes in Israel-Palestine is political orientation.   
Political orientation can range from left-wing to right-wing, which overlaps with 
liberal and conservative leanings, respectively. In Israel-Palestine, the hawk-dove 
distinction in particular is part of one’s political orientation: left-wing orientation is linked 
to “dovish” attitudes such as support for compromising peace deals, whereas right-wing 
orientation is linked to “hawkish” attitudes such as support for military intervention (Bar-
Tal, Bar-Tal, & Cohen-Hendeles, 2006; Maoz & McCauley, 2005). Given that glorification 
also tends to be linked to conflict escalation whereas attachment tends to be linked to 
intergroup reconciliation, the left-right political orientation may therefore overlap with the 
glorification-attachment distinction.  
Further, political conservatives tend to have greater obedience to authority and 
loyalty to the ingroup (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Thus, right-wing political 
orientation may be linked to ingroup glorification, which is also characterized by deference 
to ingroup authority. In line with this, glorification (but not attachment) was found to 
predict voting for conservative candidates in the U.S. context (Lamberty, Hellmann, & 
Oeberst, 2018). There is also evidence to suggest that glorification and attachment are 
related to social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Leidner, Castano, 
Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), which are personality variables characterized by preference 
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for social hierarchies and submission to authority – both of which have been linked to 
political conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 2012). 
Given the importance of political orientation to understanding conflict attitudes, 
and the potential links between ingroup glorification and attachment to right and left 
political orientation, this addendum will discuss additional analyses on how political 
orientation may be related to modes of ingroup identification among Arab and Jewish 
Israelis. Throughout Studies 1 to 3 reported in Chapter 3, the demographic section of the 
surveys included questions on political orientation, ranging from “extreme left-wing” to 
“extreme right-wing” – with higher scores corresponding to higher right-wing attitudes; 
the additional analyses presented below uses this measure of political orientation. 
Specifically, I first consider the relationship between right-wing political orientation and 
ingroup glorification and attachment. Next, I consider how right-wing political orientation 
is related to justice demands and collective action outcomes. 
How Does Right-Wing Political Orientation Relate to Ingroup Glorification and 
Attachment? 
In Study 1, among Arab Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was negatively 
related to glorification (r = -.16, p = .071), and attachment (r = -.34, p < .001). By contrast, 
in Study 2, among Jewish Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was positively related to 
glorification (r = .54, p < .001) and attachment (r = .33, p < .001). Similarly, in Study 3, 
also among Jewish Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was positively related to 
glorification (r = .58, p < .001), and attachment (r = .28, p < .001). This pattern of 
correlations suggest that right-wing orientation has unidirectional links to both ingroup 
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glorification and attachment. The strength of magnitude of correlations further suggest that 
right-wing orientation is perhaps not synonymous to ingroup glorification and attachment. 
It is also important to note that the direction of correlation between right-wing 
orientation and ingroup glorification/attachment is asymmetrical among Arab and Jewish 
Israelis. For Arab Israelis, right-wing orientation is related to lower glorification and 
attachment of Palestinian identity; by contrast, right-wing orientation is related to more 
glorification and attachment of Israeli identity. This may be because the political 
continuum from left-wing to right-wing hold different meanings for Arab and Jewish 
Israelis. As prior research has shown, identifying with the Palestinians cause is related to 
left-wing (“dovish”) orientation whereas identifying with the Israeli cause is related to 
right-wing (“hawkish”) orientation (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). Given that we measured 
ingroup identification of Palestinian identity for Arab Israelis, and ingroup identification 
of Jewish identity for the Jewish Israelis, the divergent links between political orientation 
and ingroup identification between groups also reflects the polarization between 
Palestinian and Israeli identities.  
How Does Right-Wing Political Orientation Relate to Justice Demands and 
Collective Action Outcomes? 
In Study 1 among Arab Israelis, right-wing orientation was not significantly related 
to retributive justice (r = -.07, p = .428), but it was negatively related to restorative (r = -
.28, p = .002). Right-wing orientation was also related to less support for nonnormative 
collective action (r = -.02, p = .825), and normative collective action (r = -.32, p < .001). 
In Study 2 among Jewish Israelis, right-wing orientation was related to more retributive 
justice (r = .50, p < .001), but not restorative justice (r = -.06, p =.324). Right-wing 
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orientation was also related to more support for nonnormative collective action (r = .34, p 
< .001) and normative collective action (r = .60, p < .001). In Study 3, among Jewish 
Israelis, right-wing orientation was also positively related to support for nonnormative 
collective action (r = .53, p < .001) and normative collective action (r = .23, p < .001). 
These patterns of findings suggest that high right-wing orientation is generally linked to 
pro-Israeli (or anti-Palestinian) behaviors. Therefore, the distinctive outcomes of 
glorification and attachment on retributive and restorative justice, and support for 
nonnormative and normative collective action, does not appear to be reducible to one’s 
political orientation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
The work presented in this dissertation examined public attitudes toward collective 
action as a way to understand the impact of social movements on broader society. By 
viewing collective action as a tool for social change, members of the broader public – who 
are not necessarily participants of collective action itself – are viewed as the targeted 
audience of collective action. Across three manuscripts, this dissertation examined distinct 
but interrelated phenomenon in the context of ongoing social movements: 1) the immediate 
impact of collective action for social change on subsequent public attitudes, 2) the rise of 
reactionary counter-movements in response to movements for social change, and 3) public 
support collective action to advance ingroup interests among both sides of a protracted 
intergroup conflict. Below, I briefly summarize the main findings of each manuscript. 
In Chapter 2, I presented findings from a two-wave longitudinal panel study on how 
members of the Malaysian public reacted to a mass street protest for electoral reform 
organized by the Bersih movement, and how these protest reactions influenced subsequent 
attitudes toward the movement and its goals. On the one hand, experiencing empowerment 
in response to the Bersih 5 protest promoted a more supportive movement identity and 
more support for social change. On the other hand, experiencing threat in response to the 
Bersih 5 protest promoted a less supportive movement identity and less support for social 
change. This first manuscript showed that the occurrence of protests can directly influence 
the attitudes of the broader public in polarizing ways.  
 
 
 125 
 Chapter 3 followed up on the potential public backlash to collective action for social 
change. Across a two-wave longitudinal panel study in Malaysia, and a pilot study as well 
as two cross-sectional studies in the United States, this second manuscript examined the 
role of psychological ownership beliefs – which is characterized by believing the group 
that first inhabited or established a country should be entitled to determine the rules and 
codes of conduct in a society. In the context of opposing social movements in Malaysia 
and the United States, racial majority group members’ sense of collective psychological 
ownership over their country elicited greater threat in response to collective action for 
social change, which subsequently promoted more support for reactionary counter-
movements that aim to defend the status quo. Thus, the public may come to support 
reactionary counter-movements as a direct response to the occurrence of movements for 
social change. 
Finally, Chapter 4 further investigated the dynamic of opposing social movements 
in the context of a protracted intergroup conflict. As intergroup conflict intensifies, people 
on both sides of a conflict may undertake various forms of collective action to advance 
ingroup interests. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this third manuscript 
presented findings from two cross-sectional studies with Arab and Jewish Israelis 
respectively, and one experimental study with Jewish Israelis. The findings showed that 
the way in which people identify with and seek justice for their ingroup, promotes support 
for different forms of collective action. Specifically, ingroup glorification was linked to 
retributive justice demands, which in turn promoted support for nonnormative collective 
action. By contrast, ingroup attachment was linked to restorative justice demands, which 
in turn promoted support for normative collective action.  
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Overarching Theoretical Implications and Applied Considerations 
All three investigations support the theoretical perspective that social movements 
and collective action can be a means of influencing general public attitudes. As decades of 
research have shown, there are many motivating factors that foster public support for the 
status quo (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
This past work has generally concluded that the public may be complicit in the perpetuation 
of intergroup hierarchies and oppression. Collective action for social change can therefore 
be viewed as a tool to promote intergroup equality and justice by creating a tension in the 
mind of the public, and subsequently forcing them to confront issues that they might 
otherwise overlook (e.g., Sharp, 1973; Tilly, 2008). In line with this, prior research from 
allied fields such as sociology and political science have provided evidence of how protests 
for social change can shift public opinion (e.g., Burstein & Linton, 2002; Soule & Olzak, 
2004; Wallace et al., 2014). In general, this work has tended to temporally and 
geographically link protest occurrence to public opinion polls. Complementing this prior 
research, Chapter 2 presents some of the first data linking psychological responses to a 
focal protest event with people’s subsequent attitudes. In particular, the psychological 
mechanisms of threat and empowerment in response to the protest predicted divergent 
public attitudes toward the movement and social change; the extent to which movements 
can foster favorable public attitudes relies on the movement’s ability to elicit empowerment 
rather than threat. This suggests that even if there is no visible outcome of a protest in terms 
of achieving their demands (e.g., passing a legislation), protests can help build movements 
and shape public opinion, thereby potentially influencing structural changes in the long-
term.  
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Going a step further, Chapter 3 examines how collective action for social change 
may have the unintended consequence of provoking public backlash. Most research on 
social movements and collective action have tended to focus on progressive movements 
that aim to challenge the status quo (for a review, see Blee & Creasap, 2010). Attitudes 
toward movements for and against social change are often studied in isolation, without 
considering the potential dynamics between them. However, social movement scholars 
have documented that opposing social mobilization are often structurally and politically 
connected (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Chapter 3 examines this connection by 
demonstrating the role of psychological ownership as a legitimizing myth that may underlie 
advantaged group members’ threat responses to collective action for social change, which 
can subsequently foster support for collective action against social change. Further, 
Chapter 4 also highlighted the link between opposing social movements by demonstrating 
that the same psychological process via ingroup identification and justice demands may 
mobilize support for collective action on both sides of the same intergroup conflict. Taken 
together, the approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 extends our understanding of the 
interdependence between social movements and raises the question of how movements 
should judge the rise of counter-movements. While counter-mobilization may delegitimize 
the goal of social change and perpetuate intergroup conflict, it also means that a movement 
has struck a chord among the public and triggered a reaction. It is therefore not a 
straightforward conclusion whether the presence of counter-movements itself may signal 
the success or failure of a movement.  
By exploring ongoing collective actions across different social and political 
contexts, the studies included in this dissertation allows us to observe how group-based 
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identities play a role in shaping attitudes toward collective action. As described in Chapter 
2, in a multi-racial country in which the Malay majority group holds greater power and 
privilege compared to Chinese and Indian minorities, the Bersih electoral reform 
movement in Malaysia appeared to be more threatening towards the Malay majority 
compared to the Chinese and Indian racial minority groups. As a follow-up, Chapter 3 
showed that Malay’s higher endorsement of native ownership over their country predicted 
elevated levels of threat in response to the Bersih protest. This threat subsequently 
promoted more support for a counter-movement, the Red Shirts, which strives to defend 
the government and the rights of Malays. Similarly, in the context of race relations in the 
United States, Chapter 3 also showed that non-Hispanic White Americans’ higher 
endorsement of founder ownership beliefs promoted greater threat in response to the Black 
Lives Matter protests. This threat further promoted more support for protests defending 
civil war monuments – which have been led by White supremacist groups under the 
umbrella of the Alt-Right movement aiming to defend the rights of White people. While 
Chapter 3 showed that different forms of ownership beliefs operate in Malaysia and the 
United States, a common feature we observe is that majority group members that occupy a 
more dominant position in the social hierarchy, may show backlash towards movements 
for social change. This is in line with a fundamental idea in intergroup relations, which is 
that advantaged group members are more likely to defend the status quo from which they 
benefit (Pratto et al., 1994; Saguy et al., 2008), whereas disadvantaged group members are 
more likely to challenge it (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), and extends this idea 
to the context of social movement dynamics across different cultures. 
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While Chapter 3 focused on collective action in the context of relatively peaceful, 
democratic contexts, Chapter 4 expands the focus of collective action research to an 
asymmetrical protracted conflict setting. The findings from Chapter 4 showed that Arab 
and Jewish Israelis come to support collective action to advance the rights of their own 
group, as a function of ingroup identification and demands for justice. However, it is 
important to recognize that even though that there is a similar psychological mechanism 
motivating public support for collective action among both sides of the conflict, there is a 
power asymmetry between the groups involved. Arabs and Jewish Israelis differ in terms 
of status in Israeli society: Arab Israelis live in an ethnocracy, in which the Jewish state 
serves the interests of the dominant Jewish ethnic group, whereas Arabs minorities are 
subjected to discrimination across various public spheres, including social, political, 
economic, and education (Yiftachel, 1997). For Arab Israelis, collective action is a means 
of improving their status within society, for example, by pushing for the right of 
Palestinians to return to Palestinian land, which is now occupied by Israel. By contrast, for 
Jewish Israelis, collective action focuses on defending their position within society, to 
ensure that Israel remains a Jewish state. Thus, the goals of collective action are radically 
different in the sense that one side aims to challenge the status quo while the other side 
aims to maintain it. By taking a broader view of collective action in the context of an 
ongoing conflict, Chapter 4 demonstrates that very similar psychological motivations can 
underlie collective action to support opposing goals. Understanding the societal outcomes 
of social movements requires researchers and practitioners to consider the intergroup 
hierarchies and power relations in a particular society, and the possibility that there are 
common underlying psychological motivations among low and high-status groups.  
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
While this dissertation attempted to capture psychological experiences in “real-
time” around ongoing political issues and protest events, the studies presented are limited 
in its scope because it does not reflect the range of effects that social movements might 
have on public attitudes over time. While Chapter 2 and 3 included results from a two-
wave longitudinal panel study, this design does not allow us to model attitude change in a 
more fine-grained and dynamic manner. To overcome this problem, one possibility is to 
conduct longitudinal studies with three or more waves of data collection, and field surveys 
at multiple time points following critical events. This would allow researchers to isolate 
the possible effects of protest events on long-term attitudes. Similar designs have been used 
in other areas of research involving unpredictable events, such as resilience following 
natural disasters or psychosocial adjustment after trauma, in which the same participants 
are repeatedly surveyed before and after an event occurs (e.g., Bonanno & Diminich, 2013; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This allows the researcher to study people’s 
developmental trajectories depending on specific experiences related to the focal event, 
such as degree of exposure. Using a similar approach, it may be possible to model and 
predict distinct trends in public opinion around social movements over time, for example, 
those that become more mobilized, demobilized, or remain relatively neutral/unaffected by 
collective action.  
In addition, the present research is limited in its scope because it does not consider 
how the public comes to know about collective action. We know that people may be 
exposed to collective action through various channels – for example, by personally 
encountering a protest on the streets, hearing about it from friends and family, or seeing it 
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in the news. Media effects may be particularly important given its role in disseminating 
information beyond the initial geographical range of an event. While Chapter 3 included 
an experimental manipulation in which Jewish Israeli participants read an opinion piece 
either arguing for retributive or restorative justice in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the study still did not focus on the role of the media. However, research from 
communication studies and political science have consistently shown that the ways in 
which political issues are framed in the media can shape people’s subsequent attitudes (e.g., 
McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Nelson, Lawson, & Oxley, 1997; Fryberg et al., 2012). In 
particular, protests and protesters pushing for social change are typically portrayed as 
dangerous and deviant in mainstream media, which typically represents the interests of 
dominant groups (e.g., Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, Augustyn, 2001; McLeod & Hertog, 
1992). By contrast, alternative media which tends to serve the interest of marginalized 
groups, typically portrays social movements in a more balanced and positive light 
(Downing, 2003). Building on this past work, one question that future research might 
investigate is the downstream consequences of exposure to mainstream versus alternative 
media on public attitudes toward social movements for social change.  
This dissertation also highlights the how social movements can face backlash from 
advantaged group members but does not offer possible solutions to this issue. Prior work 
has shown that movements can face the challenge of building solidarity between groups 
that have divergent levels of power and privilege. This includes alliance-building between 
movements (peace and environmental justice movements; Beamish & Luebbers, 2009), 
involving advantaged group allies within a movement (racial justice movements; 
Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016), and promoting solidarity across nations 
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(movement to support Syrian refugees, Thomas et al., 2018). One possible way movements 
strive to overcome intergroup divisions is by creating an inclusive movement identity that 
includes the different groups in society that the movement aims to unite (e.g., Reicher, 
Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Subašić et al., 2008). While prior research 
has shown that leaders effectively engage in rhetorical strategies to foster a common group 
identity through speeches and public forums (e.g., Fiol, 2002; Seyranian & Bligh, 2008; 
Steffens & Haslam, 2013), it remains an open question whether such tactics are effective 
in shaping support for a movement among groups that have unequal status relations in 
society. Future research may explore whether and how movements can proactively diffuse 
tensions and deescalate threat responses. 
Concluding Remarks 
Social movements are a key part of public life. While it is true that only a small 
number of people participate in collective action for social change, the implications of such 
actions extend well beyond the participants of collective action themselves. This 
dissertation showed that collective can influence broader public opinion, by eliciting 
greater support for the cause, or provoking backlash and counter-mobilization, and even 
perpetuating intergroup conflicts. Understanding the outcomes of social movements on 
public opinion therefore requires researchers and practitioners to consider both the 
immediate and long-term societal impact of collective action, as well as movements that 
may challenge or defend the status quo. By moving beyond psychological explanations of 
why people participate in collective action to examining the societal implications of these 
actions, social psychological theorizing can begin to address the crucial question of how 
social change can be supported, achieved, and sustained.  
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION  
This appendix contains additional information and analyses for the manuscript in 
Chapter 2. Below is a direct reproduction of the Online Supplementary Information for the 
paper published in the European Journal of Social Psychology (Selvanathan & Lickel, 
2018). Each section reported below corresponds to a specific footnote within the 
manuscript.  
Analyses without excluding participants 
As described in footnote 3, we ran analyses using all available data at Time 2 (i.e., 
without excluding any participants at Time 2), and we found virtually the same results as 
reported in the main text. Specifically, over and above the effect of Time 1 movement 
identity on Time 2 movement identity [b = .33, SE = .04, t(443) = 7.91, p < .001, R2 = .41], 
empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant increase in R2 
[R2change = .20, Fchange (2, 443) = 109.41, p < .001]. Stronger empowerment reactions 
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 [b = .37, SE = .03, t(443) = 11.17, p < .001], 
and stronger threat reactions predicted weaker movement identity at Time 2 [b = -.07, SE 
= .03, t(443) = -2.44, p = .015]. Similarly, over and above the effect of Time 1 support for 
social change on Time 2 support for social change [b = .57, SE = .04, t(444) = 13.93, p < 
.001, R2 = .38], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant 
increase in R2 [R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 444) = 67.04, p < .001]. Stronger empowerment 
reactions predicted greater support for social change at Time 2 [b = .25, SE = .03, t(444) = 
7.86, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted lower support for social change at 
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Time 2 [b = -.06, SE = .03, t(444) = -2.04, p = .042]. Thus, these findings suggest that our 
results are largely robust and not dependent on the exclusion criteria that we selected. 
Hopelessness – a threat or disempowerment response? 
As described in footnote 4, we also measured the extent to which participants felt 
hopelessness (assessed as responses to the items “weak” and “hopeless”) in response to the 
protests, which we conceptualized as a measure of threat. It is possible that the 
hopelessness measure is the conceptual reverse of empowerment, and thus should be 
reverse-scored and included in the empowerment composite rather than the threat 
composite. However, CFA analysis revealed that a two-factor solution for the reaction 
measures in which the reverse-scored hopelessness item was grouped with positive 
emotions, anger toward government, perceived effectiveness, and perceived legitimacy 
onto the first latent factor (empowerment reactions), and anxiety, anger toward protests, 
and perceived danger of protests loaded onto the second latent factor (threat reactions), did 
not provide a good fit to the data: χ2 (17) = 291.09, p < .001, SRMR = .10, NFI = .89, CFI 
= .90. Thus, empirically we could not justify including hopelessness in the empowerment 
composite measure. Alternatively, when we conducted a CFA for a two-factor solution for 
the reaction measures in which the composite measures of positive emotions, anger toward 
government, perceived effectiveness, and perceived legitimacy of protests loaded onto the 
first latent factor (empowerment reactions), and hopelessness was instead grouped with 
anxiety, anger toward Bersih, and perceived danger of protests to load onto a second latent 
factor (threat reactions), the model provided a good fit to the data: χ2 (17) = 143.23 p < 
.001, SRMR = .05, NFI = .95, CFI = .95. Thus, for these supplementary analyses, we 
created a composite measure of threat which included the hopelessness measure (αT2 = .89). 
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This threat composite and the empowerment composite were negatively correlated, r = -
.64, p < .001. 
We then analyzed the data using the composite measures of empowerment and this 
alternative threat composite which included the hopelessness measure, and we found 
virtually the same results as reported in the main text. Specifically, over and above the 
effect of Time 1 movement identity on Time 2 movement identity [b = .34, SE = .04, t(416) 
= 7.58, p < .001, R2 = .41], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a 
significant increase in R2 [R2change = .19, Fchange (2, 416) = 99.49, p < .001]. Stronger 
empowerment reactions predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 [b = .38, SE = .04, 
t(416) = 10.61, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted weaker movement identity 
at Time 2 [b = -.07, SE = .03, t(416) = -2.35, p = .019]. Similarly, over and above the effect 
of Time 1 support for social change on Time 2 support for social change [b = .58, SE = .06, 
t(418) = 13.55, p < .001, R2 = .39], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed 
to a significant increase in R2 [R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 418) = 62.64, p < .001]. Stronger 
empowerment reactions predicted greater support for social change at Time 2 [b = .24, SE 
= .03, t(418) = 7.59, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted lower support for 
social change at Time 2 [b = -.06, SE = .03, t(418) = -2.00, p = .046].  
Descriptive information on changes in movement identity  
As described footnote 6, descriptive analyses may provide further information 
about the attitudinal changes that occurred from Time 1 to Time 2, and can supplement our 
inferential analyses reported in the main text. We assessed the descriptive changes in 
participants’ attitudes by focusing on movement identity in two ways. First, we examined 
the number of participants at each of the 7 levels of movement identity at Time 1, and 
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observed whether participants became less supportive, did not change, or became more 
supportive of Bersih at Time 2 (see supplementary Table 1 below). Second, we clustered 
participants into three groups at Time 1 (supportive, neutral, unsupportive), and observed 
whether participants changed in their level of support or remained the same (see 
supplementary Table 2 below). As these tables show, although few participants made large 
quantitative shifts in their attitudes, among those who did change, shifts in attitudes 
occurred across the different levels of Time 1 movement identity (unsupportive, neutral, 
supportive).  
Beyond the distribution of participants at different levels of movement identity, we 
also examined the average levels of empowerment and threat at each level of change (see 
supplementary Table 2 below). Descriptively, we observed that those who became more 
supportive at Time 2 had higher levels of empowerment relative to threat, whereas those 
who became less supportive at Time 2 had higher levels of threat relative to empowerment. 
Further, those who became neutral at Time 2 seemed to have ambivalent reactions to the 
protest, such that they reported somewhat similar levels of empowerment and threat. These 
patterns suggest that the extent to which empowerment or threat shaped changes in 
movement identity were not restricted to the extreme ends of the scale, but occurred to 
some extent at the various levels of movement identity. 
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Supplementary Table 9 
 
Descriptive changes in participants’ Bersih movement identity from Time 1 to Time 2. 
 
 
 
 Change at Time 2 
Time 1 Total 
Less 
supportive of 
Bersih 
No change in 
level of 
support for 
Bersih 
More 
supportive of 
Bersih 
1. A very active opponent of the Bersih 
movement 5 N/A 2 3 
2. Unsupportive of the Bersih movement, 
and sometimes an active opponent 6 0 0 6 
3. Unsupportive of the Bersih movement 33 5 13 15 
4. Neutral 175 20 99 56 
5. Supportive of the Bersih movement, but 
not active 154 23 102 29 
6. Supportive of the Bersih movement, and 
sometimes an active participant 45 18 22 5 
7. A very active participant of the Bersih 
movement 2 0 2 N/A 
Total 420 66 240 114 
 
Supplementary Table 10 
 
Descriptive changes in participants’ Bersih movement identity from Time 1 to Time 2, and the average 
levels of empowerment and threat at each level of change. 
 
Movement identity  
at Time 1 and Time 2 
 Number of participants  Empowerment M (SD) 
 Threat 
M (SD) 
Unsupportive at Time 1  
(score: 1-3) 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
Still unsupportive at Time 2  26  2.27 (.92)  5.47 (1.25) 
Became neutral at Time 2  15  3.62 (.95)  3.95 (1.21) 
Became supportive at Time 2  5  5.15 (.50)  3.52 (.74) 
 
Neutral at Time 1  
(score: 4) 
 
175 
    
Became unsupportive at Time 2  20  2.66 (1.12)  5.10 (1.47) 
Still neutral at Time 2  99  4.27 (.89)  3.60 (.99) 
Became supportive at Time 2  56  5.24 (.83)  2.61 (1.02) 
       
Supportive at Time 1  
(score: 5-7) 
 
201 
    
Became unsupportive at Time 2  1  5.14 (N/A)  5.31 (N/A) 
Became neutral at Time 2  24  4.62 (.75)  3.35 (1.55) 
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Still supportive at Time 2  176  5.79 (.82)  2.22 (1.19) 
 
Assessing change with difference score analyses 
As described in footnote 7, another approach to examine change in two-wave 
designs is through the use of difference scores. Thus, we computed difference scores of 
movement identity and support for social change by subtracting each participants’ Time 1 
scores from their Time 2 scores. We report the correlation between the measures of reaction 
to protests and the changes in movement identity and support for social change in 
Supplementary Table 3 below. Each measure of protest reaction was correlated with 
changes in movement identity and support for social change in the expected direction.  
 
 
The relative effects of empowerment versus threat 
As stated in footnote 8 and 9, to assess the predictive power and relative effects of 
empowerment and threat, we conducted separate regression analyses in two ways: 1) 
entering empowerment a step before threat, or 2) entering threat a step before 
Supplementary Table 11 
 
Correlation between reactions to protests and changes in movement identity and support for social 
change 
 
 M (SD) Changes in movement identity 
Changes in support for 
social change 
1.    Positivity 4.43 (1.75) .21*** .28*** 
2. Anger toward government 5.24 (1.57) .19*** .29*** 
3. Perceived efficacy 4.69 (1.48) .20*** .32*** 
4. Perceived legitimacy 5.01 (1.58) .21*** .33*** 
5. Anxiety 3.63 (1.59) -.14** -.16*** 
6. Anger toward protests 2.68 (1.78) -.19*** -.24*** 
7. Perceived danger 2.93 (1.69) -.15** -.20*** 
8. Hopelessness 3.03 (1.56) -.17*** -.17*** 
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empowerment, when predicting movement identity or support for social change at Time 2, 
while controlling for movement identity, or support for social change at Time 1, 
respectively. As these tables show, we find consistent evidence that empowerment and 
threat predicted attitudes at Time 2 over and above Time 1 attitudes, however the effect of 
threat appears to be weaker and smaller than the effect of empowerment on subsequent 
attitudes. 
Supplementary Table 12 
 
Empowerment and threat as predictors of movement identity at Time 2, while controlling for movement 
identity at Time 1, with empowerment entered first, and then threat. 
 
Variable b SE t p df R2 
Change statistics 
R2change R2change F R2change p 
Step 1          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .72 .04 17.06 <.001 418 .41 - - - 
Step 2          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .35 .04 7.75 <.001      
Empowerment .42 .03 13.83 <.001 417 .60 .19 191.35 <.001 
Step 3          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .33 .04 7.46 <.001      
Empowerment .37 .04 10.37 <.001      
Threat -.07 .03 -2.42 .016 416 .60 .01 5.85 .016 
 
Supplementary Table 13 
 
Empowerment and threat as predictors of movement identity at Time 2, while controlling for movement 
identity at Time 1, with threat entered first, and then empowerment. 
 
Variable b SE t p df R2 
Change statistics 
R2change R2change F R2change p 
Step 1          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .72 .04 17.06 <.001 418 .41 - - - 
Step 2          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .54 .04 12.09 <.001      
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Threat -.23 .03 -8.56 <.001 417 .50 .09 73.25 <.001 
Step 3          
Movement identity at 
Time 1 .33 .04 7.46 <.001      
Threat -.07 .03 -2.42 .016      
Empowerment .37 .04 10.37 <.001 416 .60 .10 107.47 <.001 
 
Supplementary Table 14 
 
Empowerment and threat as predictors of support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for 
support for social change at Time 1, with empowerment entered first, and then threat. 
 
Variable b SE t p df R2 
Change statistics  
R2change R
2change 
F R
2change p 
Step 1          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .74 .05 16.27 <.001 420 .39 - - - 
Step 2          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .60 .04 14.30 <.001      
Empowerment .28 .03 10.97 <.001 419 .52 .14 120.41 <.001 
Step 3          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .59 .04 13.62 <.001      
Empowerment .25 .03 7.48 <.001      
Threat -.05 .03 -1.64 .102 418 .53 .003 2.68 .102 
 
Supplementary Table 15 
 
Empowerment and threat as predictors of support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for 
support for social change at Time 1, with threat entered first, and then empowerment. 
 
Variable b SE t p df R2 
Change statistics 
R2change R
2change 
F R
2change p 
Step 1          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .74 .05 16.27 <.001 420 .39 - - - 
Step 2          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .61 .05 13.47 <.001      
Threat -.19 .02 -7.73 <.001 419 .46 .08 59.81 <.001 
Step 3          
Support for social 
change at Time 1 .59 .04 13.62 <.001      
Threat -.05 .03 -1.64 .102      
Empowerment .25 .03 7.48 <.001 418 .53 .06 55.92 <.001 
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The role of participation in protests in shaping people’s reactions to protests 
Although we did not intentionally recruit participations who have joined Bersih 
protests in the past (i.e., Bersih 1, 2, 3 or 4), or those who joined the Bersih 5 protests, we 
nonetheless had 100 participants who reported joining Bersih protests in the past, and 68 
participants who joined the Bersih 5 protests. Of those 68 who joined the Bersih 5 protests, 
50 participants also took part in other Bersih protests in the past, while for the remaining 
18 participants, Bersih 5 was the first Bersih protest they attended. As described in footnote 
10, we conducted exploratory analyses to test whether prior participation in Bersih protests, 
or participation in Bersih 5 specifically, would moderate the extent to which empowerment 
and threat predicted subsequent movement identity and support for social change. First, it 
is important to note that, perhaps unsurprisingly, those who participated in Bersih protests, 
either in the past or in Bersih 5 specifically, had greater empowerment and lower threat in 
response to Bersih 5, as well as greater movement identity and support for change at both 
Time 1 and Time 2, compared to those who did not participated in any Bersih protests. 
Beyond these differences however, moderation analyses would test the following question: 
does empowerment and threat differentially predict subsequent movement identity or 
support for social change, among those who participated in Bersih protests (either in prior 
Bersih protests or Bersih 5 specifically) versus those who did not have such experiences? 
To examine this question, we tested for how participation in the prior Bersih protests (N = 
100) moderated the extent to which empowerment or threat responses to Bersih 5 shaped 
movement identity or support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for support for 
movement identity or support for social change at Time 1, respectively (using PROCESS, 
model 1; Hayes, 2013). We then ran parallel analyses using Bersih 5 participants (N = 68) 
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as the moderator to test for an effect of participation. Below, we report the findings from 
these analyses. 
Does participation in prior Bersih protests moderate the effect of empowerment 
on subsequent attitudes? Prior participation in Bersih protests did not significantly 
moderate the effect of empowerment in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement 
identity, F(1, 415) = 1.32, p = .252, or on support for social change, F(1, 417) = .02, p = 
.900. 
Does participation in prior Bersih protests moderate the effect of threat on 
subsequent attitudes? Prior participation in Bersih protests moderated the effect of 
experiencing threat in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) = 
16.78, p < .001. Among those who participated in Bersih protests in the past, threat was 
not related to movement identity, b = -.09, SE = .05, p = .064, 95% CI [-.1769, .0050]). 
However, among those who did not participate in Bersih protests in the past, threat 
predicted a less supportive movement identity, b = -.31, SE = .03, p = < .001, 95% CI [-
.3713, -.2510]). Similarly, prior participation in Bersih protests moderated the effect of 
experiencing threat in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent support for social change, F(1, 
417) = 7.38, p = .007. Among those who participated in Bersih protests in the past, threat 
was not related to support for social change, b = -.06, SE = .05, p = .186, 95% CI [-.1597, 
.0312]). However, among those who did not participate in Bersih protests in the past, threat 
predicted lower support for social change, b = -.21, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% CI [-.2669, -
.1565]).  
Does participation in Bersih 5 protests moderate the effect of empowerment on 
subsequent attitudes? Participation in Bersih 5 did not moderate the effect of feeling 
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empowered on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) = .03, p = .873, or on support for 
social change, F(1, 417) = 2.29, p = .131. 
Does participation in Bersih 5 protests moderate the effect of threat on 
subsequent attitudes? Participation in Bersih 5 moderated the effect of threat in response 
to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) = 9.50, p = .002. Among those 
who participated in Bersih 5, threat did not significantly predict movement identity, b = -
.09, SE = .06, p = .122, 95% CI [-.2025, .0241]). By contrast, among those who did not 
participate in Bersih 5, threat predicted a less supportive movement identity, b = -.29, SE 
= .03, p = < .001, 95% CI [-.3414, -.2307]). Participation in Bersih 5 did not however 
moderate the effect of threat on support for social change, F(1, 417) = 1.63, p = .202. 
Taken together, the findings from these moderation analyses suggest that 
participation in prior Bersih protests, or in Bersih 5 specifically, can sometimes weaken 
the extent to which threat in response to Bersih 5 protests shaped subsequent movement 
identity and social change attitudes. By contrast, that was little evidence that participation 
in Bersih protests influenced the extent to which empowerment shaped subsequent 
movement and social change attitudes.  
Analyses after excluding participants who attended the Bersih 5 protests 
Beyond the moderating effects of participation in Bersih protests, it is also possible 
to examine the relative effect of empowerment and threat in response to the Bersih 5 
protests on Time 2 movement identity and support for change among those who did not 
participate in the Bersih 5 protests (i.e., rerunning the main text regression analyses 
excluding Bersih 5 participants). When we excluded participants who reported attending 
the protests (N = 68), the pattern of findings were consistent with the analyses reported in 
 
 
 144 
the main text. Specifically, when we excluded those who participated in the protests 
(remaining N = 354), after controlling for Time 1 movement identity, empowerment 
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 (b = .31, SE = .04, t(348) = 8.50, p < .001) 
and threat predicted weaker movement identity at Time 2 (b = -.12, SE = .03, t(348) = -
3.85, p < .001). Similarly, after controlling for Time 1 support for social change, 
empowerment predicted more support for social change at Time 2 (b = .24, SE = .04, t(350) 
= 6.07, p < .001), but threat was not significantly related to support for social change at 
Time 2, although it was in the hypothesized direction (b = -.04, SE = .04, t(350) = -1.19, p 
= .234). These findings suggest that the mobilizing effects of empowerment and the 
demobilizing effects of threat in response to the protests were largely robust.  
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES AND SURVEY MATERIALS 
This appendix contains supplementary analyses and additional information for the 
manuscript in Chapter 3.  
Corresponding to Footnote 11 in the manuscript, below we describe specific details 
on participant recruitment and exclusion criteria used in Study 1.  
Participants and Procedure for Study 1 
A sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete online surveys on 
their social and political attitudes via TurkPrime, a survey research platform. At Time 1, 
646 participants were recruited. After excluding 18 participants who failed to complete the 
study, 12 participants who did not identify as either Malay, Chinese, or Indian Malaysian, 
and 4 participants who took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours), 
612 participants were retained for cross-sectional analyses (296 Malay, 244 Chinese, and 
72 Indian Malaysians; age: M = 32.46, SD = 9.61, range = 18-17; gender: 317 males and 
274 females; 21 participants did not report their age and gender). Although we initially 
aimed to sample equal numbers of Chinese and Indian Malaysians, we could not reach our 
desired sample size for Indian Malaysians; thus we oversampled Chinese Malaysians, and 
combined Chinese and Indian Malaysian participants as the racial minority group. 
At Time 2, all 612 participants were re-contacted to complete another survey. Of 
those who were re-invited, 459 participants returned at Time 2 (response rate = 75%). After 
excluding 13 participants who did not complete the survey, 2 participants with duplicate 
entries, 4 participants who took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 
hours), and 18 participants whose demographics at Time 1 did not match Time 2, a sample 
 
 
 146 
of 422 participants who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 measures were retained for 
longitudinal analyses (218 Malays, 177 Chinese, and 27 Indian Malaysians). 
Corresponding to Footnote 13 in the manuscript, below we report the full items and 
instructions that accompanied each measure for all studies. 
Study 1 
Native ownership (Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013) 
In every country, there is typically a group of people who were the first to live there. We 
are interested in your opinions about this. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
1. The original inhabitants of a country are more entitled than newcomers. 
2. Every country belongs to its original inhabitants. 
3. The original inhabitants of a country have the most right to define the rules of the 
game. 
4. “We were here first” is an important principle for determining who decides on 
what happens in a country. 
 
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree) 
 
Red Shirt movement identity (adapted from Dunlap and McCright, 2008) 
Thinking about the Red Shirt movement, do you think of yourself as… 
§ A very active participant of the Red Shirt movement   
§ Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active participant   
§ Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, but not active   
§ Neutral    
§ Unsupportive of the Red Shirt movement  
§ Unsupportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active opponent  
§ A very active opponent of the Red Shirt movement  
 
Threat from Bersih protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers, 
2013) 
Thinking specifically about the Bersih 5 demonstration, to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements?  
1. The demonstration is not compatible with the culture and values of Malaysia.   
2. The demonstration harms the reputation and image of Malaysia.    
3. The demonstration endangers the physical safety of people.     
4. The demonstration undermines the peace and harmony in Malaysia.         
5. The demonstration is a threat to the rights of the bumiputeras (Malay people and 
Indigenous people).                           
6. The demonstration is a threat to the rights of the non-bumiputeras (Chinese 
people, Indian people, and others)                            
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Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree) 
 
Threat from Red Shirt protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and 
Ellemers, 2013) 
Thinking specifically about the Red Shirt demonstrations, to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements?  
[same 6 items as “Threat from Bersih protests”] 
Demographics 
What is your race? 
§ Malay 
§ Chinese  
§ Indian   
§ Other (Please specify) :  ___________ 
 
What is your age? ____________ 
 
What is your gender? 
§ Male  
§ Female   
 
Pilot Study 
 
Personal psychological ownership (adapted from van Dyne and Pierce, 2004) 
Think about the home or apartment that you live in, and the experiences and feelings of 
ownership associated with the sentiment "This is my home!"  Similarly, people may also 
feel a sense of ownership for their country. 
   
The following questions are about the sense of ownership that you may feel for your 
country. Please indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
1. This is my country. 
2. It is hard for me to think about this country as mine. (reverse) 
3. I feel a very high degree of ownership for this country. 
4. I sense that this is my country. 
5. This country is my home. 
 
Native ownership (Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013) 
We are interested in people's ideas about ownership over a place. For this question, we 
are interested in how you view the original inhabitants of a country. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
[same 4 items as in study 1] 
 
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013) 
We are interested in people's ideas about ownership over a place. For this question, we 
are interested in how you view the people that founded a particular country. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
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1. The founders of a country are more entitled than newcomers. 
2. Every country belongs to its founders. 
3. Those who founded a country have the most right to define the rules of the game. 
4. “We founded this country” is an important principle for determining who decides 
on what happens in a country. 
 
Characteristics of original Americans (based on Devos and Banaji, 2005) 
When you think about the characteristics of people who are considered the “original” 
Americans, to what extent do you think they should have each of the following traits?  
The "original" Americans... 
1. …are born in the United States. 
2. ...are Christian. 
3. ...identify as White. 
4. ...speak English. 
 
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 9 (Strongly agree) 
 
Study 2 
 
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013) 
[same as Pilot Study] 
 
Threat from BLM protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers, 
2013) 
Thinking about Black Lives Matter protests, to what extent do you personally agree or 
disagree with each of the following statements? 
1. The protests are not compatible with American values. 
2. The protests harm the reputation of our country.  
3. The protests endanger the physical safety of others. 
4. The protests undermine the peace and harmony. 
5. The protests threaten the rights of other people. 
 
Threat from Alt-Right protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and 
Ellemers, 2013) 
Thinking about the Alt-Right protests, to what extent do you personally agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements? 
[same 5 items as “Threat from BLM protesters”] 
 
Criticism of BLM protesters (adapted from McLeod and Detenber, 1999) 
Thinking about Black Lives Matter protesters, to what extent do you personally agree or 
disagree with the following statements? 
1. The protesters tend to be violent. 
2. The protesters tend to be disrespectful. 
3. The protesters tend to be annoying. 
4. The protesters tend to be troublemakers. 
5. The protesters tend to be very radical. 
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Criticism of Alt-Right protesters (adapted from McLeod and Detenber, 1999) 
Thinking about Alt-Right protesters, to what extent do you personally agree or disagree 
with the following statements? 
[same 5 items as Criticism of BLM protesters] 
 
Support for anti BLM actions (developed for this study) 
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
regarding the Black Lives Matter movement? 
1. The police should closely the monitor the activities of the movement. 
2. There should be strict security measures enforced for their activities. 
3. If any of the supporters of the movement refuse to abide by the law, they should 
face stern legal consequences. 
 
Support for anti Alt-Right actions (developed for this study) 
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
regarding the Alt-Right movement? 
[same 3 items as Support for anti BLM actions] 
 
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (developed for this study) 
Recently, some towns and cities have been removing Confederate monuments related to 
the Civil War, such as monuments of Robert E. Lee. On the next page, we ask you some 
questions about protests around this issue. 
 
-- 
 
There have been protests saying that Confederate monuments should be preserved as an 
important part of American heritage. 
 
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
regarding these protesters who want to preserve Confederate monuments? 
1. People need to listen to their arguments. 
2. They deserve a platform to share their views. 
3. I can sympathize with their cause. 
4. They have good intentions. 
5. People are too quick to dismiss them. 
6. They mean no harm. 
 
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 9 (Strongly agree) 
 
Study 3 
 
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013) 
[same as Pilot Study] 
 
Anti BLM attitudes 
 
 
 150 
[same as Study 2 “Threat from BLM protests”, “Criticism of BLM protesters” and 
“Support for anti BLM actions”] 
 
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments 
[same as Study 2] 
Demographic questions  
(asked in Pilot Study, Study 2 and Study 3) 
 
Please indicate your age (in years): 
_______________________________ 
 
 
What is your gender? 
§ Male  
§ Female   
§ Other (Please specify): _______________________ 
 
 
What is your racial identity? 
§ American Indian/Alaskan Native   
§ Asian   
§ Black or African American   
§ Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander    
§ White or Caucasian   
§ More than one race (Please specify):  ______________________ 
§ Other (Please specify):  _______________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY MATERIALS 
The verbatim survey materials for all three studies are reported below.  
Study 1 
 
Group identification 
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006) 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by 
moving the cursor below it. Keep in mind that all your answers are stored anonymously 
and cannot be linked back to you. There are no right or wrong answers, we are interested 
in your personal opinion. 
Glorification: 
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Palestinian 
leadership 
2. All Palestinian people should respect Palestinian customs, norms, and leadership 
3. Relative to other peoples, the Palestinian people are very moral 
4. The Palestinian people are better than other peoples in all respects 
Attachment: 
1. It is important to me to contribute to the Palestinian people 
2. I am strongly committed to the Palestinian people 
3. Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity 
4. It is important to me that others see me as a Palestinian 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
 
Justice demands  
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) 
In the next series of questions, you will be asked how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
should be treated in order to achieve justice. Please move the cursor to indicate how 
much you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers, we 
are interested in your personal opinion. 
Retributive justice: 
1. For the sake of justice, Jewish Israelis have to suffer 
2. The only way to restore justice is to punish Jewish Israelis 
Restorative justice through value reaffirmation: 
1. To restore justice, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a 
peaceful world 
Restorative justice through compensation: 
2. Without Jewish Israelis giving a sincere apology for having acted wrongly, the 
injustice is not completely restored  
 
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
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Collective action 
(developed for this study) 
The questions below are about the efforts of Arab Israelis to improve the conditions of 
their group. To what extent do you support or oppose the following actions for the 
struggle of Arab citizens to improve their situation in Israel? Please move the cursor 
below each statement to indicate your response. Please remember that since we are 
interested in your opinion, there are no right or wrong answers. 
Nonnormative collective action: 
1. Non-violent yet unlawful actions of protest (such as participating in unauthorized 
demonstrations, blocking roads, etc.) 
2. Violent actions of protest (physically confronting police, property damage, etc.) 
Normative collective action: 
1. Actions of protest online (such as signing petitions, sharing information on 
Facebook, etc.) 
2. Actions of protest in Israel within the law (such as participating in authorized 
demonstrations, distribution of informational materials, etc.) 
3. Actions of protest abroad within the law (such as participating in demonstrations 
overseas, meeting foreign politicians, etc.) 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support) 
 
Study 2 
Group identification 
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006) 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by 
moving the slider below the statements. Remember that all of your responses are 
completely anonymous and cannot be traced back to you in any way. There are no right 
or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal opinion. 
Glorification: 
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of 
our nation 
2. All Israelis should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of our 
nation 
3. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation 
4. Israel is better than other nations in all respects 
5. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the leaders of our 
nation propose 
6. It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel 
7. Other nations can learn a lot from us 
8. The IDF is the best army in the world 
Attachment: 
1. It is important to me to contribute to my nation 
2. I am strongly committed to my nation 
3. Being Israeli is an important part of my identity 
4. It is important to me that others see me as an Israeli 
5. When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they” 
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6. It is important for me to help my country 
7. It is not important to me to view myself as an Israeli 
8. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
 
 
Justice demands 
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 201) 
In the next series of questions, you will be asked how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
should be treated in order to achieve justice. In order to indicate the extent of your 
agreement or disapproval with any statement, please move the cursor below it. 
Remember that since we are interested in your positions, there are no right or wrong 
answers. 
Retributive justice: 
1. For the sake of justice, the Palestinians have to suffer 
2. The only way to restore justice is to punish the Palestinians 
3. Justice is only fully served when there are punitive measures against the 
Palestinians for its actions 
4. To fully reinstate justice, the Palestinians needs to be prosecuted for its role in the 
conflict 
5. Justice is served at the moment that the Palestinians are punished 
Restorative justice through value reaffirmation: 
1. To restore justice, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a peaceful 
world 
2. For justice to be reinstated, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on which 
ethical values should not be violated 
Restorative justice through compensation: 
1. Without the Palestinians giving a sincere apology for having acted wrongly, the 
injustice is not completely resolved 
2. To fully restore justice, the Israeli victims and their family members need to 
receive compensation from the Palestinians for what happened 
3. For justice to be fully reinstated, the Palestinians need to express remorse to the 
Israeli victims and their family members for what happened 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
 
Collective action 
(developed for this study) 
The questions below are about the efforts of Jewish Israelis to promote their cause.  To 
what extent do you support each of the following actions to protect the rights of Jewish 
Israelis in Israel? Please move the cursor in each statement to indicate your answer.  
Remember that since we are interested in your opinion, there are no right or wrong 
answers. 
Non-normative collective action:  
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1. participate in unauthorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler 
rights 
2. organize disruptive direct actions (for example, sit ins in buildings to block 
entrances, block roads or highways) to advocate for Jewish settler rights 
3. violent protests (physically confronting police, property damage, etc.) to defend 
the rights of Jewish settlers  
4. damage the property of Arab villages in the settler areas  
5. attack demonstrations that are organized by or on behalf of Palestinian settlers 
6. price-tag campaigns to protect Israeli settlement areas 
Normative collective action:  
1. sign petitions to advocate for the rights of Jewish settlers 
2. share information on social media to influence other people’s opinions about 
Jewish settler’ rights 
3. participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler 
rights 
4. organize lawful public opinion campaigns to protect Jewish settler rights 
5. lobby groups from foreign countries to gain support for Jewish settlement rights 
6. lobby domestic Israelis politicians and policy makers to ensure the rights of 
Jewish settlers are protected 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support) 
 
Study 3 
Manipulation 
(developed for this study) 
On the next screen, you will see a short excerpt from an article in a paper written by a 
Israeli author, Eitan Harel, in which he addresses other Israelis. Please read the article 
carefully and focus on the content. We will ask you some questions about it later. 
 
Restorative justice condition: 
We can achieve justice by re-establishing our shared values 
Author: Eitan Harel 
Over the years, the harm that Palestinians have inflicted upon Israelis have brought up the 
crucial question of how to restore justice between us. In public, populated areas around 
Israel, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, there have been suicide bombings, knife attacks, 
and shootings. In the Gaza strip, there have been stones thrown at cars and people, and 
rockets fired across the border. These various attacks go against shared moral values and 
ethical principles of both sides: do no harm, treat others with kindness and compassion, 
live in harmony and peace. In the process, the relationship between our groups has been 
severely disrupted. 
 
To restore justice, we need to repair the relationship between our groups. To begin doing 
so, there needs to be a shared understanding of, and commitment to, moral values and 
ethical principles that we both agree on. Therefore, the process of achieving justice 
should first and foremost revolve around both groups mutually reestablishing shared 
values and principles that have been violated. Specifically, both groups should work 
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towards an understanding of the harm that these attacks have caused, and based on this, 
both groups should then reaffirm their commitment to the shared values and principles 
that govern our lives. Any call to action that violates these shared values, will undermine 
justice. The actions we take will only achieve justice when they are in line with our 
shared values. In this sense, then, the mutual reaffirmation of our shared values will help 
repair the relationship between our groups and therefore help serve justice.  
 
Retributive justice condition: 
We can achieve justice through punishment 
Author: Eitan Harel 
Over the years, the harm that Palestinians have inflicted upon Israelis have brought up the 
crucial question of how to restore justice between us. In public, populated areas around 
Israel, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, there have been suicide bombings, knife attacks, 
and shootings. In the Gaza strip, there have been stones thrown at cars and people, and 
rockets fired across the border. These various attacks have taken a huge toll on Israel, be 
it in terms of loss of life or loss of resources, and in this way, we have suffered a severe 
loss of power and status. 
 
To restore justice, the Palestinians need to be punished for their actions. There need to be 
punitive measures to rightfully penalize the Palestinians and hold them accountable for 
the suffering they have caused us. Therefore, the process of achieving justice should first 
and foremost revolve around punishment of the Palestinians, proportionate to the 
suffering they have inflicted upon us. Any call to action that does not include us 
regaining the power and status we have lost, will undermine justice. The actions will only 
achieve justice when they reestablish our power and status. In this sense, then, 
punishment of Palestinian attacks will help repair our power and status and therefore help 
serve justice. 
 
Manipulation check 
Please answer the following questions based on the excerpt that you have just read.  
According to the author of the excerpt that you just read, which of the following needs to 
happen in order to achieve justice between Palestinians and Israelis? 
§ Punish Palestinians for their actions (only appeared for retributive condition) 
§ Re-establish the shared values of our communities (will only appeared for 
restorative condition)    
§ There needs to be a conflict mediation conducted by a third party 
§ The author did not discuss this issue 
Which group do you think the author belongs to? 
§ Israelis 
§ Palestinian  
§ Iranian 
 
Group identification 
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006) 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by 
moving the slider below the statements. Remember that all of your responses are 
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completely anonymous and cannot be traced back to you in any way. There are no right 
or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal opinion. 
Glorification: 
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of 
our nation 
2. All Israelis should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of our 
nation 
3. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation 
4. Israel is better than other nations in all respects 
5. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the leaders of our 
nation propose 
6. It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel 
7. Other nations can learn a lot from us 
8. The IDF is the best army in the world 
Attachment: 
1. It is important to me to contribute to my nation 
2. I am strongly committed to my nation 
3. Being Israeli is an important part of my identity 
4. It is important to me that others see me as an Israeli 
5. When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they” 
6. It is important for me to help my country 
7. It is not important to me to view myself as an Israeli 
8. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
 
Collective action 
(developed for this study) 
The following statements relate to the various efforts of Israeli to protect itself vis-à-vis 
the Palestinians, in terms of safety, the well-being and livelihood of Israelis, and the right 
to a Jewish state. Please indicate to what extent you support any of the following actions 
to protect the rights of Israelis. To express your attitude toward each statement, please 
move the cursor below each statement. We are interested in your opinions, so there are no 
right or wrong answers. 
Non-normative collective action: 
1. participate in non-violent demonstrations to support Israel’s right to defend itself 
against Palestinian aggression, even if the demonstrations are unauthorized 
2. organize sit-ins to block entrances to public buildings, or block roads or highways 
to demand all members of the Knesset to delegitimize organizations which risk 
Israel’s right to self-defense against the Palestinians 
3. participate in violent counter-protests to pro-Palestinian protests, even if this 
might lead to physical confrontation with Palestinian protesters 
4. organize protests against pro-Palestinian protests, even if it leads to violence 
against the two groups 
5. damage the property of Palestinian villages to protect Israeli settlement areas, if 
necessary 
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6. Israeli citizens directly opposing pro-Palestinian demonstrations to disperse them 
through the use of physical force 
7. Even if I don’t condone it, I accept other Israeli’s rights to conduct price-tag 
campaigns to protect Israeli settlement areas 
Normative collective action: 
1. sign petitions to advocate for the rights and well-being of Israelisshare 
information on social media to increase public support for Israel’s policies 
towards Palestinians 
2. participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Israel’s right to 
defend itself against Palestinian aggression 
3. organize lawful public opinion campaigns that counter pro-Palestinian rhetoric 
4. lobby other groups and countries to support Israel’s right to statehood 
5. lobby politicians and policy makers in Israel to strengthen measures that protect 
Israelis from Palestinian aggression 
6. join advocacy groups that focus on the protection of Israel through peaceful 
means 
 
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support) 
 
Demographic questions  
(asked in Study 1 – 3) 
What is your age?   ____ 
What is your gender? 
§ Male  
§ Female 
§ Other 
What is your citizenship status? 
§ Israeli citizen 
§ Resident alien 
§ Work or education visa 
§ Other (Please specify) 
Is Hebrew your native language? 
§ Yes  
§ No 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
Using non-violent versus violent nonnormative collective action as outcomes 
As described in foonote 17 in the manuscript, we also tested our model using the 
non-violent and violent dimensions of the nonnormative collective action measure. As 
reported below, we found consistent effects regardless of the measure used, which suggests 
that our results generalize to both forms of nonnormative collective action. 
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Using non-violent nonnormative collective action. The model fit the data well, 
χ2(3) = 5.48, p = .0140, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, NFI = .99 (n = 292). As we 
did in Study 1, we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, t = 
8.01, p < .001), retributive and restorative justice (b = -.66, t = -3.42, p < .001), and 
nonnormative and normative collective action (b = .80, t = 5.40, p < .001) to correlate, 
reflecting the conceptual idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group 
identification, notions of justice, and collective action, respectively). Consistent with the 
findings reported in the paper, glorification predicted greater retributive justice (b = .77, 
SE = .09, t = 8.99, p < .001), which predicted greater nonnormative collective action (b = 
.37, SE = .05, t = 8.09, p < .001). Attachment predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, 
SE = .07, t = 3.63, p < .001), which predicted greater normative collective action (b = .15, 
SE = .05, t = 2.95, p = .003). The indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative 
collective action via retributive justice was significant, b = .29, SE = .05, t = 6.01, p < .001. 
The indirect effect from attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice 
was marginally significant, b = .04, SE = .02, t = 2.29, p = .022. After accounting for these 
indirect paths, the direct path from glorification to nonnormative collective action was 
significant (b = .24, SE = .07, t = 3.71, p < .001), and the direct path from attachment to 
normative collective action was significant (b = .22, SE = .08, t = 2.86, p = .004). 
There were also additional paths which suggest that there was a negative 
relationship between attachment and retributive justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p < 
.001). There was also a positive relationship between glorification and normative collective 
action (b = .38, SE = .07, t = 5.28, p < .001), and between retributive justice and normative 
collective action (b = .28, SE = .04, t = 6.45, p < .001).  
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Using violent nonnormative collective action. The model fit the data well, χ2(3) 
= 9.49, p = .033, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .99, NFI = .98 (n = 292). Once again, 
we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, t = 8.01, p < .001), 
retributive and restorative justice (b = -.66, t = -3.42, p < .001), and nonnormative and 
normative collective action (b = -.04, t = -.34, p = .732) to correlate, reflecting the 
conceptual idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, notions 
of justice, and collective action, respectively). Consistent with the findings reported in the 
paper, glorification predicted greater retributive justice (b = .77, SE = .09, t = 8.99, p < 
.001), which predicted greater nonnormative collective action (b = .41, SE = .04, t = 11.06, 
p < .001). Attachment predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.63, p < 
.001), which predicted greater normative collective action (b = .11, SE = .06, t = 1.99, p = 
.046). The indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative collective action via 
retributive justice was significant, b = .31, SE = .04, t = 6.98, p < .001. The indirect effect 
from attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice was marginally 
significant, b = .03, SE = .02, t = 1.75, p = .081, and the direct effect from attachment to 
normative collective action remained significant, b = .23, SE = .08, t = 2.80, p = .005. 
There were also additional paths which suggest that there was a negative 
relationship between attachment and retributive justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p < 
.001), and between attachment and nonnormative collective action (b = -.21, SE = .06, t = 
-3.46, p < .001). There was also a positive relationship between glorification and normative 
collective action (b = .39, SE = .07, t = 5.30, p < .001), and between retributive justice and 
normative collective action (b = .28, SE = .04, t = 6.27, p < .001).  
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